*592OPINION OF THE COURT BY
WAKATSUKI, J.Following a bench trial, Defendant Michael H. Wallace was convicted of first degree burglary. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-810(l)(c) (1985).
Defendant did not concede that he committed the burglary in question. Prior to trial, however, he filed a notice of intention to rely on the defense of mental irresponsibility. In accordance with HRS § 704-404 (1985 and Supp. 1989), a panel of examiners was appointed to examine and report on Defendant’s physical and mental condition.
At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal which was denied. Thereafter, four experts testified as to Defendant’s mental condition. Although all agreed that Defendant had a frontal lobe dysfunction, they disagreed as to whether this substantially impaired Defendant’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
The prosecutor asked these experts what Defendant had told them about the burglary with which he was charged. For example, *593the prosecutor asked Dr. Knight whether Defendant indicated whether or not he was under the influence of drugs at the time the burglary was committed, whether Dr. Knight and Defendant talked about the burglary, and what Defendant had related to Dr. Knight about the burglary. To Dr. Altman, the prosecutor posed the question whether Defendant was able to remember:the burglary incident. Over defense objection, the trial court permitted the questions for the limited purpose of explaining Defendant’s mental condition. Defendant contends on appeal that this constituted reversible error. We agree.
According to the State, the questions were asked not for the purpose of establishing the fact that Defendant committed the burglary, but rather to test the experts’ foundations and findings of Defendant’s capacity or lack of capacity. For this reason, the trial court held that Defendant’s statements to the experts were admissible on the issue of Defendant’s mental condition.
The plain reading of HRS § 704-416 (1985) convinces us that the trial court erred. It provides:
Statements for purposes of examination or treatment inadmissible except on issue of physical or mental condition. A statement made by a person subjected to examination or treatment pursuant to this chapter for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any penal proceeding on any issue other than that of his physical or mental condition, but it shall be admissible upon that issue, whether or not it would otherwise be deemed a privileged communication, unless such statement constitutes an admission of guilt of the offense charged. (Emphasis added.)
The last clause of the statute is explicit that if a statement is an admission of guilt, then it is not admissible, even on the issue of *594Defendant’s mental condition. The Commentary on § 704-416 states:
The final clause of this section provides that any statement made for the purpose of examination and treatment pursuant to this chapter, which constitutes an admission of guilt of the offense charged, in addition to being inadmissible on other issues, will also not be admissible in evidence on the issue of defendant’s mental or physical condition.
“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute.” Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 215-16, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984). Obviously, the State and trial court would treat the last clause of HRS § 704^-16 as superfluous and void contrary to the rule of statutory construction.
Although no one testified that Defendant said, “I admit I committed the burglary,” it cannot be seriously contended that the questions asked by the prosecutor did not elicit what would clearly be admissions of Defendant’s guilt. We hold that Defendant’s statements made to the experts about the burglary which amounted to confessions were inadmissible.
We recognize that HRS § 704-416 is incompatible with Rule 702.1, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, which permits an expert to be examined about the facts and data underlying his or her opinion. “Where a plainly irreconcilable conflict exists between a law of general application and a law of specific application concerning the same subject matter, the specific authority will be favored.” State v. Greysott, 70 Haw. 227, 235, 768 P.2d 759, 763-64. Here, HRS § 704-416 which specifically precludes the admission of *595Defendant’s statements to the experts overrides Rule 702.1, HRE, a rule of general application.
Peter Van Name Esser of Peterson & Esser for defendant-appellant. Vickie L. Silberstein, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff-appellee.The State’s other arguments are without merit. Defendant’s conviction is vacated and this case is remanded for a new trial.