OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:Ben Hame Corporation (BHC) appeals the grant of an injunction prohibiting it from conducting commercial lodging operations in its single-family residence in violation of the Alta Town (Alta) zoning ordinance. We affirm.
BHC claims that its rental activity was a valid accessory use of its residence, and if not, that equitable estoppel should bar Alta from enforcing the zoning ordinance. Additionally, BHC asserts that Alta’s ordinance is unconstitutional because the subdivision in which the Ben Hame residence is located is an “arbitrary” spot zone.
Alta occupies about four square miles, including both sides of Little Cottonwood Canyon at its upper reaches. Prior to 1982, the Blackjack Village Subdivision was developed under county zoning ordinances *799on land adjacent to Alta. Blackjack occupies land located on the south slope of the canyon and consists of nine lots of at least one-half acre each. The north side of the subdivision, consisting of three lots, fronts on the Bypass Road. Lot Five is one of the three lots that front on the Bypass Road. The Bypass Road and the main road, U-210, provide vehicular access to and from Alta. U-210 is often closed because of snow avalanches; hence the Bypass Road is a critical traffic artery for Alta. BHC, an Illinois corporation, purchased Lot Five in Blackjack while the subdivision was in Salt Lake County zone FR-0.5. The only permitted uses in that zone were (1) agriculture, (2) single-family dwellings, and (3) accessory uses and structures customarily incidental to a permitted use. Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-9A-2 (1975). Single-family dwellings, however, did not include hotels, apartment hotels, boarding houses, lodging houses, mobile homes, tourist courts or apartment courts. Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-6(21) (1966).1
BHC’s residence was designed and constructed as a 5,000 square foot single-family residence pursuant to county zoning and building codes and was first occupied in 1981. The home was built against the south slope of the canyon on three levels. As the structure rises, each level is set back from the front to accommodate the slope of the mountain. BHC’s tax and corporate filings stated its business in Utah was “operation of hotels and inns.” BHC printed and distributed brochures and rate schedules advertising the residence for rental. BHC stated that its home “can accommodate 12 to 20 people.” Its annual rental rate schedules quoted rates for every month of the year with a base rate plus a surcharge for “each additional person.” BHC also advertised and provided an on-site chef and airport shuttle service. BHC’s 1988-89 rate schedule stated that rates included “services of resident manager and cooking 5/6 days out of 7 days (breakfast and dinner) and housekeeping services daily.” The standard booking was stated as “7 days — Saturday to Saturday.” A service charge applied “if shorter bookings are accepted.” From 1980 to 1988, the number of rental occupants ranged from eight to fifteen. In 1988, BHC received about $54,000 in rental income from short-term rentals of its residence.
All nine lots of the Blackjack Village subdivision were annexed into Alta on August 11, 1982 and consequently into Alta zone FR-0.5.2 Alta’s ordinance stated that *800the permitted uses in this zone were the same three uses permitted by the county’s ordinance mentioned above. Alta, Utah, Ordinances § 22-9-2 (1972). However, while the county ordinance did not state that commercial rentals were either permitted or prohibited in the FR-0.5 zone, Alta’s ordinance contained a specific prohibition:
Commercial Rental Prohibited. It shall be deemed to be a prohibited commercial use in all FR [Forestry and Recreation] zones to lease or rent any dwelling or other structure, or portion thereof, for lodging purposes, for a period of thirty (30) days or less.
Alta, Utah, Ordinances § 22-9-3A (1979).
BHC applied three times to Alta’s town clerk for a business license to operate a “lodging facility.” The clerk issued licenses for six months beginning November 1, 1983, and November 1, 1984, and for twelve months on November 1, 1986. The record does not indicate that BHC received any licenses after these. In December of 1988, Alta filed this action for injunctive relief to prohibit BHC’s ongoing short-term rentals of its home as a commercial lodging facility in violation of Alta’s zoning ordinance. The trial court granted Alta a preliminary injunction on April 9, 1990 and, on cross motions for summary judgment, granted Alta’s summary judgment on August 15, 1990, resulting in a permanent injunction. On appeal, we examine BHC’s defensive claims in turn.
ACCESSORY USE TO SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENCE
BHC claims that its rental operation was a valid accessory use in Salt Lake County zone FR-0.5. Further, BHC claims that since such use was valid in the county zone, the use became a valid nonconforming use in Alta’s FR-0.5 zone. Accordingly, we first examine the accessory use assertion.
The county zoning ordinance defines accessory use as “[a] subordinate use customarily incidental to and located upon the same lot occupied by a main use.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-6(68) (1966). The quoted language requires that a valid accessory use be customarily incidental to a main use. Thus, the question is whether intensive short-term commercial rental is a subordinate use customarily incidental to the main use as a single-family dwelling.
Here, the trial court concluded that “accessory use” as defined by the Salt Lake County ordinances applicable at the time BHC’s house was constructed “does not include over-night rental use of a single family house.” We accord conclusions of law no particular deference but review them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The trial court’s interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for correctness without deference. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). We apply the same standard to the trial court’s interpretation of an ordinance.
BHC has noted that “there has been no official interpretation by Salt Lake County which would bind or influence the court’s interpretation of the county ordinances.” Just as the interpretation of a statute or zoning ordinance is a question of law for the court, Burley Lagoon Improvement Ass’n v. Pierce County, 38 Wash.App. 534, 686 P.2d 503, 505 (1984), the determination of what uses are accessory uses customarily incidental to a single-family dwelling is a question of law. See Thomas v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 393, 550 A.2d 1045, 1046 n. 3 (1988) (“whether a use constitutes an accessory use under a particular ordinance is a question of law, but one which can be answered only by the consideration of the underlying factual situation”); City of Boise City v. Gabica, 106 Idaho 94, 675 P.2d 354, 356 (Ct.App.1984) (deeming it clear as a matter of law that business was not “incidental” to residential use of single-family dwelling); Potts v. City of Hugo, 416 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding as a matter of law that parking a *801semi-truck and trailer is not customarily incidental to a residential use).
BHC contends that county officials interpreted the words “accessory use” to include and allow short-term rentals of single-family dwellings. BHC relies on the affidavit of the county’s Director of Development Services, Ken Jones. Mr. Jones stated that he was responsible for enforcing county zoning ordinances when the BHC home was first rented. He stated that the county considered the short-term rental of recreation homes in the canyons to be an accessory use. BHC further refers to the fact that the county never took any enforcement action to prohibit such rentals and refused to adopt a proposal expressly prohibiting short-term rental of canyon homes.
BHC also relies upon the affidavit of the Wasatch Front Ski Association, which arranges short-term rentals of county dwellings for skiers. The affidavit states that, although the association had advised the county of its activities, at no time had the county taken any action to prohibit such rentals or advised the association that such rentals were prohibited by the ordinance. Thus, BHC concludes that “[t]he declared custom, practice, and intent of Salt Lake County is to allow such short-term seasonal rentals.” Although we defer to the county commission’s legislatively delegated discretion in making legal decisions, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992), county administrative officials may not forfeit the power of enforcement by disregarding an ordinance. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1976). The custom or practice of certain county officials not to enforce the prohibition of short-term rentals of single-family residences does not necessarily mirror the intent of the legislative body in enacting the zoning ordinance with the language now under scrutiny.
We divine the meaning of the county zoning ordinance regarding accessory use from the general purpose of the ordinance. “In interpreting and applying the provisions of this Ordinance, the requirements contained herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the purposes set forth.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-3 (1966). By specifying that the permitted uses were agriculture, single-family dwellings, and accessory uses customarily incidental to a main use, and that such uses as boarding houses, lodging houses, or hotels, were not permitted, the ordinance was intended to prohibit uses inconsistent with the agricultural or residential character of the area. “Among the objectives to be served [by zoning] is to avoid mixing together of industrial, commercial, business, and residential uses.” Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764, 765 (1966). The ordinance should thus be construed to maintain the character of a single-family neighborhood. Further, the words “customarily incidental” to a main use, as used to define an accessory use, imply that the use flows from, naturally derives or follows as a logical consequence of, or is a normal and expected offshoot from the main use. See Township of Groveland v. Jennings, 106 Mich.App. 504, 308 N.W.2d 259, 262-63 (1981), aff'd, 419 Mich. 719, 358 N.W.2d 888 (1984); see also Klavon v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 22, 340 A.2d 631, 634 (1975) (“accessory use doctrine” acknowledges that certain general types of real estate use have a natural and reasonable tendency to lead to certain other more specific uses). A valid accessory use to a single-family dwelling is one which actually furthers or enhances the use of the property as a residence and not one which merely helps finance the property. Lerner v. Bloomfield Township, 106 Mich.App. 809, 308 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1981).
Courts have widely recognized that “residential” use may include many elements. “ ‘Use by a family of a home under our customs includes more than simple use of a house and grounds for food and shelter. It also includes its use for private religious, educational, cultural and recreational advantages of the family.’ ” City of Boise, 675 P.2d at 356 (quoting Borough of Chatham v. Donaldson, 69 N.J.Super. 277, 174 A.2d 213, 216 (1961)).
*802Family hobbies, recreation and education are without question accessory uses customarily incident to single family dwellings. The words “uses customarily incident to single family dwellings” mean the class of activity a family customarily does in or about their home.... As long as the activity is a form of family hobby, recreation or education it is permissible even though it may be unusual unless it is specifically excluded by a zoning restriction.
Dettmar v. County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 28 Ohio Misc. 35, 273 N.E.2d 921, 922 (Ct. Common Pleas 1971).3 On the other hand, courts have drawn a line on uses they consider residential. The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the granting of an injunction against the property owners’ expanded use of a single-family residence as a restaurant under a similar zoning ordinance. Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah 1981); see also Provo City v. Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P.2d 570, 573 (1936) (allowance of public and semipublic buildings in residential district did not manifest intention to allow funeral home).4
We conclude that use as a “lodging facility” 5 of a building originally designed and constructed as a single-family dwelling is not an accessory use customarily incidental to the main use within the meaning of the Salt Lake County zoning ordinance. Thus, BHC’s short-term rental operation conducted in its residence violated the zoning ordinance.
In view of the above determination, we need not reach BHC’s claim that it acquired a valid nonconforming use under the county zoning ordinance which carried forward under Alta’s zoning ordinance. A nonconforming use may not be established through a use which from its inception violated a zoning ordinance. Such use has no lawful right to continue. Goodwin v. City of Kansas City, 244 Kan. 28, 766 P.2d 177, 181 (1988). Instead, we turn to BHC’s claim that Alta should be estopped in equity to enforce its zoning ordinance against BHC’s Lot Five.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
BHC claims that its applications for and Alta’s issuance of three business licenses to operate a lodging facility in its home for a total of twenty-four months, along with Alta’s previous failure to enforce the zoning ordinance, estops Alta from now seeking to enforce its ordinance. Generally, to raise a successful equitable defense against the enforcement of a zoning law, a landowner must first show ex*803ceptional circumstances warranting such a defense.
Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive relief against alleged violations of the zoning laws, unless the circumstances are exceptional. Zoning ordinances are governmental acts which rest upon the police power, and as to violations thereof any inducements, reli-ances, negligence of enforcement, or like factors are merely aggravations of the violation rather than excuses or justifications therefor.
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1976) (quoting 8A McQuillin Mun. Corps. § 25.349 (Rev.1965)).
In Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980), the supreme court outlined the prerequisites for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel in a zoning case. To invoke the doctrine, Alta must have committed an act or omission upon which BHC could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position or in incurring extensive expenses. If BHC’s reliance is based on Alta’s action, the action must be clear, definite and affirmative. If BHC’s reliance is based on Alta’s omission, the omission must be negligent or culpable and Alta, failing to act, must have been under a duty to do so. See id. at 1267-68. Mere “silence or inaction will not operate to work an estoppel.” Id.; see also Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981) (requiring exceptional circumstances); Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1984) (holding estoppel did not apply when city had not misled builder to his detriment); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App.1990) (holding equitable estoppel may be asserted against state or its agencies only when the injustice to be avoided is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception). BHC used its home as a lodging facility at the time of annexation in 1982 and continued this use long before the clerk issued the first “lodging facility” business license. Thus, BHC has failed to show that it substantially changed its position to its detriment. Further, any action or omission by Alta was not of a nature to justify good faith reliance. We think the rationale in Morrison v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P.2d 1113, 1114 (1961) regarding estoppel applies:
It would be unreasonable and unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no authority to do so, could bind the county to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly passed, to which everyone has notice by its passage and publication, because a ministerial employee erred in characterizing the type of property.
In Morrison, the assessor’s erroneous description of the property for a number of years as commercial did not preclude zoning authorities from denying a building permit for a service station. Id. Similarly, the Alta town clerk’s issuance in this case of three lodging facility licenses does not estop Alta from denying use of BHC’s residence as a lodging facility contrary to the Alta zoning ordinance. Additionally, failure to enforce zoning for a time does not forfeit the power to enforce. See Kartchner, 552 P.2d at 138. BHC has shown neither an act or omission by Alta justifying good faith reliance nor a substantial detrimental change in BHC’s position in reliance on Alta’s acts. Hence, BHC has not shown any exceptional circumstances constituting an estoppel defense to the injunction action.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT VERSUS “SPOT ZONING”
Because summary judgment presents for review only questions of law, we review those issues for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). Alta moved for summary judgment granting its claim for injunctive relief under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Injunctive relief is generally available only when intervention of a court of equity is essential to protect against irreparable injury. However, under our zoning statutes, injunctive relief is available as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-30 (1989); *804see Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah 1981) (applying comparable statute for counties under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23 (1953)). To be granted an injunction, Alta need not make a specific showing of irreparable injury. “A showing that the ordinance has been violated is tantamount to a showing of irreparable injury (to the public).” Baxter, 635 P.2d at 65. Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R.Civ.P. 56; Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App.1991).
The court had before it the zoning ordinance in support of Alta’s position and the affidavit of Marcus LaFrance, Alta’s expert, a former member of the town planning commission, in charge of revising the town general plan. The affidavit states in essence that property surrounding the Blackjack subdivision is zoned for single-family dwellings (FM-20 and FR-50) unless owners obtain a conditional use permit for short-term rentals. The affidavit further states that the prohibition of short-term rentals is necessary in this area to facilitate snow removal and to avoid parking congestion when the Bypass Road is the only passable route. This affidavit was uncontested by BHC. Since BHC admitted that without a valid accessory or nonconforming use permit, its rental operation was in violation of the ordinance, Alta had presented a valid case for injunctive relief. Thus, Alta was entitled as a matter' of law to a summary judgment granting the injunction unless BHC could present evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, of a legitimate defense, creating a genuine issue as to any material fact. “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits, or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e).
BHC opposed Alta’s motion with the claim that the zoning ordinance created an arbitrary spot zone of the Blackjack subdivision, because “the zone in which the defendant’s home is located is small and ... the property is surrounded by residential property expressly zoned for short-term rental." In support of BHC’s position, the court had before it the town zoning map and an expert’s affidavit. The zoning map shows that the town occupies an area about two miles square divided into six types of districts. One large district covers most of the area exclusive of the canyon, interspersed with six small subdivision districts. The remaining ten districts are within the confines of the canyon south of the main road. The districts are of varying sizes. Near the Blackjack subdivision is another FR-0.5 district of similar size. Nothing on the face of the map would support a conclusion that the Blackjack subdivision was an arbitrary spot zone, or that the various districts are not deemed appropriate to carry out the purposes of the zoning ordinance. Accordingly, BHC relies solely on its expert’s affidavit to support its contention that Blackjack subdivision is an arbitrary spot zone.6
On appeal, BHC argues that its affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Alta’s zoning of the Blackjack subdivision constitutes illegal arbitrary spot zoning. However, BHC’s affiant’s conclusory statements are not relevant and material to BHC’s legal claim, and thus do not create a “genuine issue as to any material fact.” Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). The affidavit states, with our emphasis, *805that “based upon affiant’s education, skill, expertise, training and practical experience, affiant holds the following opinions regarding the short-term rental of Ben Hame [premises] in the Blackjack Village subdivision.” The expert then states his opinion that short-term rental of the Ben Hame premises does not: increase street congestion, increase parking problems, increase danger associated with fire, increase risk to dangers of avalanches or other dangers, contribute to overcrowding and undue concentration of populations, burden adequate provision for water, diminish adequate provision for sewage, impact snow removal, impact adequate provision for schools, parks and other public requirements, offend the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, decrease the value of buildings in the subdivision; that it in fact increases the value. Finally, the affidavit states that the short-term rental of the home is appropriate land use, that the prohibition against short-term rental is not warranted and based upon the foregoing and other considerations that “[t]he prohibition against short-term rental on the Ben Hame premises is unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary, abuse of discretion and has no relation whatever to the public health, safety and welfare.” Each of the statements contains the limiting phrase “that the short-term rental of the Ben Hame premises does not....” However, BHC’s allegation both in its answer and in its memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment is that the zoning of the entire Blackjack subdivision is illegal spot zoning. Accordingly, the statements relating only to the “Ben Hame premises” and not to the “Blackjack subdivision” do not even speak to BHC’s legal claim. The zoning map and Alta’s expert affidavit presented evidence that areas adjacent to the Blackjack subdivision were treated similarly; the expert affidavit also presented evidence that the zoning was related to public health, safety, and welfare. In response, BHC rested only on its allegations and an inadequate affidavit.7
In reviewing a summary judgment grant, we view the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was granted, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1992), and responsive affidavits may not always be necessary when material facts are genuinely at issue, see Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). However, summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 25. Because BHC has failed to present any material facts creating a genuine issue for us to view, we must sustain the summary judgment.8 We *806affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not relied on below. Hill v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Judgment affirmed.
GREENWOOD, J., concur.
. A "boarding house” is defined as "[a] building with not more than five (5) guest rooms, where, for compensation, meals are provided for at least five (5) but not more than fifteen (15) persons.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-6(9) (1966).
A "lodging house” is defined as "[a] building where lodging only is provided for compensation of five (5) or more, but not exceeding fifteen (15) persons.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-6(41) (1966).
A "hotel” is defined as "[a] building designed for or occupied by sixteen (16) or more guests who are for compensation lodged, with or without meals and in which no provision is made for cooking in any individual room or suite.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinances § 22-1-6(37) (1975) (emphasis added).
. The record does not indicate whether Alta completed the annexation and zoning by single or separate legislative acts. Nor does the record show whether districts other than the Blackjack Village subdivision were involved in the legislative action. Further, it is not apparent whether BHC challenged either the initial annexation or the zoning ordinances during Alta’s legislative enactment process.
The record contains a letter from Alta’s attorney to BHC’s attorney dated September 30, 1988. The letter states: ”[W]e are, of course, aware of the attempts you have made to obtain a zone change for the Blackjack Village Subdivision from FR-0.5 to the Peruvian Estates zone. Presently, the zoning remains FR-0.5, and unless and until the Town Council rezones the Ben Hame property, the house may not be used for non-single family purposes.”
We are left to conjecture regarding what "attempts” BHC made to rezone. BHC's reply brief states, without any support in the record, that "Ben Hame petitioned the town of Alta on two separate occasions to re-zone the Blackjack Village subdivision," and that both petitions were rejected. Further, BHC has attached to its reply brief copies of two "petitions” to rezone which do not appear in the record. The first is signature-dated January 9, 1990. The second does not contain any date or signature. Neither shows a filing date.
The record does not reveal whether BHC appealed or sought review of any of Alta’s legislative decisions on annexation, zoning or rezón-*800ing. Alta filed this action on December 16, 1988.
. Some examples of activities typically found to be accessory uses to single-family dwellings include recreational uses such as tennis courts and swimming pools, Hardy v. Calhoun, 383 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex.Civ.App.1964); the keeping of pets, Foster Village Community Ass'n v. Hess, 4 Haw.App. 463, 667 P.2d 850, 855 (1983); and the practice of hobbies such as the use of an amateur radio antenna, Dettmar, 273 N.E.2d at 922.
. Activities typically found not to be customarily incidental to a single-family dwelling include running a carpet cleaning business from the home, City of Boise City v. Gabica, 106 Idaho 94, 675 P.2d 354, 356 (Ct.App.1986); a homeowner’s use of a helicopter to land at his home, Redington Ranch Assocs. v. Redman, 153 Ariz. 437, 737 P.2d 808, 809 (Ct.App.1987); rendering of psychotherapy and marriage counseling services from the home, Lerner v. Bloomfield Township, 308 Mich.App. 809, 308 N.W.2d 701, 702 (Ct.App.1981); and the use of a residential dwelling as a "boarding or rooming house,” defined as a house where the business of keeping boarders is carried on and which is held out by the owner as a place where boarders are kept, Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (1938), appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 503, 60 S.Ct. 77, 84 L.Ed. 431 (1939); see also Keseling v. City of Baltimore, 220 Md. 263, 151 A.2d 726, 729 (1959) (use of home for seven roomers, four apartments, and a business office not incidental to residential use).
. This is the term BHC used for its operation. We believe that the trial court's term, "commercial lodging facility," adequately describes the three mutually exclusive but comprehensive exceptions into which any chosen use of Ben Hame by a short-term occupant would fall. Regardless of whether occupants used the facility as a "boarding house," by taking advantage of the meal services provided by the owners, or as a "lodging house," by providing their own meals, or as a “hotel," by occupying the facility with sixteen or more guests for compensation, the pervasive short-term commercial use of the facility fell within one of these three enumerated exceptions.
. "Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of ‘islands.’ One type results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be made of a small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type of ‘island’ results when most of a large district is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more spots in the district.” Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah 1976). We point out that, if allowed, BHC’s use of its lot for commercial lodging in the Blackjack residential district could create a spot zone of the second type.
. The dissent raises a new argument on behalf of appellant, advocating that “the zoning authority has the burden of identifying the purpose for the zoning decision when spot zoning is raised as a defense," citing cases in which municipalities made no showing of any benefits justifying zoning schemes. We think the burden of proof is irrelevant in this case because BHC has pleaded only conclusory legal allegations and has not presented any facts whatsoever upon which a "material issue” could be based. Further, because constitutionality is presumed in the municipality’s exercise of its legislative powers, the burden of showing "failure to comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness” is on the challenger once the municipality has disclosed the basis of its decisions. Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981); see also Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City & County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815, 822 (1989) (the burden of demonstrating that a zoning ordinance creates illegal "spot zoning" rests upon the party asserting its illegality). Neither the zoning map nor the affidavit interpreting it showed a pattern of spot zoning or revealed a lack of rationale for the zoning plan. Thus, BHC's mere unsupported legal allegations do not suffice to create a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
. Utah Supreme Court zoning cases considering equitable actions for injunctive relief include: Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988) (request for extraordinary relief denied); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981) (injunction granted against property owner’s commercial use (restaurant) of single-family residence) Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943) (grant of injunction against issuance of building permits, reversed); Provo City v. Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P.2d 570 (1936) (injunction granted against operating a funeral home in residential district).
Utah Supreme Court zoning cases considering legal actions for declaratory judgment relief include: Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d *806192, 398 P.2d 27 (1965) (issues of fact precluded summary judgment, reversed for trial); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953) (factual allegations of complaint insufficient, dismissal affirmed); Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949) (ordinance not a discrimination against rightful use of premises).