The opinion of the court was delivered by
Wachenfeld, J.The Ethics and Grievance Committee of Bergen County, on a complaint made, held a formal hearing and took the testimony of the parties in interest and others, after which it unanimously submitted a presentment setting forth:
“* * * this Committee is of the opinion that the said attorney, Herman G-. Honig, is guilty of unethical and improper conduct in that he abused and took advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client for bis own personal benefit and gain and that he failed to respect the trust reposed in him by his client.”
As a result, we issued an order to show cause, directed to the respondent, why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
He is an attorney and counsellor at law practicing in Waldwicb and was also the municipal magistrate of the Borough of Allendale in Bergen County.
*76The disciplinary proceedings were initiated by Leon R. Kornhoff, a real estate broker.
In the fall of 1950, Kornhoff was critically ill and intended to enter a hospital for a serious operation. He was also in financial difficulty and made an agreement with a friend of his, Berkowitz, whereby he was going to convey his property to Mr. Berkowitz and “* * * in three months’ time, if I don’t sell it, or redeem it, he keeps it.”
For the purpose, of having this deed prepared, Kornhoff, on Saturday, November 25, 1950, the day he was to be hospitalized, called at the office .of the respondent, H onig, whom he had known for some ten years and who' on prior occasions ■ had done legal work for him. Honig warned Kornhoff that under the proposed arrangements he was in danger of losing ■.his house to Berkowitz and offered to gUe Kornhoff a iCbetter break.”
The testimony is at variance as to Honig’s proposal. According to Kornhoff, he understood Honig was to take over the property, with Kornhoff and his aged mother, who dwelt with him, having the right to live there rent free for one year, he retaining the right to redeem his property any time within the year by reimbursing Honig for all expenses; if Kornhoff did not survive the operation, the house was to be sold and, after deducting his disbursements and outlays, Honig was to turn the balance of the proceeds over to the mother.
Honjg’s version, which we are inclined to believe, was that in return for an absolute conveyance of the property he agreed to provide Kornhoff and his mother with a place to live for one year, he paying all the overhead expenses.
In any event, Honig actually prepared a deed for the property to himself and Kornhoff executed it. He also prepared and had executed an agreement between them which read:
“For and in consideration of legal services rendered and the assumption of the mortgage now on the premises known as (description) *77and the nse and occupancy of said premises for a period of one year from the date hereof,
I, the said Leon It. Kornhoif, do hereby agree to convey the hereinabove premises to Herman G. Honig and I, Herman G. Honig, do hereby agree to accept the aforesaid conveyance under the terms above set forth.”
At this time there was no money owing to Honig from Kornhoff for legal services.
Honig thereupon had the deed executed by Kornhoff’s wife, from whom Kornhoff was separated, on the payment to her of $250, and had it recorded, showing himself as the unconditional owner of the property.
We think the respondent thus entered into an unconscionable bargain with a client who was without independent advice, was distraught by the possibilities of death in an impending operation and beset with financial difficulties. The oppressiveness of the transaction is indicated by the fact there was apparently a substantial equity in the property. Kornhoff estimated the value of - the realty at $21,000 while the respondent’s witness, also a real estate broker, placed it at $15,000. There was a balance outstanding on the mortgage against it of less than $9,800, with two payments of $93 each being in default.
Because of a hurricane and blocked roads, Kornhoff was prevented from going to the hospital on the appointed date but went the following day. The operation was successful and in a month Kornhoff returned home.
During the next two months Honig called on Kornhoff on several occasions and during their conversations no conflict of ideas as to the status of the property was expressed. Late in Eebruary or early in March, Honig received a notice from his landlord discontinuing his tenancy and approached Kornhoff with respect to the latter’s vacating his home in favor of Honig, who offered to compensate him financially for the balance of the agreed one-year term of occupancy.'
Kornhoff did not assent to this proposal and retained another attorney, and on March 8, 1951, a letter was sent to *78Honig offering to pay him whatever sums were dne in connection with the property and demanding a reconveyance. Honig wrote in reply that he expected Kornhoff to live up to the terms of the contract and the deed executed on November 25, 1950.
Negotiations being unsuccessful, an action was instituted on behalf of Kornhoff against Honig to recover the property. It was eventually settled by Kornhoff reimbursing Honig for all money expended by him in connection with the property and in addition paying Honig $600. Honig then reconveyed the property to his erstwhile client.
The respondent admits his behavior in this matter “is subject to some criticism.” We find his conduct is a violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. By Rule 1:7-6, made to govern the conduct of the members of the bar of this State, “The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.”
All fiduciaries are held to a duty of fairness, good faith and fidelity, but an attorney is held to an even higher degree of responsibility in these matters than is required of all others. 536 Broad St. Corp. v. Valco Mtge. Co., Inc., 135 N. J. Eq. 361 (Ch. 1944), affirmed o. b. 138 N. J. Eq. 431 (E. & A. 1946). See also Dunn v. Dunn, 42 N. J. Eq. 431 (E. & A. 1886); Crocheron v. Savage, 75 N. J. Eq. 589 (E. & A. 1909); Presbyterian Church v. Plainfield Trust Co., 139 N. J. Eq. 501 (Ch. 1947); 7 C. J. S. 964, Attorney & Client, Sec. 127; 5 Am. Jur. 287, Attorneys at Law, Secs. 48 and 49.
A member of the bar must act in good faith and deal fairly with his clients. He is not privileged to exercise an advantage which will in any respect prove detrimental to his client's interests.
The respondent's over-reaching was occasioned by the application of a false standard of comparison. He thought, inasmuch as his offer was better than the one already made to *79his client, he was justified in arranging the terms ultimately agreed upon.
As to the client, we think because of his 25 years’ experience in the real estate business he was fully cognizant of the transaction and fully consented to it, but this does not exonerate the respondent.
The exigencies of the situation are stressed by respondent’s counsel, contending Honig had to act quickly and “in acting quickly he acted erroneously.” Even if this be true, there wás a noticeable reluctance, as a matter of fact a direct refusal, to release what he had acquired when he was subsequently asked for a return of the property.
We are in accord with the findings of the Bergen County Ethics and Grievance Committee that the respondent was guilty of improper conduct and we so find.
The punishment'to be imposed always presents a difficult and distasteful task but the obligation is nevertheless ours. Although the respondent’s conduct trespassed upon the high standard established, there were some mitigating circumstances that equity and fairness direct should be given consideration.
The respondent has been a member of the bar in good standing for 24 years and bears a good reputation in the community in which he lives. He returned to Kornhoff, at our suggestion, the $600 previously paid him- in settlement, for which he had a general release that would have barred such a recovery. His resignation as a magistrate of the Municipal Court of the Borough of Allendale while this proceeding against him was pending removes the necessity of our considering any further question with respect thereto and is an indication of his belated realization of the impropriety of his conduct. His self-removal reflects repentance, which in turn adumbrates the possibility of a moral awakening.
Our judgment is that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and until the further order of this court.