This appeal arises from a divorce decree entered by the Faulkner County Circuit Court equally dividing, as marital property, twenty acres of land between appellant Bill Baldridge and appellee Susan Baldridge. We affirm.
It is undisputed that Susan and Bill Baldridge were married on May 5, 1989, and separated in December 2005. During their marriage, they lived in a mobile home that Bill had purchased before they were married. The mobile home was placed on approximately twenty acres in Faulkner County that was owned by Bill’s father, William Baldridge. It is also undisputed that William executed a quitclaim deed on November 3, 2004, conveying the twenty acre tract to Bill and that this deed was recorded the same day.
In dispute is a quitclaim deed executed by William on March 8, 2002, conveying the same twenty acres to both Bill and Susan, as husband and wife. The March 8, 2002 deed was recorded on February 3, 2006. At trial, William testified that he gave the twenty acres to Bill and intended for Bill to own it. He also stated that he did not remember signing or ever seeing the March 8, 2002 deed.
Bill testified that he had never seen the March 8, 2002 deed and that he did not know where Susan got it. He stated that, in an effort to divest all of his property, William gave him the twenty acres and gave his sisters other, income-producing, real estate. Finally, he stated that Susan cared for his ill mother prior to her death.
Susan testified that Bill knew about the March 8, 2002 deed but that they did not file it because “Bill wanted to make sure his dad knew we weren’t trying to take the farm away from him.” She became aware of the March 8, 2002 conveyance during the time that William was divesting all of his property. She added that she provided care to William, in addition to caring for Bill’s mother before her death.
The trial court held that the twenty acre tract was marital property because both deeds were executed during the course of the marriage. The court further held that, although there was a question raised as to the delivery of the March 8, 2002 deed there was insufficient evidence showing that it was not delivered. Therefore, the property was equally divided.
We view divorce cases de novo on the record and we will not reverse the trial court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007). Id. We defer to the superior position of the circuit court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A trial court’s decision will be upheld if the court reached the right result, even if it did not enunciate the right reason. Crowder v. Crowder, 303 Ark. 562, 798 S.W.2d 425 (1990).
On appeal, Bill first argues that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the March 8, 2002 deed was delivered. Consequently, Bill argues, the court must give effect to the November 3, 2004 deed which gifted the twenty acres to him.
As a general rule, the requisites of a valid deed are that there be competent, identifiable parties and subject matter; a valid consideration; effective words expressing the fact of transfer or grant; and formal execution and delivery. Harrison v. Loyd, 87 Ark. App. 356, 192 S.W.3d 257 (2004). A deed is inoperative unless there is a valid delivery. Wilson v. McDaniel, 247 Ark. 1036, 1038, 449 S.W.2d 944, 946 (1970). Further, a presumption of a valid delivery attaches when a deed is recorded. Corzine v. Forsythe, 263 Ark. 161, 163, 563 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1978). This presumption, however, is not conclusively established when there is proof of other factors pertaining to the deed which may rebut the presumption. Crowder, supra. It has been consistently held that, in a proceeding to cancel a solemn deed, on the theory of non-delivery or otherwise, the quantum of proof required must rise above a preponderance of the testimony; it must be clear, cogent, and convincing. Simmons v. Murphy, 235 Ark. 519, 522, 360 S.W.2d 765, 766 (1962).
The trial court did not err in finding that the March 8, 2002 deed was delivered. It was presumed delivered because it was recorded, and Bill had the burden of rebutting the presumption of delivery. The trial court properly reviewed and weighed the evidence and then found that Bill failed to meet his burden. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the March 8, 2002 deed was delivered. We also affirm its finding that the twenty acres was subject to equitable division because it was marital property.
Bill’s second argument is that the twenty acre tract is not marital property because it was gifted to him pursuant to the November 3, 2004 deed. We do not address this argument because we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the March 8, 2002 deed was delivered, thereby conveying ownership in the twenty acre tract to Bill and Susan.
Affirmed.
Pittman, C.J., and Robbins, Glover, and Baker, JJ., agree. Hart, J., dissents.