dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s affirmance of the superior court’s order denying Beavers’ Motion to Accept Late Appeal. I would remand for a factual determination as to whether Beavers’ initial attorney’s failure to file a timely appeal was a tactical decision, of which Beavers was aware. In the event that the superior court determines counsel’s failure to file a timely appeal was not a consequence of a tactical decision, and that Beavers believed in good faith that his attorney would file an appeal, I would direct the superior court to allow the late appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 502(b). I base this approach on my dissent in Rill v. State, Department of Highways, 669 P.2d 573 (Alaska 1983). There I concluded that Civil Rule 60(b)(1)
can properly' be read to include within the notion of ‘excusable neglect’ instances in which an attorney wholly fails to represent the client’s interests, assuming the client reasonably believed the attorney would provide such representation.
Id. at 578-79 (footnote omitted).