I dissent.
The State of Montana has declared and prescribed the proper place for the trial of civil actions commenced, prosecuted and to be tried in the courts of the state.
*249The public policy of this state which determines the place for the trial of all actions commenced in the courts of this state is that declared and prescribed by the Legislature in its enactment of sections 93-2901 to 93-2912, both inclusive, of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947.
Such public policy may neither be circumvented nor nullified by the provisions of any private contract.
Two persons making and entering into a contract of life insurance in Liberty County, Montana, may not lawfully provide therein that the venue of any suit thereon must be laid in Liberty County.
Two persons entering into a contract of marriage in Gallatin County, Montana, may not lawfully provide in such contract that the venue of any suit for the enforcement of any of the obligations of such marriage contract be laid only in Gallatin County.
Likewise, Electrical Products Consolidated, the owner of the electrical sign here involved, may not lawfully provide in its lease agreement or contract that in any suit it may institute under such contract that the venue of any such suit or action may, at the option of the owner, be laid in the County of King, State of Washington, where at 1263 Mercer Street in Seattle, it has its home office, nor may it lawfully provide that “the venue of any such suit or action may at the option of the owner, be laid in the County of Cascade, State of Montana” where the corporation has and maintains a branch office.
That such provisions in private contracts are null, void and of no effect is clearly shown in the following well-considered cases wherein the proper rule is stated viz.: McCarty v. Herrick, 41 Idaho 529, 240 Pac. 192; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 Pac. 383; General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson, 207 Cal. 285, 277 Pac. 1039; Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 182 N.C. 498, 109 S.E. 362.
On June 28, 1950, Herb Springer, then residing and operating a bar in Meagher County, Montana, signed a contract in writing with Electrical Products Consolidated, a foreign corporation, *250for installing and maintaining an electrical sign supplied by the corporation to Springer’s premises, the Maverick Bar, in "White Sulphur Springs.
The owner corporation duly installed the electrical sign called for by the contract at Springer’s Bar in Meagher County. The’ contract provided that the corporation should continue to be the owner of the sign and that for the use of its property Springer should pay to it a stipulated monthly rental.
Later Springer sold the Maverick Bar to Helen Bair Bodell,. who thereupon entered into the operation of such business. At the time she purchased the bar, Springer, the seller, assigned to her all his rights and interest in his contract with the corporation.
Sometime thereafter a dispute arose between Helen Bair Bodell and the plaintiff corporation, as to the maintenance of the sign and to settle same, Electrical Products Consolidated, as plaintiff, commenced in the district court of Cascade County, this suit against the defendant, Helen Bair Bodell. At the time-of the commencement of such suit, the defendant was and still is a bona fide resident of Meagher County, Montana. Upon being so made a party to the suit, the defendant, Helen Bair Bodell, made timely and proper application for a change of the place of trial to Meagher County where she resides; where the sign was installed; where the sign was and is to be maintained and where defendant’s witnesses reside.
The general rule governing venue in civil actions is that the action shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action. Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469, 146 Pac. (2d) 151.
R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2904, inter alia, provides that actions upon contracts may be tried in the county in which a contract was to be performed, and also that actions such as this shall be tried in the county in which the defendant may reside at the commencement thereof.
R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2906, provides that the court or judge *251must, on motion, change the place of trial when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county.
It is true that R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2910, provides: “All the parties to an action, by stipulation or by consent in open court, entered in the minutes, may agree that the place of trial may be changed to any county in the state. Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed upon.” Emphasis supplied.
Helen Bair Bodell was not a party to any action at the time she purchased the Maverick Bar in Meagher County. She did not become a party to this action until the day this suit was commenced against her in Cascade County. Then and not until then did she become a party defendant.
At no time since she became a party to this action did she by stipulation, by consent in open court entered in the minutes or by any other means provided by statute, section 93-2910, supra, agree that the place of the trial of this action be had in any other place or in any county other than Meagher County where she resides.
For these reasons the provisions of section 93-2910, supra, quoted in full and relied upon in the majority opinion herein, have no application whatever.
The venue of this action is to be determined by the provisions of the duly enacted statutes set forth in Chapter 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure of this state, sections 93-2901 to 93-2910.
In the case of Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, supra, 115 Mont. 469, 479, 146 Pac. (2d) 151, 154, this court said: “The legislature has enacted certain statutes which prescribe the rules by which ‘all contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted’. (Sec. 7526 [Revised Codes 1935, now R.C.M. 1947, section 13-701]). These provisions are obligatory on the courts.”
The provisions in the plaintiff corporation’s lease agreement providing that if the corporation shall institute any suit for the enforcement of any of the obligations under the contract, that the venue of such suit may, at the option of the owner, be laid in the County of Cascade, is violative of the public policy and statutes of the state, and therefore null and void. Under *252tke plain provisions of the statutes, the defendant, Helena Bair Bodell, was and is entitled to have this law suit transferred, to and tried in Meagher County, Montana, the place of her residence.