(dissenting) — The issue before the court is whether the Seattle landmarks preservation ordinance 106348 (Seattle Municipal Code 25.12), under the authority of which the church building owned by and housing the plaintiff has been declared a landmark (see Seattle ordinance 112425), unconstitutionally impinges upon plaintiff's right to its free exercise of religion. U.S. Const, amend. 1; see also Const, art. 1, § 11 (amend. 34). I would hold that it does not.
In contrast to the extended analysis of the majority, I believe the case can be decided easily and summarily. Particularly in cases of this nature the court should render a decision only on those issues necessary to decide the case.
The pertinent language of the ordinance designating the First Covenant Church building as a landmark (Seattle ordinance 112425) is as follows:
[N]othing herein shall prevent any alteration of the exterior when such alterations are necessitated by changes in liturgy, it being understood that the owner is the exclusive authority on liturgy and is the decisive party in determining what architectural changes are appropriate to the liturgy. When alterations necessitated by changes in liturgy are proposed, the owner shall advise the Landmarks Preservation Board in writing of the nature of the proposed alterations and, the Board shall issue a Certificate of Approval. Prior to the issuance of any Certificate, however, the Board and owner shall jointly explore such possible alternative design solutions as may be appropriate or necessary to preserve the designated features of the landmark.
(Italics mine.)
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant stated:
Any changes that First Covenant chooses to make to the exterior of the structure for religious purposes are exempted from the normal landmarks review and approval requirement. As *418written, therefore, the imposed controls cannot interfere with First Covenant's free exercise of religion.
(Italics mine.)
By this statement, which is surely in the interest of the plaintiff, the City has given its interpretation of the term "liturgical exception" in the ordinance designating the First Covenant Church as a landmark. Thus, all this court need do is confirm the interpretation of the City, and the City will be bound to that position. If this is done, the ordinance on its face would not threaten the use made of the building by the congregation or changes made in the exterior of the building so long as any uses or changes are for religious purposes. Since this, as I understand it, is the real concern of the plaintiff, if this approach were adopted, the case of the plaintiff would collapse.
As to other questions which plaintiff may have as to the validity of the ordinance, there is neither a justiciable controversy (Spokane v. Taxpayers, 111 Wn.2d 91, 758 P.2d 480 (1988)) nor is the matter ripe for litigation (Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,148-49,18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967)). Finally, to suggest that the requirement the church and landmarks board "shall jointly explore such possible alternative design solutions as may be appropriate or necessary to preserve the designated features of the landmark" (majority, at 408) is an excessive burden on the "free exercise of religion" is to trivialize the great protections of the First Amendment.
I would affirm the trial court. This court should by its opinion confirm the interpretation by the City of Seattle landmarks preservation ordinance 106348 and hold the ordinance does not apply to any changes made to the First Covenant Church for "religious purposes". The discussion of other issues raised by the landmarks preservation ordinance, including the effect of a decision by plaintiff to use *419or sell its property for "nonreligious purposes", should wait until another day.
Brachtenbach and Smith, JJ., and Baker, J. Pro Tem., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied September 12, 1990.