Opinion by
Me. Justice Mush anno,In 1947 the School Board of the Borough of Ephrata, which has 8,000 inhabitants, 2 elementary schools and a high school, ordered a school census for the purpose of determining its future school building requirements. From this census it was calculated that by the beginning of the 1952-53 term, another school building containing three rooms for three grades and accommodating from 60 to 65 students would be required. For the 1953-54 term 3 more rooms would be needed.
On July 10, 1950, the School Board met and decided to purchase the land of the plaintiffs, known as the Winger Farm, for the school building intended, and to this end offered the owners of the farm, the plaintiffs in this case, |22,500, which the plaintiffs declined. On December 4, 1950, the School Board met again in this matter and adopted a resolution authorizing the acquisition by condemnation proceedings of the property in question, which embraced 54.894 acres.
The plaintiffs filed a bill of complaint in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas for an injunction restraining the School Directors of the School District of the Borough of Ephrata and the School District of the Borough of Ephrata, more conveniently referred to herein as the School Board, from initiating eminent domain proceedings against the Winger Farm. The Bill of Complaint was dismissed and an appeal to this Court followed.
The Public School Code of 1949, P. L. 30, Art. VII, sec. 703 (24 P.S. sec. 7-703) provides inter alia that: *244“. . . the board of school directors of each district is hereby vested with the necessary power and authority to acquire, in the name of the district, by . . . condemnation . . . any and all such real estate, either vacant or occupied,... as the board of school directors may deem necessary to furnish suitable sites for proper school purposes for said district. . .”
The appellants do not question, and indeed cannot question, that the School Board has the power by this statute and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth itself, to take private property for school building purposes. They do, however, challenge the extent of that power, and properly so. There is no authority under our form of government that is unlimited. The genius of our democracy springs from the bedrock foundation on which rests the proposition that office is held by no one whose orders, commands or directives are not subject to review. The power of eminent domain, next to that of conscription of man power for war, is the most awesome grant of power under the law of the land. Article 1, Section 10 of our Pennsylvania Constitution, declares: “. . . nor shall private property be. taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured.”
It is to be emphasized, however, that the restriction in this clause is not limited to the guarantee of just compensation. The condemnation may not take place at all without authority of law.
Did the School Board of Ephrata have authority of law to take 55 acres of land for a school building which would accommodate 65 pupils?
Although the Board here proceeded vigorously in the assumed interests of the people of the borough, the zeal exercised in the execution of its duties was as excessive *245as its knowledge of the law applicable to the situation was lacking.
One witness testified, for instance, that the vice president of the Board said that the Board could take more land than it needed for the school building and then sell what remained over. Obviously no school board can, even in this indirect fashion, go into the real estate business.
The record shows quite clearly that the Board moved precipitately and without adequate preparation for the exercise of so solemn a power as that of eminent domain. No definite plans had been formulated as to the use to be made of the 55 acres. Although the Board knew that so vast an acreage could swallow up one building and many more, no specifications as to the proposed building had yet been indicated; no architect had been retained, and no surveys of the property had been made. Nor had any definitive location on the tract been designated for the intended structure. A bond issue of |150,0Q0 had been approved at the election of November, 1950, for the purpose of purchasing land and constructing a school building, but no estimate of construction costs was yet available.
The darkness in which the directors moved in this most serious business of condemnation of private property was further evidenced by the fact that, although it was generally admitted 55 acres was excessive acreage for the public use intended, the directors were prepared to condemn 71 acres for that purpose had they known the plaintiffs owned an additional tract of 16 acres, title to which was not recorded at the time. Director R. Y. Grube testified: “Q. Would you have voted for that resolution if you had known there was an additional 16 acres, I am talking about the condemnation resolution? A. I don’t think anyone knew. Q. Would you have voted for all of the farm? A. I would have. Q. To *246take 71% acres? A. I would have, you can never get too much land”. (Italics supplied) This statement was made despite the general knowledge that the City of Lancaster had constructed a school building of 22 classrooms, administrative offices, health and music departments, library, gymnasium, locker and shower rooms, club room, lunch room, kitchen and auditorium on a plot of land covering only 12 acres.
The members of the Ephrata School Board envisaged a vaguely formed program for the future which would encompass additional rooms to the building to be erected, a junior high school and a football field. But there was no money in the treasury or even in thought for such a program. The Lancaster School Building hereinbefore referred to cost $850,000.
The State Council of Education had approved the condemnation of the 55 acre tract, but this is no evidence of necessity for the condemnation since, as Dr. Bowman, who had been with the Department of Education for 33 years and now occupies an important post in that department, testified, the Council never denied approval of a site because it was too large. He further stated that the minimum requirement established by the State Council of Education as to the size of school sites for elementary schools was two acres for a two-room school and one additional acre for each additional fifty students, and that he would have approved the erection of the Ephrata proposed school on a 10 acre tract.
Although there is a presumption that school directors perform discretionary acts in the interests of public welfare and that their decisions have been reached by the exercise of intelligent judgment and in a legal manner after suitable investigation (Hibbs v. Arensberg, 276 Pa. 24, 119 A. 727), the evidence in this case overcomes that presumption and leads inevitably to the conclusion that the action of the School Board of *247Ephrata constituted an abuse of discretion in its exercise of the power of eminent domain.
It was very early held by this Court in Lance’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 16, 25, that: “The right of the Commonwealth to take private property without the owner’s assent on compensation made, or authorize it to be taken, exists in her sovereign right of eminent domain, and can never be lawfully exercised but for a public purpose — supposed and intended to benefit the public, either mediately or immediately. The power arises out of the natural principle which teaches that private convenience must yield to the public wants. This public interest must lie at the basis of the exercise, or it would be confiscation and usurpation to exercise it. This being the reason for the exercise of such a power, it requires no argument to prove that after the right has been exercised the use of the property must be held in accordance with and for the purposes which justified its taking. Otherwise it would be a fraud on the owner, and an abuse of power. . . . The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the state or its authorized grantee, is necessarily in derogation of private right, and the rule in that case is, that the authority is to be strictly construed: Dwarris on Stat. 750; 2 Casey 355; 3 Id. 339; 7 Harris 711. What is not granted is not to be exercised.
In the celebrated case of Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 56, 88 A. 904, this Court declared unconstitutional an Act of the General Assembly which empowered the City of Philadelphia to condemn certain lands which it could then resell to private persons with certain easement conditions. Justice Mestrezat, speaking for the Court, said: “Holding, as Ave do, that the use to be made of property located outside a public highway is not a public use for which private property may be taken by the city against *248the consent of the owner, the effect of the Act of 1907 authorizing the appropriation of property for such purpose is to permit by the exercise of eminent domain the taking of the property of one citizen without his consent and vesting the title thereto in another. No court in this country has yet sanctioned such action by the State or its representative exercising the power of eminent domain.”
What the Legislature cannot do, a, fortiori a school district may not do.
This decision is not intended to restrict the defendants in taking such action, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be necessary to meet the needs of the School District of the Borough of Ephrata.
Decree reversed, costs to be paid by appellees.