I concur in the judgment for the reasons discussed below. I do not concur in the majority’s analysis, which implies an inappropriate expansion of the duty of school employees to control the conduct of students with regard to nonstudents, based on an ill-conceived analogy to the broad duty of a parent to control a child.
I
Plaintiff Frederick Hoff, a nonstudent, was injured across the street from a public high school when he was struck by a car driven by Jason Lozano, a student exiting the school parking lot at Vacaville High School. Lozano, a licensed driver, lost control of his car as he drove out of the campus overflow parking lot onto West Monte Vista Avenue and struck Hoff, who was on the sidewalk across the street from the school, causing serious injuries. There was no adult supervisor monitoring the flow of traffic from the lot.
We granted review to address the legal question whether the school district could be held liable for such injury, based on the duty of teachers and other certified employees of a school district to supervise students in their care. I conclude that the answer is no. Although school district employees are obligated to supervise student conduct on school premises during the school day, they do not owe a duty to the general public to monitor student driving to or from school. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary.
II
Whether a duty of care exists in a particular case is a question of law. (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712 [230 Cal.Rptr. 823].) Accordingly, we review the Court of Appeal’s decision on this point under an independent review standard. Because this matter is before us on review of a nonsuit, we must accept as true all facts asserted in Hoff’s opening statement and indulge every legitimate inference that may be drawn therefrom. (Abeyta v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1041 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].)
Our courts follow a logical sequence of inquiry in determining whether a public entity may be liable for negligence in tort. At the threshold, it must be established that the public entity owed an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances and that there was a statutory basis for liability. “ ‘[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on statute.’ ” (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 716, *942italics in Rodriguez; Gov. Code, § 815 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity . . . .”].)
Only if these points are answered in the affirmative does the question of governmental immunity arise. “Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 957 P.2d 1323] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily should precede the question of statutory immunity.”]; Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 723 [“Immunity is the third prong in a governmental tort action analysis, but need not be reached where the cause of action fails for want of statutory liability.”].)
Government Code section 815 provides in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by statute: [1]] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”
Under section 815.2, a school district may be liable for the acts or omissions of school employees within the scope of employment “if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee. . . .” (Ibid.) As explained in Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 41, 44-45 [242 Cal.Rptr. 752]: “The effect of [Government Code section 815.2] is to incorporate ‘general standards of tort liability as the primary basis for respondeat superior liability of public entities. . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, in a cause of action for negligence, the existence and extent of an entity’s vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), will be determined by the scope of the duty legally attributed to its employees.” A public employee is liable for negligence “to the same extent as a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 820.) Common law principles may be relevant for the purposes of determining whether individual school teachers or administrators have acted negligently. I note, however, that such common law or public policy considerations may not be used to create a nonstatutory basis of liability against a school district in contravention of Government Code section 815.
This case fails at the threshold. Vacaville Unified School District (District) was not liable, either directly or vicariously, to Hoff.
*943III
The Court of Appeal concluded that the existing statutory and common law duty of teachers and school employees to supervise their students for their safety also runs to nonstudents such as Hoff. It erred thereby.
a
In California, courts have interpreted statutory and constitutional law to impose a duty on the employees of a school district to supervise students for the protection of students.
“While school districts and their employees have never been considered insurers of the physical safety of students, California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to ‘supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other duties. This uniform standard to which they are held is that degree of care ‘which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.’ [Citations.] Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision. Under section 815.2, subdivision (a), of the Government Code, a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by such negligence.” (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747 [87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360].)
Education Code section 44807, in pertinent part, provides: “Every teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess. A teacher, vice principal, principal, or any other certificated employee of a school district, shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or criminal penalties for the exercise, during the performance of his duties, of the same degree of physical control over a pupil that a parent would be legally privileged to exercise but which in no event shall exceed the amount of physical control reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect property, or protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions conducive to learning.”
Although Education Code section 44807 refers to “conduct on the way to and from school,” the liability of a school district and its employees for *944student conduct off campus is expressly qualified. Thus, Education Code section 44808, in pertinent part, provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district... or any officer or employee of such district . . . shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district . . . has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” Even in such event, however, liability may arise “only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee of such district . . . .” (Ibid.)
A duty to supervise students has also been inferred from article I, section 28, subdivision (c), of the California Constitution, articulating the right of students to school safety: “Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.”1
The foregoing provisions primarily describe a duty to protect students entrusted to the care of a school, which may involve controlling the conduct of third persons, presumably including other students, so as to avoid injury to those in their charge. Thus, Education Code section 44807 refers to holding students “to a strict account” for their conduct and immunizes teachers and other certified employees from criminal liability for exercising physical control over students necessary to “maintain order, protect property, or protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions conducive to learning.”
Education Code section 44808, which refers to the “conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools,” is intended to limit the liability of schools for injury caused to students, or by students, under section 44807 to occurrences on school property, unless the school district specifically has undertaken or assumed responsibility as statutorily described and its employees *945are directly and immediately supervising the students. Like section 44807, it appears to concern, primarily, liability for conduct by students that could cause injury to themselves or other students. Likewise, article I, section 28, subdivision (c), of the California Constitution refers to the right of students and school personnel to secure and safe campuses, but makes no mention of third parties.
The decisions addressing the school district’s liability for a breach of the duty to supervise students for their protection rely, for the most part, on Education Code section 44807 or its predecessors. Thus, Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 747, cites former Education Code section 13557, the predecessor to Education Code section 44807. (See also, e.g., Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 45 [citing Education Code section 44807]; Charonnat v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 840, 842 [133 P.2d 643] [citing predecessor of Education Code section 44707]; Forgnone v. Salvadore U. E. School Dist. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 423, 425-426 [106 P.2d 932] [citing predecessor of Education Code section 44707]; Buzzard v. East Lake School Dist. (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 316, 320-322 [93 P.2d 233] [citing predecessor of Education Code section 44707 as source of duty to “regulate the conduct of pupils on the playground with respect to known acts or practice of pupils from which, by the exercise of reasonable prudence[,] the school authorities should have anticipated that injuries were likely to follow”].)
The decisions in point have consistently described the statutory duty of school authorities toward their students as, essentially, a duty of supervision for the purpose of protecting them from injury. Thus, in Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 748, we held that a school district was liable for the failure of school authorities to supervise students who were engaged in a “slap fight” during recess. We explained: “Supervision during recess and lunch periods is required, in part, so that discipline may be maintained and student conduct regulated. Such regulation is necessary precisely because of the commonly known tendency of students to engage in aggressive and impulsive behavior which exposes them and their peers to the risk of serious physical harm.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) One of the earliest cases in point explains: “We assume that the purpose of the law requiring supervision of pupils ... is to regulate their conduct so as to prevent disorderly and dangerous practices which are likely to result in physical injury to immature scholars under their custody.” (Forgnone v. Salvadore U. E. School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.2d at p. 426 [school district liable for breach of duty to protect a student injured when her arm was twisted by another student]; accord, Charonnat v. S. F. Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 840, 844; see also, e.g., Lucas v. Fresno Unified School *946Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 866, 871-872 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 79] [school district liable for breach of duty to protect a student from injury by a dirt clod thrown by another student]; Buzzard v. East Lake School Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.2d at p. 320 [school district liable for breach of duty to protect a student injured when struck by a bicycle ridden by another student on the playground]; Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 594, 600 [110 P.2d 1044] [school district liable for breach of duty to protect a student on the way to the athletic field from injury by a negligently driven garbage truck].)
To be sure, all of the foregoing cases involved injury to a student, and therefore did not require consideration whether the duty to supervise extended to protect nonstudents. Significantly, however, the parties point to no California case that has held that Education Code section 44807 establishes a duty owed by school authorities to nonstudents. Nor, as discussed, does the text of that statute, when read in conjunction with the limitations of Education Code section 44808, support the imposition of such liability under the circumstances here.2
Also significantly, although school authorities, in supervising students, act in loco parentis, no statutory provision purports to make them vicariously liable for the misconduct of students. It is, rather, the actual parents who may bear such statutory liability. Thus, Civil Code section 1714.1, subdivision (a), in pertinent part provides: “Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in injury or death to another person or in any injury to the property of another shall be imputed to the parent . . . having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages, and the parent . . . having custody and control shall be jointly and severally liable [up to *947the amount of $25,000] with the minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct.” Similarly, Vehicle Code section 17708 provides that “[a]ny civil liability of a minor, whether licensed or not. . . , arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway with the express or implied permission of the parents ... is hereby imposed upon the parents . . . [who] shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the minor in driving a motor vehicle.” (See also id., § 17709 [limiting liability to $15,000 for injury to, or death of, one person].)3
In accordance with my understanding of these provisions, I would reject Hoff’s claim that the District may be subject to liability based on the duty of its employees under Education Code section 44807.1 also conclude that his reliance on Education Code section 44808 is misplaced. Specifically, he contends that because school authorities undertook to direct traffic from the main parking lot, the District therefore owed a duty under Education Code section 44808 to protect him from injury by students leaving the overflow parking lot. Even if that section may be construed to create a duty owed to nonstudents for student conduct off school premises in the limited circumstances described therein, it would be unavailing here. As Hoff concedes, school authorities did not undertake to supervise students exiting the overflow lot.
b
Several decisions by our courts refer to a duty to supervise students based on the common law “special relationship” between schools and their students. For instance, Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 804 [223 Cal.Rptr. 206] states that “[t]he special relationship doctrine may. serve as the basis for . . . the long-established duty of schools to supervise students in their charge and protect them against harm from others on school premises during the school day.” (See also Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 [249 Cal.Rptr. 688] [referring to school district’s “special relationship] with [student] upon which a duty of care may be founded”]; Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 715 [concluding that “a special relationship is formed between a school district and its students so as to impose an affirmative duty on the district to take all reasonable steps to protect its students”]; Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist. (1978) 83 *948Cal.App.3d 492, 499 [147 Cal.Rptr. 898] [holding that the “established duty of a school district to supervise its playgrounds is therefore grounded upon the special relationship between the school and its attending students”].)
But those decisions suggest that the common law duty to supervise students should be construed, in this context, as no broader than is otherwise provided by the statutes that have codified the obligation of school authorities to students entrusted to their care. Thus, Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School Dist., supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at page 499, citing the predecessor to Education Code section 44807, determined that the duty of supervision, arising from the special relationship between school and students, is limited to school-related functions and activities taking place during school hours. Similarly, Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist., supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at page 804, held that the special relationship did not impose on school districts an obligation to supply traffic protection to students en route to and from school beyond that provided under the Education Code: “In light of California’s statutory scheme of limited governmental liability, the special relationship doctrine can impose no greater duty of protection on school districts for off-school-grounds hazards than the Legislature has authorized by statute.” (See also Kerwin v. County of San Mateo (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 304, 307 [1 Cal.Rptr. 437] [the school district-pupil relationship did not impose a duty to supervise students on their way home unless it undertook to provide transportation for them].)
Hoff cites Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508 [150 Cal.Rptr. 1, 585 P.2d 851], as an example of a decision using general tort law principles to expand the statutory duty of a school district to supervise. His point is unavailing. Hoyem concluded that a school district owed a duty to supervise a 10-year-old student who, after leaving campus without permission during school hours, was injured several blocks away when he was hit by a motorcycle. The school district’s failure to supervise the student on campus was held to be the proximate cause of his injury off campus. Hoyem says nothing about a school district’s duty to supervise a student to prevent injury to a nonstudent.
IV
The Court of Appeal, relying on our decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166] concluded that, apart from existing statutory and common law requirements, policy considerations weigh in favor of judicially recognizing a general duty on the part of school employees to supervise students for the protection of nonstudents under the facts presented. I disagree.
*949Tarasoff involved an action against the Regents of the University of California after psychotherapists employed by the student hospital on the Berkeley campus failed to protect a young woman victim from a violent patient, either by confining the patient or warning of his threat to kill her. Tarasoff holds that “once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 439.)
Observing that legal duties are “merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 434), we analyzed whether the special relationship between a psychotherapist and patient required imposition of a duty of protection to third parties, as an exception to the general principle that a person owes no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those endangered thereby. (Id. at p. 435.) In doing so, we noted as well the factors considered in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]: “ ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ ” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 434.)
In Rowland, the court considered these factors in determining whether to formulate an exception to an existing duty. (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) As in Tarasoff, however, they are now commonly identified as the balance of considerations for creating a new basis of liability in particular circumstances. Here the Court of Appeal imposed a duty on school employees based on its finding of a special relationship and a determination that the Rowland factors justified the result.
I find no such duty under the facts of this case. The critical consideration in finding a special relationship in Tarasoff was the fact that the defendant psychotherapists had actual knowledge of “dangers emanating from the[ir] patient’s illness.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 436; see id. at p. 451 (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In this case, the record establishes that school employees had no knowledge of reckless driving or other misconduct by Lozano. Absent such knowledge, the key basis for imposing liability fails.
*950Moreover, as a licensed driver, Lozano was presumptively competent to drive. (See Veh. Code, § 12805, subd. (c) [“The department shall not issue a driver’s license to, or renew a driver’s license of, any person: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [w]hen it is determined, by examination or other evidence, that the person is unable to safely operate a motor vehicle upon a highway.”]; see also Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 727, 732 [47 Cal.Rptr. 904, 408 P.2d 360] [“The age of a minor who operates a motor vehicle will not excuse him from liability for driving it in a negligent manner, and he will be required to meet the standard established primarily for adults.”]; Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (b)(2) [child engaged in activity requiring adult qualifications is held to an adult standard of due care].) “It would be extending the legal consequences of wrongs beyond a controllable degree to hold that the use of an automobile by a licensed operator under these circumstances constitutes an unreasonable risk to others for which . . . schools may be liable.” (Thompson v. Ange (1981) 83 A.D.2d 193 [443 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921] [school authorities were under no duty to shield the general public from a licensed student operating his automobile off school grounds]; cf. Rogers by and Through Standley v. Retrum (1992) 170 Ariz. 399, 403-404 [825 P.2d 20, 24-25] [“[W]e decline to make high school districts that adopt an open campus policy insurers against the ordinary risks of vehicular injury that students face in driving off school grounds.”].)4
Additionally, in Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 751 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701]), we reiterated that any Tarasoff special relationship duty required a finding that the defendant’s “conduct placed the specific plaintiff in a position of clearly foreseeable danger.” Here, Hoff was a member of the general public who happened to be walking on a public sidewalk when Lozano drove out of the overflow parking lot and lost control of his car. “Unlike members of the general public, in Tarasoff and Johnson [v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352]] the potential victims were specially known and designated individuals.” (Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 755.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that the special relationship theory of liability fails at the outset. Thus, there is no need to address the Rowland factors. I therefore express no opinion as to the existence or scope of a *951possible duty toward nonstudents under different circumstances warranting their full consideration. (Cf. Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 750-754 [no consideration of Rowland factors after court found no special relationship upon which to impose a duty].)
The majority reach a similar result, but do so based on an analogy to the duties arising from the unique “special relationship” between a parent and child. Certainly the duty of school employees should be no greater in scope than that owed by parents. Neither the Court of Appeal nor Hoff has so argued. Nor, as I have stated, should it be greater in scope than that owed by the defendants in Tarasoff or Thompson. Unlike the majority, however, I would go no further. I thus reject the suggestion, implicit in the majority opinion, that a school employee’s duty to supervise a student is analogous to a parent’s duty to control a child with regard to third persons. As the majority observe, a parent is liable under the common law if he or she knew or should have known, e.g., based on past misconduct, that it was necessary to control the child and failed to exercise due care to do so. I strongly disagree with the implication that school districts could or should be subject to liability when a school employee knew or should have known of a child’s tendencies to misbehavior that might injure a nonstudent in this context. None of our precedents supports such a broad expansion of potential tort liability for school districts and their employees. At the very least, the majority’s analysis begs the question whether the District would be potentially liable for any future accidents involving Lozano or another student using the parking lots at Vacaville High School.
V
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that no duty of care extended to Hoff and that, therefore, the District could not be deemed liable, either directly or vicariously, for the conduct of its students. Based on the facts presented in opening argument, nonsuit was properly granted. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
George, C. J., and Baxter, J., concurred.
Some decisions have also cited to Education Code section 48200 et seq., the so-called Compulsory Education Law, which requires, in section 48200, as to “[e]ach person between the ages of 6 and 18 years,” “compulsory full-time education ... for the full time designated as the length of the schoolday . . . .” (See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 714 [identifying compulsory education as a factor imposing an affirmative duty to provide protection for students].) See also Penal Code section 627, subdivision (b), restricting access of unauthorized persons to school campuses: “The Legislature declares that the purpose of this chapter is to safeguard the teachers, other employees, students, and property of public schools.”
In Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 544 [2 Cal.Rptr. 279, 348 P.2d 887], this court held that a school district was liable for injuries to two students caused by the failure of a student employed by the student body association to use a safety chain when he hitched his community college’s sound truck to an automobile driven in a homecoming parade. The district’s liability was based, inter alia, on former section 903 of the Education Code, which provided that “ ‘[t]he governing board of any school district is liable as such in the name of the district for any judgment against the district on account of injury to person or property arising because of the negligence of the district, or its officers, or employees in any case where a verified claim for damages has been presented.’ ” (53 Cal.2d at p. 551, fn. omitted.) We noted that the statute had been amended expressly to include liability to nonstudents. (Id. at p. 551, fn. 4.) Former Education Code section 903 has since been repealed. (See Gov. Code, §§ 815, 815.2.) Lehmuth, unlike the present case, involved the district’s “primary duty to reasonably supervise” the members of the college’s student body association while they were using school property on the public streets for an activity conducted under faculty supervision. (53 Cal.2d at pp. 551-552; see also former Ed. Code, § 16142 and former Veh. Code, § 400.) It is not analogous; it involved none of the Education Code provisions at issue here. Nor did it purport to address a general common law duty to supervise students.
In the absence of statute, a parent is ordinarily not liable for the torts of his or her minor child. (See Hagerty v. Powers (1885) 66 Cal. 368, 369 [5 P. 622] [“a father is not liable in damages for the torts of his [minor] child, committed without his knowledge, consent, or sanction”]; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988), § 1001, p. 391.)
Thompson v. Ange, supra, 443 N.Y.S.2d at page 921, involved a similar attempt to impose liability on a school district based on failure to supervise a student driver. Rejecting the claim, the court emphasized: “The schools’ awareness of reckless driving by some students and their concern for student safety is not sufficient to show that [the tortfeasor] was anything but the average 17-year old whom the Legislature has determined may be licensed to drive[]. . . . The risk that [he] would be involved in an automobile accident was no greater than the risk incurred by the operation of an automobile by any average 17-year old driver.” (Ibid.)