We are called upon to review a ballot title for a proposed initiative measure to amend the Oregon Constitution.
The initiative measure proposes the following constitutional amendment:
“Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
“Paragraph 1. The Constitution of the State of Oregon is amended by creating a new section 40 to be added to and made a part of Article I and to read:
“Section 40 Any provision, provided by law, requiring, authorizing or relating to the imposition of the death penalty shall not be deemed to contravene section 15, Article I of this Constitution or the cruel and unusual punishment clause of section 16, Article I of this Constitution.”
Pursuant to ORS 250.035 and 250.065, the Attorney General provided a ballot title consisting of the following caption, question, and explanatory statement:
“REMOVES TWO POSSIBLE BARS IN CONSTITUTION TO DEATH PENALTY LAWS
“QUESTION: Shall section 15 and part of section 16 of Article I of the state Constitution not bar death penalty laws?
“EXPLANATION: Amends state Constitution. Existing provisions require that laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not vindictive justice and ban cruel and unusual punishments. The measure states that these provisions shall not bar laws requiring, authorizing or relating to the imposition of the death penalty.”
Petitioner challenges this ballot title as “insufficient or unfair.” ORS 250.085. We allowed the motion of Stephen Kanter to intervene and to participate in oral argument. Both petitioner and intervenor submit alternative proposals for the ballot title.
The challengers’ criticisms are directed primarily at the use of the verb “bars” and at the failure to explain the sections cited by number in the statement of the question. Petitioner argues that “bars” erroneously implies that the measure only would eliminate constitutional barriers *790to the death penalty as such, whereas it would also withdraw these restraints from measures governing the manner of executing a death penalty. The intervenor adds that the use of the constitutional section numbers “gives the voter no inkling of the substance of the Constitutional provisions” involved.
The section numbers refer to two guarantees in the Bill of Rights adopted with the original Constitution in 1859. Article I, section 15, provides: “Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” The “part of Section 16” referred to in the question drafted by the Attorney General is the guarantee against “cruel and unusual punishments.”1 Few people know Oregon’s Bill of Rights well enough to recognize these guarantees by their section numbers. We agree that the question as drafted is insufficient insofar as it uses section numbers rather than words to describe the principles at issue. The challengers offer several rewordings of the question to avoid this difficulty.2 We think the following is an accurate statement of the question presented by the proposed initiative set forth above:
*791“Shall Oregon constitutional guarantees against vindictive justice and cruel and unusual punishments not apply to death penalty laws?”
This change in the question also eliminates the ambiguity in the use of the verb “bar” criticized by petitioner. The same can be done in the explanation. “Bars” is insufficient, not because it misstates that part of the effect of the measure which it describes, but because it needlessly leaves other potential effects unmentioned. Although it is often impractical fully to describe a complex ballot measure in the space allowed by law, here there is enough space to communicate a more complete idea of its reach by adding a few words.
An examination of the proposed initiative measure shows that it does not refer to a “bar” on death penalty laws as such. Rather, it states that not only laws authorizing or requiring the death penalty shall “not be deemed to contravene” the constitutional guarantees, but also any laws “relating to the imposition of the death penalty.” How far this phrase reaches may remain an open question, but it can be read to extend beyond mere authorization of death as punishment and of the manner of execution. As to the latter, respondent agreed in oral argument that the initiative measure may well leave Oregon’s Constitution with no restraint against punishment by drawing or quartering or other historical forms of painful execution. With minor changes in the Attorney General’s draft, the explanation can describe the existing provisions and the scope of the proposed measure as follows:
“EXPLANATION: Amends State Constitution. Existing article I, sections 15 and 16 require that laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not vindictive justice and ban cruel and unusual punishments. The measure provides that these limitations shall not apply to laws requiring, authorizing, or otherwise relating to the imposition of the death penalty.”
For the reasons already stated, the caption similarly is insufficient insofar as it refers to “possible bars” to death penalty laws. Although sections 15 and 16 may only be “possible” bars to the death penalty as such, they presently apply generally to laws governing punishment for *792crime, not excluding punishment by death. The measure would remove not only a “possible bar” but exempt death penalty laws entirely from the cited provisions.
Because of the ten-word limit on the caption, this shortcoming is less easily corrected by changing a word or two in the caption as drafted. But the sequence of the words in the draft is somewhat awkward in any event, and it inaccurately suggests that sections of the constitution which may possibly bar the death penalty are being “removed” rather than that a special exemption for the death penalty is added. The following caption will correspond to the amended question and explanation set forth above:
“EXEMPTS DEATH PENALTY LAWS FROM TWO OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES”
Accordingly, we certify the following ballot title to the Secretary of State:
“EXEMPTS DEATH PENALTY LAWS FROM TWO OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
“QUESTION: Shall Oregon constitutional guarantees against vindictive justice and cruel and unusual punishments not apply to death penalty laws?
“EXPLANATION: Amends State Constitution. Existing article I, sections 15 and 16 require that laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not vindictive justice and ban cruel and unusual punishments. The measure provides that these limitations shall not apply to laws requiring, authorizing, or otherwise relating to the imposition of the death penalty.”
Or Const art I, § 16 in its entirety provides:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law, and the facts under the direction of the Court as to the law, and the right of new trial, as in civil cases.”
Petitioners proposed these alternative ballot title questions:
“Shall a death sentence which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or vindictive justice be permitted by the Oregon Constitution?”
Intervenor’s proposed ballot title questions:
“1. [quotes petitioner’s proposal]
“2. Shall the limits in the Oregon Constitution on cruel and unusual or vindictive, non-reformative, death sentences be removed?
“3. Shall the Oregon Constitution permit executions constituting cruel and unusual punishment or executions based on vindictive justice rather than reformation?
“4. Shall the Oregon Constitution permit death sentences which constitute cruel and unusual punishments, or which are non-reformative and vindictive?
“5. Shall the Oregon Constitution permit some executions constituting cruel and unusual punishment, and some executions based on vindictive justice, not reformation?”