(concurring in the result).
I concur in the result only, — for two reasons: 1) that the purported order of adoption violated Title 14-4-14, U. C. A. 1943, having been entered before the children had lived for one year in the home of the purported adopting parents, and 2) that prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, *288the natural mother effectively revoked any consent to adoption that she may have given, a right generally conceded under the authorities, when applied to the facts of this case.
It is respectfully suggested that the remainder of the opinion relating to the consent necessary for adoption invites further confusion to an already confused phase of the law. It is said in the opinion that under 14-4-8, U. C. A. 1943, the person whose consent is necessary must appear before the court and sign the consent where an agency is not involved, but that under 14-4-4, U. C. A. 1943, a parent may give a binding consent to an adoption by merely signing the same before a notary public if the child is released to a licensed agency for placement or adoption. To require physical appearance in the one case and not in the other, as the opinion establishes, seems to pay little tribute to lawyers, whose advice to natural and prospective adopting parents in my opinion is as wholesome and solid as that of the social service worker.
Admittedly, the main opinion has logical justification for its interpretation that the wording of Title 14-4-8, U. C. A. 1943, after having been amended by Chap. 16, Laws of Utah 1941, deleting that portion of the old statute which allowed for acknowledgment of a consent before a notary public where the natural parent was a non-resident of the county, requires physical presence in court of all interested parties; and such argument may be strengthened by Title 14-4-9, U. C. A. 1943, which requires examination by the court of such persons separately. None the less, the statutes are not entirely free from doubt and are subject to dual interpretation. In such case it is urged that there is good reason to interpret the statute, if possible, so as to carry out the spirit of adoptions generally and simultaneously to pay tribute to practicality and convenience in assuring the adoption by good people of children who otherwise might be the victims of shifting social conditions, obscure status, or onerous procedural difficulties. Viewing it thus, I can *289see no reason why we should interpret strictly the word “appear” as synonymous with “physical presence.” Contrariwise, it would seem that the sensible interpretation thereof would be to endow the word with the connotation with which generally it is attributed, — that of an appearance in court by filing an answer or other pleading, personally or by attorney. One is left to wonder what would happen, if, in a contested adoption proceeding where a non-resident parent whose consent was necessary had. filed an answer or other pleading through a local attorney, and thereafter failed or refused to show up at the trial. Requiring physical presence would result in a stalemate and there would be no trial, although the court had acquired jurisdiction of person and subject matter in the normal, customary way.
Interpreting the word as has been done in the opinion lends doubt to the statutes of many who have assumed that appearance meant that which has been accepted generally in the profession, — a word of art, as it were, where jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by the filing of a pleading quite unrelated to personal physical presence. It is my belief that the legislature, in using the word “appear,” had in mind something akin to this generally accepted concept of appearance and did not intend to change the meaning by deleting that portion of Sec. 14-4-8 allowing for acknowledgment of consent by those residing outside of the county of adoption before a notary public. The vice of such deleted portion is apparent since the bench and bar may never have had a chance to learn anything about the natural parent, or would have no jurisdiction over him, as is the case where an appearance is made in the generally accepted meaning of that term.
Such interpretation, as meaningful as that of the main opinion, would provide an orderly procedure for adoption in many meritorious cases, where for one reason or another (such as being in the military service overseas) it would *290or may be impossible for a natural parent to present himself physically before the court, although all persons interested could be protected through the good offices of an attorney. It is no answer to suggest that in such case an agency be used, since in the opinion of the writer based on years of experience, prospective parents having the opportunity to adopt a specific child would have little or no chance of succeeding, what with the priority lists of agencies and the reservation of absolute and exclusive rights of placement.