Appeal by the city of Estacada from a decree restraining and enjoining it from including within its boundaries the “River Mill Plant” belonging to plaintiff which the city sought to annex under ch. 210, Oregon Laws 1949. The decree held that the annexation proceedings were void as to plaintiff’s property since they were instituted for the sole purpose of taxing plaintiff’s land and were unreasonable and unlawful, and also enjoined the assessor and the sheriff from assessing the property and collecting taxes on it, respectively.
The city’s first proposition, raised on appeal for the first time by a challenge to the sufficiency of the com*147plaint, is that quo warranto would be plaintiff’s sole remedy and that an injunction suit will not lie. The following cases are authority for the propriety of an injunction suit to test the validity of annexation proceedings: Thurber v. McMinnville, 63 Or 410, 128 P 43; Landless v. City of Cottage Grove, 64 Or 155, 129 P 537; Couch v. Marvin, 67 Or 341, 136 P 6; Cooke v. Portland, 69 Or 572, 139 P 1095; Spence v. Watson, 182 Or 233, 186 P2d 785.
The city contends that on authority of State ex rel. v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Or 332, 124 P 637, quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to attack an annexation proceeding. In that case we held that quo warranto is a proper proceeding, but we did not hold that it was exclusive.
The city further urges that the above cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because in those cases the proceedings were declared void in that the cities did not comply with some essential procedural requirement. This contention is not accurate since, in several of the cases above cited, the annexation was attacked on grounds other than the validity of the machinery leading up to the election. It is true, however, that none of the cases went so far as to hold that a suit in equity would be proper in a proceeding of this kind where it was necessary to consider matters aliunde the record.
There is respectable authority in the early Oregon cases for the proposition that where a corporation is de facto rather than de jure quo warranto is the sole remedy. Since there is a wide cleavage of opinion among the members of this court as to which remedy is appropriate in the present case, we are of the opinion that on the record made we may treat this as one for *148a declaratory judgment under § 6-602, OCLA, which follows:
“* * * Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under any such instrument, constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”;
it being remembered that the declaratory judgment statute is a remedial statute and is to be liberally construed and administered, and that questions of fact may be tried and determined as in other cases.
Since the city did not question in the lower court the bringing of the injunction suit, and joined issue and, after an adverse decision, appealed the case and now challenges, for the first time, the propriety of the same, in the interest of justice and to terminate litigation, it is our duty to decide the questions at issue on the merits, if we may properly do so.
The assessor and the sheriff have not appealed from the injunction decree against them. There remains a justiciable controversy between the parties involving the question of the proper exercise of a municipal franchise conferred on. the city by the annexation statute.
In Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed, 712, § 309, we read:
“A Declaratory Judgment will be granted even when not prayed for, but some other relief is asked, as an injunction, or where the prayer is in conjunction with a request for other relief, or where the application for other relief is abandoned, or where relief prayed for is denied. Indeed the Court may of its own motion grant declaratory relief in the *149absence of any prayer. So too, a declaratory judgment may be made in response to a prayer for general relief, although inserted with other prayers for different relief.”
We find in §9-102, OCLA, that, “No cause shall be dismissed for having been brought on the wrong side of the court.”
In the case of Miles et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 506, 535, 220 P2d 511, 221 P2d 905, it appears from the amended complaint that the plaintiffs based their cause of suit on the theory that the statute was null and void; that the enforcement of the same would result in irreparable loss and damage to them; that they had no plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law; and that the prayer prayed for a decree declaring the act null and void and perpetually enjoining the law enforcement officials from attempting to enforce the statute. We construed the proceedings as one for a declaratory judgment. On petition for rehearing, it was insisted by the plaintiff that the suit was brought as an injunction suit “for the purpose of procuring an injunction to prevent threatened injury to their property and property rights.” We said:
“* * * Even if that were so, the relief sought involved an adjudication that the initiative act was unconstitutional, and, therefore, was declaratory in character. 16 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, § 3. The amended complaint might have been based upon either the uniform declaratory judgments act (§§ 6-601 to 6-616, O. C. L. A.) or the injunction statute. We construed it as being based upon the former, by reason of the fact that it prayed for a decree ‘declaring said initiative act * * * null and void in its entirety’. We were of the opinion that such a prayer indicated that the pleaders conceived that they had made a case for a declaratory decree. 41 Am. Jur., Pleading, § 110.”
*150Professor Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed, said, at p. 362:
“* * * Since quo warranto is a traditional writ of ancient lineage, an occasional court will conclude that it is the indicated method of trying title to office or the validity of an election or other public act. But most courts have readily perceived that the declaratory judgment is a vehicle of relief of equal efficacy with quo warranto for the determination of the rights of the parties, while having the advantage of escaping some of the restrictions of quo warranto, * *
On p. 341 of Declaratory Judgments (published in 1934), Professor Borchard said:
“* * * With the ever-greater interference by government in the affairs of private individuals, it often becomes important to the individual to test the validity of the interference, present or proposed, before it is applied or invoked against him. * * * As a rule, the mere enactment of a statute or ordinance imposing restraints on an individual and implying enforcement by prosecuting officials threatens and hampers the plaintiff’s freedom, peace of mind or pecuniary interests, and creates that justiciability of the issue which sustains a proceeding for an injunction and, a fortiori, for a declaratory judgment. ’ ’
It is suggested that since the attorney general was not served with a copy of the proceedings, a constitutional question being involved, we would have no jurisdiction to declare a judgment. It is true that the statute states that the attorney general must be served with a copy of the proceedings where, “ * * * the constitution, statute, charter, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, * * This provision becomes unimportant, however, since we have not passed on the constitutionality of the ordinance in*151volved. See Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed, p. 275.
In the case of School Dist. No. 1 v. School Dist. No. 45, 148 Or 554, 570, 37 P2d 873, a declaratory judgment proceeding was instituted to determine the validity of the consolidation of two school districts. It was urged that quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, Point No. II of the appellant school district’s brief being as follows: “Only the State in a direct proceeding can attack the validity of the formation of a school district, changing the boundary lines, consolidating it or annexing it to another.” In disposing of this question, we said:
“* * * We think that this remedy by proceeding under the declaratory judgment law should not be denied to the parties hereto merely because a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto might also be invoked.”..
In Tompkins v. District Boundary Board, 180 Or 339, 177 P2d 416, the declaratory judgment act was invoked by a property owner to obtain an adjudication of the validity of the consolidation of various school districts, it being alleged that he would “ ‘suffer irreparable injury and the taxes on plaintiff’s property will be materially increased to plaintiff’s detriment’ ” unless the election was declared illegal and void. For the first time on appeal, as in the case at bar, it was contended that quo warranto was the sole remedy to test the validity of the consolidation. We cited, with approval, School Dist. No. 1 v. School Dist. No. 45, supra. In the Tompkins ease, it was asserted that under the authority of State ex rel. v. School District No. 23, 179 Or 441, 172 P2d 655, a quo warranto proceeding was the sole remedy where a de facto municipal corporation existed. We held that under § 6-602, OCLA, *152plaintiff had the right to have the validity of the annexation determined since its rights were affected, and that qno warranto was not the sole remedy.
A declaratory judgment proceeding was invoked to determine the validity of the annexation of school districts in Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324, 332, 334, 215 P2d 368. One of the justiciable issues upon which the case turned was whether or not the chairman of the school board closed the polls prematurely, thus depriving one Huckleberry, a registered voter, of voting. This involved a question of fact not apparent on the face of the election records. It appears that the election was conducted on daylight saving time rather than on standard time, and the election carried by a vote of 38 to 37. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the complaint as to the above issue. This court, sitting in banc and speaking through Mr. Justice Hay (there being in the case Justices Lusk and Brand), reversed, holding:
“A justiciable controversy having been stated, the test of the sufficiency of the complaint was not whether or not it showed that plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment in accordance with their theory, but whether or not they were entitled to any declaration at all, even if they were mistaken in their theory. * * * Moreover, even though the plaintiffs had not been entitled to a favorable declaration upon the facts stated in their complaint, if the complaint stated a justiciable controversy between the parties the general demurrer thereto should have been overruled, and the controversy should have been determined by a judicial declaration.”
We also said:
“* * * And it would seem that, the notices in the present case having informed the electors that *153the meeting would be held from seven o’clock, p.m., to nine o’clock, p.m., on a day certain, the chairman and other election officials were obliged to keep the meeting and the polls open continuously between such hours. If they failed to do so, and if such failure resulted in plaintiff Huckleberry, a registered voter, being denied the right to exercise his franchise at the election, and if the lack of his vote was sufficient to change the result of the election, as is alleged to be the fact, then it would seem that the election would have to be set aside.” (Italics ours).
The case was remanded with directions “for hearing upon such first cause of action.” Upon such hearing, it would be necessary to go outside of the record of the election proceedings to determine whether or not one Huckleberry, a qualified registered voter, presented himself at the polls, whether or not the election polls had been prematurely closed, and on what side of the question he would have voted.
Webb’s cause of action was based on the failure of the election officials to permit him to vote in the election. A trial was had on this issue, the action of the officials being upheld by the trial court. On appeal, after considering the evidence in the case, which obviously was evidence dehors the election records, we affirmed.
According to the authorities, the Webb case was a collateral attack; however, the declaratory judgment act makes no distinction between a collateral and a direct attack, or between a de jure or de facto corporation. If there is a justiciable issue between the parties wherein the legal status of a party is affected by a municipal charter or ordinance, he may “obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” The Webb case is authority for the prop*154osition that a declaratory judgment may be obtained where there is a jurisdictional defect not appearing on the face of the record.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Lusk, in referring to the Webb case, brushes it aside on the ground that it does not appear that the consolidated district had “achieved de facto status * * * and in any event the question here debated was not raised or passed upon by the court.” In the instant case, Estacada, for the first time on appeal, raised the quo warranto issue by asserting, “The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit.” In passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, therefore, we are confined to the allegations of the complaint. No reference is made in either the complaint or in the answer to a de facto corporation. To bolster his dissent on the de facto phase of the case, our esteemed associate has gone outside of the complaint and resorted to the evidence in order to draw his conclusion that Estacada, as annexed, is a de facto corporation because he alludes to $4,000 which was spent by the city in running water mains and a road into the annexed territory, but even this evidence falls far short of establishing a de facto status. The mayor of the city, over plaintiff’s timely and proper objection, testified that the city had spent $4,000 in running water mains into the annexed territory and had built a disposal plant in the new portion of the city with a road leading to it.
Sections 95-1808 and 114-121, OCLA, authorize cities to extend water mains and build disposal plants outside the corporate limits of the city. How, then, can it be said that the improvements alluded to were accomplished under the above statutes or under some *155other scheme? In onr opinion, such inadmissible, flimsy evidence is insufficient to establish a de facto corporation.
As to the contention that the debatable question was not raised in the Webb ease, suffice it to say that it was undoubtedly thought unnecessary to raise such a question since this court in School Dist. No.1 v. School Dist. No. 45, supra, and Tompkins v. District Boundary Board, supra, had previously held that quo warranto was not an exclusive remedy, and that a declaratory judgment proceeding was appropriate to test annexation proceedings. Over a period of 18 years, this court has adhered to the rule that the declaratory judgment act could be employed to test the validity of annexation proceedings, which rule has attained a stare decisis status. We should proceed mighty slowly, and with sound and logical reasons, before we upset the apple cart of procedure. As pointed out by that eminent jurist, Chief Judge John J. Parker, of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a recent address in Portland, the legal profession is destroying its very existence in a maze of procedural involvements and delays.
It cannot be denied that some jurisdictions hold that a declaratory judgment will not lie where plaintiff has another adequate remedy. One such case is Skinner v. City of Phoenix, 54 Ariz 316, 95 P2d 424, cited by Mr. Justice Lxxsk in his dissent. It will be observed that Arizona does not have a uniform declaratory judgment act. It lacks uniformity in that it contains no clause that the act is remedial or should be construed liberally. Our court is committed to the proposition that the declaratory judgment act may be employed to test the validity of annexation proceed*156ings, and that quo warranto is not the sole remedy. It will be noted that practically all of the Oregon cases holding that quo warranto is the sole remedy were decided prior to the passage of the declaratory judgment act in 1927. Anderson on Declaratory Judgments, vol. 1, 2d ed, 396, § 195, has the following to say:
“The holdings that a declaratory judgment action may be entertained without regard to the existence of another remedy, are not only sustained by the better reasons, but are more in harmony with the true spirit and purpose of the declaratory procedure.”
School Dist. No. 1 v. School Dist. No. 45, supra, is cited in the footnote under that section.
Of those who are loathe to depart from the old order, Professor Borchard in the preface to Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed, has the following to say:
“The declaratory judgment exposes the anatomy of the judicial process and discloses the many obstructions to the administration of justice which the current legal system incorporates and tolerates. These obstructions, identified in the encumbrances and barnacles which have accumulated over the centuries around the procedural writs, are cherished by many judges and lawyers as indigenous to the system and to the judicial process. Hence many members of the bench and bar not unnaturally acquire the view that the technicalities characterize the profession and the system, and that they exist for the delectation and benefit of the votaries of the priesthood itself; they are inclined to forget that both bench and bar are merely servants of the people, the better to enable the administration of justice to be accomplished.”
The judicial system has been endowed with the technicality curse from its inception, causing consonant delay and uncertainty and often enmeshing the real *157issues to the great perversion of justice. One of the reasons for the enactment of the declaratory judgment act was to unloosen the fetters of procedural bondage.
In the case at bar there is a division of the court on the appropriateness of the remedy. Those in the minority would have this ease dismissed and compel the plaintiff to resort to quo warranto. In such a situation, plaintiff would “hitch old Dobbin to the shay”, drive to Oregon City and change drivers, that is, if the district attorney would allow himself to be placed in the driver’s seat, since he, as such, represents two of the defendants in the present case in opposition to the contentions of plaintiff. Should he refuse to shift from one horn of the dilemma to the other, it would then be incumbent upon plaintiff to bring a mandamus proceeding to compel him to act in a quo warranto proceeding. After the matter was finally settled, plaintiff would return here with the same, or similar, record which we now have, with the ultimate result being the same.
The only difference we can see, in the two forms of relief, other than the name of the party-plaintiff, concerns the burden of proof. In quo warranto, the burden would be on the city to sustain the annexation, while, under the declaratory judgment act, the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove the illegal annexation. In both instances, the court has discretionary power to adjudicate on the merits, and the same defenses of laches, estoppel, etc., are available in either proceeding, so that if plaintiff were now required to bring a quo warranto proceeding, substance would be sacrificed to the goddess of form. “What’s in a name? that which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.”
*158This case has been before the courts for approximately two years, and another two years would elapse before a final determination. This matter is not only of great importance to the litigants but to the people of the community as well, and all are entitled to know at the earliest possible date what their status is, and we of the majority can see no justification for postponing action where the case was fairly tried on its merits in the circuit court, and it can be determined just as judicially now as later.
In the case at bar, it appears that there are two dissents in which it is argued that quo warranto is the proper proceeding, and two specially concurring opinions in which the thought is advanced that an injunction suit is the appropriate remedy. Could one think of a more cogent and impelling argument, when we ourselves are not in unanimity, for embracing the provisions of the declaratory judgment act?
The city raises the second proposition that, “The reasonable or unreasonable extension of city boundaries under the Oregon annexation statute is not a subject of judicial inquiry.” Many eases are cited by the city to sustain its position, notably among them being the City of Burlingame v. San Mateo County, 90 Cal App2d 705, 203 P2d 807. The plaintiff counters with a like array of authorities to sustain its position that in annexation proceedings the question of the reasonableness of extension of corporate limits is subject to judicial review and cites Vestal v. Little Rock, 15 Ark 321, 15 SW 891, 16 SW 291, as its leading case. We gain little solace from the eases cited by both parties since they are in hopeless conflict.
The crucial question in this case is whether or not the city has the absolute right to annex contiguous *159property irrespective of its reasonableness. Chapter 210, Oregon Laws 1949, in part, reads :
“Sec. 95-901. 1. The boundaries of any incorporated city now or hereafter existing in this state may be altered and contiguous new territory included therein after proceedings had as required by this section. Areas separated from cities only by streams or rivers shall be considered contiguous to such cities.”
The act goes on further to provide machinery in furtherance of the annexation, including an election in the city and in the area to be annexed, after due notice.
In a number of the Oregon decisions to which reference is made above, it is definitely held that where a city in annexation proceedings violates the state law the annexation is void. From time immemorial, we have consistently held that in the interpretation of state statutes relating to the enactment of legislation or ordinances by a city that the same must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily; therefore, in statutes empowering cities to legislate annexation proceedings, there is implied within the legislative grant that such cities must legislate reasonably and not arbitrarily, and such reasonableness is a part of the legislative grant to the same extent as if it were written literally into the statute.
It must be presumed that the legislature in enacting this legislation was fully conversant with the decisions of this court that all ordinances passed by cities must be reasonable, and that it intended that annexation by cities should be effectuated reasonably. It would be absurd to think that the legislature intended that a city would have carte blanche authority to reach out its tentacles like an octopus and envelop property which *160in no wise could be considered as beneficial to the city or to the property annexed. If this were not so, there would be nothing to prevent the cities from attaching to themselves territory far removed from the city environs by a narrow ribbon strip, so long as the property attached was contiguous. In State ex rel. Bibb v. City of Reno, 64 Nev 127, 178 P2d 366, 368, we find the following language:
“Chief Justice Shaw, famous Massachusetts jurist, said: ‘It is necessary to put extreme cases to test a principle.’ We will apply a test: Could Reno annex all farms, ranches and mines in the county? Could it annex a narrow strip to and then include Lake Tahoe? Or could it hurdle a hundred miles and annex a gypsum plant in northern Washoe County? The test shows respondents’ position is unsound. It is well settled that a court may construe an annexation statute and determine whether it has been misapplied by a city council. An annexation which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and unnecessary will be held invalid. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed. revised vol. 1, secs. 291, 293.”
Mr. McQuillin in 1 Municipal Corporations (rev), 2d ed, 801, § 291, has the following to say:
“* * * However, under most statutes the courts generally hold that the question of the reasonableness of extension of corporate limits is subject to judicial review, and if found unreasonable, will be declared void.
“The judicial view will be better understood by indicating a few general considerations which have influenced the courts. The conditions under which the municipal limits may be extended and territory annexed, and the nature of such territory, are well *161outlined in general terms in an Arkansas case which is usually followed.” (See eases in footnotes). See also 62 CJS, 127, §44.
It is the settled law in Oregon that municipal corporations, in exercising their powers, granted either by the legislature or by their charters, cannot exceed the powers granted them nor can they exercise such granted powers in an unreasonable manner. In Sloan v. Baker, 139 Or 370, 374, 10 P2d 362, we quote, with approval, 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed, § 367:
“ ‘As relates to the exercise of powers it is generally regarded that municipal corporations have none of the elements of sovereignty, that they cannot go beyond the powers granted them, and that they must exercise such granted powers in a reasonable manner. These are legal propositions well settled, and are everywhere enforced by judicial judgments.’ ”
The city next argues that the annexation proceedings were, in fact, reasonable. The trial court found that they were not. The record shows that the trial judge made a personal inspection of the territory in question. In an equity case the decision of the trial judge is entitled to weight, but where he examines the locus in quo, his findings and decree are entitled to more consideration.
As the case is tried de novo on appeal, we must look to the facts to determine whether or not the evidence supports the decision of the trial court. Plaintiff called to the witness stand seven witnesses as against one for the defendants. As space and time will not permit an analysis of the evidence of each witness, we will summarize the same. In order to follow our sum*162marization, we are inserting below a copy of an exhibit in the case, an aerial view of the property involved, with surrounding territory, taken from an airplane at an elevation of some 3,000 feet. The single heavy lines enclose the city of Estacada; the jagged lines enclose the whole of the annexed property; the parallel lines enclose plaintiff’s property.
*163The whole annexed area may be likened unto a “dumbell” in shape, one end being adjacent to the city and the other embracing plaintiff’s dam and powerhouse. The two ends of the “dumbell” are separated by a strip of land in varying widths, the narrowest point, hereinafter referred to as the “bottleneck”, being less than 300 feet, exclusive of the river which flows along the westerly side of the annexed property. South of the “bottleneck” and adjacent to the city proper is where all the persons reside inside of the annexed territory other than two families, one of which resides within the territory between the “bottleneck” and plaintiff’s property (circled on the map) and the other at the extreme northeast corner of the property sought to be annexed. Plaintiff’s property, comprising 60 acres, is practically one-and-one-half miles, by roundabout road, from the city boundary proper. There is no direct connecting means of access to plaintiff’s property, aside from that on foot through the woods, and then one must traverse a deep gully separating the city from plaintiff’s property.
Estacada comprises 222 acres with a population of 795 people and snuggles in the foothills of the Cascade range. The city consists of 1,038 lots, of which only 314 are improved, and 34.6 acres of unplatted property, none of which is occupied.
It is interesting to note that directly north of the city proper, but not included in the annexation, there are numerous homes situate on level land. The area north of the “bottleneck” is wooded land, and there is no habitation whatsoever within the boundaries of plaintiff’s property.
There are in evidence aerial photographs which give a very comprehensive view of the entire situation. From these photographs and from the other evidence, *164it is discernible that Estacada has nothing to offer in the way of city benefits to plaintiff’s property, and plaintiff’s property has nothing to offer to the city other than the revenues derived from taxation. Plaintiff’s electric plant at the river mill dam does not even service Estacada; it receives its power and light from other sources. The total assessed valuation of Estacada is $362,830, while the assessed valuation of plaintiff’s property is $708,000, almost twice as much.
Nearly all of plaintiff’s arguments are directed to the legal propositions involved, and very little is offered to the reasonableness of the annexation proceedings. The city’s sole argument for the reasonableness of the annexation is that the city has increased in population by 269 persons within ten years; that, “The area annexed is flat, suitable for home building, and borders a beautiful lake recreation area. There are already homes there, and with the extension of water mains, improvements of roads, and furnishing of street lighting, all contemplated and in part commenced, there can be little doubt the area will build more rapidly.”; and that, “The problem of policing the annexed area could be greatly aggravated by the removal of respondent’s land from the city.”
As to the increase in population, as hereinbefore pointed out, there is plenty of room to expand within the unoccupied portions of the city proper, and so far as the homes already being there is concerned, as hereinbefore indicated, they were located south of the “bottleneck” and adjoining the city itself. Concerning the policing of the area, it is interesting to note that the city’s witness, Mayor A. Gf. Ames, when queried about how many policemen the city had, replied, “One good one.”, so that the policing problem appears to be de minimis. The above reasons advanced by the *165city as to the reasonableness of the annexation are untenable.
No exact yardstick can be laid down as to what is reasonable and what is not. A sound formula is laid down in Vestal v. City of Little Rock, supra, at p. 892, as follows:
“That city limits may reasonably and properly be extended so as to take in contiguous lands (1) when they are platted and held for sale or use as town lots; (2) whether platted or not, if they are held to be brought on the market and sold as town property, when they reach a value corresponding with the views of the owner; (3) when they furnish the abode for a densely settled community, or represent the actual growth of the town beyond its legal boundary; (4) when they are needed for any proper town purpose, as for the extension of its streets, or sewer, gas, or water system, or to supply places for the abode or business of its residents, or for the extension of needed police regulation; and (5) when they are valuable by reason of their adaptibility [sic] for prospective town uses. But the mere fact that their value is enhanced by reason of their nearness to the corporation would not give ground for their annexation if it did not appear that such value was enhanced on account of their adaptibility to town use.
“We conclude further that city limits should not be so extended as to take in contiguous lands (1) when they are used only for purposes of agriculture or horticulture, and are valuable on account of such use; (2) when they are vacant, and do not derive special value from their adaptibility for city uses.”
We do not hold that the above is exclusive as facts may alter the situation since each case must depend upon its own facts. When we have a case, such as is presented by the record here, where it is obvious that the inclusion of plaintiff’s property was unreasonable and *166where the annexation was employed for the sole purpose of enhancing the revenues of the city in an amount practically twice that which the city now enjoys, the same is void.
The question arises as to whether we should declare the entire annexation proceedings void. The trial court held that the annexation of plaintiff’s property to Estacada was void and enjoined the collection of taxes on it. It is our opinion that the whole proceedings are void for the reason that the people of both districts voted on a particular annexation, and, if the annexation is void as to any part of the property involved, it necessarily follows that the entire annexation falls. The decree will be modified with directions to the trial court to enter a decree declaring the entire annexation proceedings void.