dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the court’s resolution of both issues raised by the petition for certiorari. I think the scope of the planning board’s authority must be considered in light of the State enabling act, RSA 36:19-30, and the particular regulations enacted pursuant to it by the town of Newbury. Levin v. Livingston Tp., 35 N.J. 500, 173 A.2d 391 (1961). The first sentence of RSA 36:21 provides that planning boards, in order to exercise any power, “shall” enact regulations. Following this is an extensive list of items which the regulations “may” cover. The clear import of these sections is that towns must first promulgate regulations and, once promulgated, the towns themselves are bound by them. Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and Planning Bd., 344 Mass. 329, 182 N.E.2d 540 (1962); 3 A. Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning § 9, at 71-82 (1972).
I do not think section V C of the subdivision regulations applies to this petitioner’s property and I do not think it should be construed as a general grant of discretionary police power to the board. The provision was obviously designed *403to act prospectively and to prevent structures from being-built on land which is not suited for them. I can find no evidence, other than the board’s actual denial of the permit, that the plot in question “cannot be safely used for building purposes”, poses an “exceptional danger to health or peril from fire”, or is even “being platted” in the prospective sense. Indeed, the existence and use of the structures on this land for the last twenty years belies the reasonableness of any of these inferences. Since these regulations stand in derogation of important property rights, they should be construed strictly and they should not be extended by implication. 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning §§ 12.02,12.03(1968); see Leda Lanes Realty, Inc. v. Nashua, 112 N.H. 244, 293 A.2d 320 (1972).
On the second issue, I concede that petitioner’s lot is a nonconforming use in that one of the structures is within 30 feet of a public right of way. But the sale of half the lot in no way represents an extension of that use. One of petitioner’s primary arguments, which the court ignores, is that the particular regulations at issue do not apply to his subdivision. Article II of the zoning ordinance provides, “[t]his regulation does not affect existing land use and/or regulations.” Article V C, specifying requirements for lakeshore property, states that, “[e]very new dwelling shall have a lakeshore frontage of not less than seventy-five (75) feet and a lot area of not less than twenty thousand (20,000) square feet.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, by their express and unambiguous terms, the particular regulations, which the majority thinks the property as divided violates, do not even apply to petitioner’s property.
Secondly, even if the word “new”, were not in the regulations, this sale would not be an extension of a nonconforming use. Authority is overwhelming that a mere change from tenant occupancy to owner occupancy is not an extension of a nonconforming use. Beers v. Board of Adjustment, 75 N.J. Super. 305, 183 A.2d 130 (1962); MacLean v. Planning Bd., 94 N.J. Super. 288, 228 A.2d 85 (1967); 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 6.35 (1968). I think the proper approach to this issue is to consider the actual use of the property before and after the subdivision. Petitioner’s land *404for the last twenty years has in effect been used as two separate lots. Access, frontage and lot size for the three structures would be the same after the subdivision as it was before. A change of title, therefore, makes no difference. The conclusion that splitting ownership would “substantially change the nature and extent of the previous use” strikes me as illogical.