concurring and dissenting. I agree with the majority opinion in all particulars, except I believe that the so-called discovery rule should be adopted as the law of this jurisdiction. In my view, the discovery rule provides the appropriate standard for ascertaining when the cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. 12 V.S.A. § 511. I am unable to hide behind the majority’s reasoning that inertia on the part of the Legislature bars us from overruling Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931). “Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent.” Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966). This is especially true in view of the changes that have occurred since 1931.1 find it particularly compelling that the Legislature has overruled the precise holding in Murray by enacting the discovery rule for all injuries to the person caused by the act or default of another. 12 V.S.A. § 512(4).
The majority acknowledges that the modern trend of the law is towards the adoption of the discovery rule, and their view is amply supported by well-reasoned authority in the decisional law of sister states. Accountants: Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967); Isaacson, Stolper & Co. v. Artisan’s Savings Bank, 330 A.2d 130 (Del. 1974); Chisholm v. *609Scott, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300 (1974); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967). Architects: Housing Authority of Limon v. Leo A. Daley Co., 35 Colo. App. 244, 533 P.2d 937 (1975); Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588 (1975); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967). Attorneys: Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974). Designers and Engineers: Hunt v. Star Photo Finishing Co., 115 Ga. App. 1, 153 S.E.2d 602 (1967); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (1969); Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970). Surveyors: Doyle v. Linn, 37 Colo. App. 214, 547 P.2d 257 (1975); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968).
In the case at bar, the nature of the defect or injury is inherently unknown and latent in nature. Much of the defendants’ work was done out of plaintiffs view. Moreover, the plaintiff is not an expert and should not be expected to recognize the expert defendants’ negligence or the breach of their contractual duties. Nor should the plaintiff be expected to hire an expert to do the same. Hendrickson v. Sears, supra, 365 Mass, at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135. To say that a cause of action accrues to a person or legal entity when the person or entity may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, that it accrues before the person or entity has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. One cannot maintain an action before one knows there is one. To say to one who has been wronged, “You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,” makes a mockery of the law. In the absence of an express statutory direction to that effect, to ascribe this meaning to the word “accrue” is unreasonable. Berry v. Branner, supra, 245 Or. at 312, 412 P.2d at 998.
This Court stated in Union School District No. 20 v. Lench, 134 Vt. 424, 427, 365 A.2d 508, 511 (1976) that “[a]bsent legislative action in fields other than medical malpractice, it may become necessary to reappraise the holding in Murray.” Now is the time to do so. In cases involving negligence and breach of contractual duties by professionals and experts, *610including architects, contractors, and roofing experts, a cause of action should accrue under 12 V.S.A. § 511 on the date the injury or damage is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered. There are compelling equitable and policy considerations for adopting the discovery rule. Murray v. Allen, supra, should now be overruled.