dissenting. I cannot agree with the court’s construction. It holds that Mabel had a vested equitable life estate in income not used by the trustees for her support. This means that Mabel in her lifetime could have demanded that the trustees pay over such income to her. I submit that it is difficult to find good warrant for such a construction in the language of the residuary clause itself. There is nothing in that clause which even suggests that the trustees are obligated to pay anything to Mabel. The direction to them is to use the income and if need be the principal “for the comfortable support of my said daughter during her *345life.” Moreover the whole context of the residuary clause strongly negatives the view that the testator intended Mabel should personally receive any income from his estate.
There is no question that Mabel was the chief object of his bounty. We said so when this same will was recently before us for the construction of another portion of the residuary clause. Carpenter v. Smith, 77 R. I. 358, 75 A.2d 413. But we also said in that opinion that the testator “hád no particular interest in his own relatives as such,” and had left the bulk of his residuary estate, in the event of Mabel’s death without issue surviving, “to certain intimate friends and to a charity.” While his dominant intent was to provide for her welfare it was limited to securing comfortable support for her during her life, and did not extend to her heirs generally. Apparently he was desirous that if she should die without issue the major part of the trust estate which he had set up for her personal benefit during her life should go to strangers in blood. In such event he expressly provided that only one eighth should ultimately go to those who were his legal representatives at the time of his decease.
In the light of that express disposition and in the face of the testator’s express direction' that the income shall be used by the trustees, it is not easy to credit him with an intention to give to Mabel for her personal use any portion of the income not needed for her “comfortable support.” A more reasonable deduction from the circumstances, it seems to me, is that he intended that such surplus income, if any, should be conserved in the hands of the trustees. In that way his dominant intent to provide for her future welfare would be given stronger effect by making the provision therefor more secure.
In my opinion the testator’s concern for Mabel’s future financial security, especially in view of the unfortunate condition of her health, was SO' intense that it precludes any reasonable inference of an intention that she should personally receive the income which was not expended for her “comfortable support.” Rather it is reasonable to assume *346that if such surplus income became available he would wish it to be retained by his trustees for reinvestment, thus strengthening the trust fund which he had set up to assure Mabel’s future security. As was said in our earlier opinion above cited, this concern of the testator was paramount. It ranks with his intent to place his entire residuary estate at the disposal of his trustees, if need be, to provide for Mabel’s support during her life.
For reasons sufficient to him the testator did not give Mabel directly any portion of his estate notwithstanding that she was thirty years of age when he executed his will. Apparently he did not think that in her peculiar circumstances it would benefit her to receive funds personally. To carry out that conviction he set up the trust for her “comfortable support” during her life and nominated as trustees certain persons in whom he reposed great confidence. To those trustees he gave extensive powers commensurate with that confidence. After having done those things it is quite unlikely, it seems to- me, that he could have intended that Mabel should be given any portion of the income, however great, for her own personal use.
I shall not prolong this opinion by further discussion of the testator’s intention or by an extended treatment of the .law applicable to my construction of the testamentary language. Nor shall I burden the opinion with citation of authorities which lend support to my view. Suffice it to say that such authorities are discussed in the majority opinion and while they are rejected there I am of the opinion that they furnish good ground upon which to base the construction I favor here.
My construction is based almost wholly upon the intention of the testator as disclosed by the language he has used in his will. Where that intention can be deduced from the testamentary language and it violates no rule of law it is not necessary to resort to other rules of -construction to ascertain such intent. In my opinion it was the intention of the testator not to give any unexpended income of the trust fund *347to Mabel but to have the trustees retain it for reinvestment as a part of the principal.
Swan, Keeney & Smith, Frederick W. O’Connell, Ernest A. Jenckes, for complainants. Sherwood & Clifford, Sidney Clifford, Raymond E. Jordan, Charles H. Drummey, Edwards & Angelí, Elmer E. Tufts, Jr., Wilfrid E. McKenna, William S. Flynn, Elmer S. Chace, James J. Corrigan, Francis M. Flaherty, City Solicitor of Attleboro, Massachusetts, for various respondents.On Motion for Reargument.
JUNE 13, 1952.
Per Curiam.After our opinion in the above cause was filed certain respondents requested and received permission to present a motion for leave to reargue. Pursuant thereto they have filed such a motion, stating therein certain reasons on which they base their contention that justice requires a reargument of the cause. We have carefully considered those reasons and we are of the opinion that they suggest no point which we have not already considered or which in the circumstances warrants such reargument.
The said respondents’ motion is denied, and on-June 18, 1952 the parties may present to this court for approval a form of decree, in accordance with the opinion, to be entered in the superior court.