concurring:
While I agree that the judgment of the trial court sustaining appellees’ demurrer must be reversed, it is my opinion that the declaration, as currently drawn and without the need for any further amendment, sets forth facts sufficient to establish a cause of action against the *71engineering firms on the theory that they voluntarily assumed and then breached a duty of care toward appellant Krieger, independent of any contractual obligations appellees may have undertaken in their agreements with the State Roads Commission.
In paragraph 19a of his declaration, Krieger alleged that appellees were under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in inspecting and supervising the construction of the Francis Scott Key Bridge for the protection of persons who might foreseeably be injured by appellees’ failure to exercise such care. Appellant then goes on to allege in paragraph 19b that appellees:
“[A jssumed said duty of care by their contract with the State Roads Commission, wherein they duly covenanted not only to see that the bridge conformed to contract specifications, but they also agreed to control the day to day methods and procedures utilized by contractors in doing the work in that:
“4.) [Appellees] had exercised their right to stop the work on numerous other occasions when said work ... was being performed in a negligent and dangerous manner which was unsafe for the workmen employed on the project.”
The majority apparently interprets the quoted portion to mean that the voluntary acts of appellees were carried out pursuant to their contracts with the Roads Commission under which the engineering firms clearly had no duty to supervise the contractors’ methods.1 Read literally, the declaration would appear to support the majority’s view. On closer scrutiny, however, it is quite obvious that the allegations concerning appellees’ previous conduct in stopping work for the safety of workmen were not based on any contractually assumed duty. Rather such allegations relate to events which *72transpired after the contracts had been executed and performance actually begun.
Assuming, as we must, the truth of all well pleaded facts and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom, Zion Evang. Luth. Ch. v. St. Hwy. Adm., 276 Md. 630, 632, 350 A. 2d 125 (1976); Citizens P. & H. Ass’n v. County Exec., 273 Md. 333, 337-38, 329 A. 2d 681 (1974), I can only read paragraph 19 to mean that appellees, for whatever reason, unilaterally took it upon themselves on numerous occasions to halt construction on the bridge in order to protect workmen on the job site. It is settled tort law that once a person gratuitously embarks upon a course of conduct intended to protect another person or class of persons whom he was under no preexisting legal duty to protect, he must conduct himself in a reasonable and prudent fashion; and his failure to do so will subject him to liability for damages if injury proximately results. Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 253-54, 203 A. 2d 861, 10 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1964); Penna. R.R. Co. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 176-77, 129 A. 36, 41 A.L.R. 398 (1925). And see Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Company, 248 F. Supp. 588, 592 (D. Md. 1965), aff’d, 363 F. 2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966) (applying Maryland law); Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, 8 Cal. 3d 551, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358, 503 P. 2d 1366, 1370 (1972); Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161, 362 N.E.2d 960, 964 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).
Having assumed a duty of care towards Krieger, appellees then are said to have breached this duty when they failed to warn the subcontractor of the hazardous condition and failed to stop work on the column after they had either seen or should have seen that Bildot Steel Corporation had failed properly to secure and weld the steel reinforcing bars which ultimately collapsed on appellant. Surely these allegations were sufficient, if true, to make out a prima facie case for recovery against appellees.
Appellees contend that Krieger was required to allege in his declaration that Bildot had been led to rely on appellees’ oversight by reason of their past acts in stopping work for job safety purposes, and that in the face of such reliance *73appellees could not casually abandon their previously assumed responsibilities. Suffice it to say, that for purposes of pleading it was not necessary for appellant to allege reliance on the part of Bildot or any other person. The rule remains that whenever a person voluntarily assumes a duty of care, he must thereafter act reasonably. While reliance on the part of the victim or a third party may be relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the volunteer’s conduct, it is not a necessary element of the cause of action. Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 246 (D. D.C. 1974) (applying Maryland law); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 56, at 347-48 (4th ed. 1971). Contra, Chisolm v. Stephens, 47 Ill. App.3d 999, 7 Ill. Dec. 795, 365 N.E.2d 80, 86 (1977).
Accordingly, on remand I would not require appellees to amend their declaration in order to state a cause of action for breach of a voluntarily assumed duty of care. Judge Eldridge authorizes me to state that he joins this opinion.
. But see Slifer v. Wheeler & Lewis, Colo. App., 567 P. 2d 388, 892 (1977), cert. granted, (holding that architect owed duty of care to construction workers at job site under contract provisions very similar to those involved in the instant case).