Dissenting Opinion by
Justice CASTILLO.I respectfully dissent. The threshold question is our jurisdiction to review the *204appeal of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration under the Texas General Arbitration Act (the “TGAA”).1 Litigants who allege entitlement to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)2 or, in the alternative, under the TGAA, are burdened with the need to pursue parallel proceedings — a writ of mandamus from the trial court’s denial under the FAA and an interlocutory appeal under the TGAA. Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding). Where the parties designate in the arbitration agreement which statutory scheme controls, the trial court applies that choice. See D. Wilson Constr. Co. v. Cris Equip. Co., 988 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g). The disputed arbitration agreement here does not reference either the FAA or the TGAA. Mony filed parallel proceedings. See EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex.1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 391. We did not consolidate the two proceedings and render a decision disposing of both simultaneously. See In re Valero Energy Corp., 968 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding). Rather, as the majority notes, we first denied mandamus relief. However, we denied mandamus relief without holding that the FAA controls the disputed arbitration agreement.3 The majority then dismisses this parallel interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. The result is that this Court does not address the merits of the case under either statutory scheme. On this record, I would hold that our refusal to grant mandamus relief under the FAA does not preclude exercise of our jurisdiction to review and consider this interlocutory appeal under the TGAA. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 231 n. 2 (Tex.2003) (deciding case under TGAA when appellant had not filed parallel mandamus proceeding under the FAA). I then would determine if Mony met its burden to prove entitlement to enforcement of the parties’ arbitration agreement under Texas law. See Webster, 128 S.W.3d at 227-228; see also Perlstein v. D. Steller 3, Ltd., 109 S.W.3d 36, 44 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref'd) (Castillo, J., dissenting).
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 171.001-171.098 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004).
. See 9 U.S.C. § 1-307 (2003).
. I note, in the absence of any preclusive effect of our unspecified refusal to grant relief in the parallel mandamus proceeding, that the majority cites to application by this Court of the FAA to an arbitration agreement at issue in an unrelated case. See Majority Op. at 203 (citing MONY Secs. Corp. v. Durham, 83 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (combined appeal and orig. proceeding)).