GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOGGS, C.J., BATCHELDER, ROGERS, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, JJ., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 237-50), delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which MARTIN, MOORE, COLE, and GILMAN, JJ., joined, with MOORE, J. (p. 250), also delivering a separate dissenting opinion, in which MARTIN, COLE, and CLAY, JJ., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (p. 251), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part.
OPINION
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.Petitioner-appellant Stephen Michael Bell1 was convicted in Tennessee state court of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder. After unsuccessfully pursuing relief in the Tennessee appellate courts, Bell sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied Bell’s petition but issued a certificate of appealability as to Bell’s claims that the prosecution in his case violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to turn over impeachment material and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell appealed, and a divided panel of our court reversed the *226district court as to Bell’s Brady claim. Bell v. Bell, 460 F.3d 739 (6th Cir.2006). A majority of the active members of the court voted for rehearing en banc, vacating the original panel decision.
For the reasons below, we affirm the decision of the district court denying Bell habeas relief.
I.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals set forth the facts underlying Bell’s conviction:
The victims, Herman Harrison Wallace, a/k/a Mad Dog, and his wife, Jean Lynn Wallace, were street people who camped under the bridges along the Cumberland River. The defendant, Michael Bell, a/k/a Monk, a street person, camped between the Wallaces and Nashville’s Riverfront Park.
Ronald Harrington, a street person, met the defendant on the railroad tracks near the camp sites on September 6, at approximately 3:00 p.m. Defendant was shirtless, wearing Levi’s, a pair of shoes or boots and had a gun in his hand. Chained to his belt, was a billfold similar to that carried by truck drivers. The gun was either a .32 or .38 caliber revolver. Defendant appeared to be under the influence and stated that he had been “coking[.”] During this exchange the defendant asked Mr. and Mrs. Harrington to take care of his dog if anything happened to him.
Edward Stansbury, an admitted alcoholic, testified that he spent the night of September 5, 1986, with friends on the river. The next morning he left but returned to the camp of Gary Hedges in the afternoon. At approximately 4:30 p.m. they noticed a man come up a path with a shiny black dog on a leash. The leash was a choker chain with a leather belt. When the man got to within twenty feet he spoke identifying himself as “Monk” and inquiring if “Mad Dog” and Jean were home. He walked down to the Wallaces’ tent and entered. Up to this point he, Stansbury, had no reason to commit to memory the man’s clothing or facial features.
As Stansbury and Hedges continued to sit they heard the sounds of dogs fighting and people arguing in the Wallaces’ camp, then they heard a muffled shot. Jean Wallace ran out of the tent screaming “He has killed my dog, he has killed my dog[.”] She turned and re-entered the tent. Stansbury heard a distinctive gun shot and saw Jean Wallace backing out of the tent. As she cleared the entrance she fell and there were two more shots. He was sure he had seen the man fire the last shot. The man had been right behind Mrs. Wallace at the entrance. The man left the tent and left the scene. As the man was leaving he attempted to reload his pistol.
Stansbury described the culprit as 6'2" or 6'1", lanky, wearing fairly new blue jeans, a black baseball cap over his eyes, a sleeveless Levi jacket and T-shirt. His arms were tattooed. He had a billfold with a chain which appeared attached to a belt loop.
At a line-up conducted near the crime scene in the fading evening light, Stans-bury was hesitant to identify the man in the number two spot. He was certain as to the man’s jeans and nearby dog. While testifying he said he was still confused about the man’s beard; he thought the culprit had short dark hair, but everything else about the number two man, the defendant, “fit to a tee[.”] Robert Moore, a Metropolitan Police Department homicide officer, arrived at the Wallaces’ camp. He viewed the body of Mrs. Wallace and was directed to four shell casings that were lying on *227the ground. The soil in the area was fairly loose and the shell casings, covered with a chalky gray substance, were on top of the soil. Upon closer examination he was able to detect the smell of gun powder.
Officer Moore was advised that Mr. Wallace had been moved to General Hospital and although he appeared to have been shot as many as three times, only one slug had been found at the hospital. The officers at the crime scene made an extensive search and were able to recover a slug from the bloody mattress within the tent where Mr. Wallace had lain when shot.
After talking with Hedges and Stans-bury and getting a general description of the suspect, the officers broadcasted a pick-up. Other detectives took the defendant in[to] custody and returned him to an area near the crime scene. Due to the fading light in and around the camp sites and under the bridges, other officers were setting up a line-up of street type people in an open area nearby. Officer Moore explained that facial identification was not that strong at the crime scene, but clothing details and the overall characteristics of the participants were strong in the witnesses’ minds.
Officer Mark Wynn and two other officers responded to a call that a man fitting the description of the suspect was believed to be in the area of Fessler’s Lane and Hermitage Avenue. They observed the suspect sitting on the curb and drinking a beer. He had a dog with him. He was taken in[to] custody and found to have six unspent .38 caliber Special Winchester 158 grain bullets in his pants pockets, but no weapon was found. He was concerned about the dog so the officers agreed to transport the dog to the place of the line-up. (A picture of the dog wearing the choke chain and belt leash was shown the jury.)
Sergeant Tommy Jacobs testified that shortly after 5:80 p.m., September 6, 1986, he visited the camp site of the defendant and recovered eleven spent .38 caliber shell casings and a Winchester ammunition box that were lying on the ground. A holster was also recovered at the camp site. Later at the police station Sergeant Jacobs read the defendant his Miranda rights. When told he would be charged with murder, the defendant responded that he had not shot anyone, had not shot a gun and had never shot a gun.
Officer Darryl Ryan performed a nitric acid test on the defendant’s hands. The swabs were sent to the crime laboratory.
Officer Archie Spain was sent to General Hospital. He took possession of a .38 caliber slug that was laying beside Mr. Wallace’s body in the emergency room.
The State introduced testimony from three laboratory technicians. The first technician had examined the defendant’s clothing for blood stains but found none. The second technician, a criminalist, had examined the swabs from the defendant’s hands for gunshot residue. This technician testified that “antimonium, barium and lead indicative of gunshot residue was found in significant concentrations on exhibit 5, hand swabs. These results indicate that the .subject could have fired or handled a gun.”
The third technician was a firearm examiner. He identified the two lead slugs filed earlier as exhibits as being fired from the same firearm. He had disassembled one of the live cartridges taken from the defendant’s pockets to compare the lead to the other lead slugs. He was of the opinion the three were from the same manufacturer. The eleven spent shells taken from defendant’s camp site were compared with the four *228spent shells recovered at the victims’ camp site. Based upon his microscopic examination he was of the opinion they all had been fired from the same firearm.
The medical examiner testified in detail as to two gunshot wounds found upon Jean Wallace’s body. In his opinion either one of these would have caused her death. From his examination of Herman Wallace, he concluded that death was the result of a saddle pulmonary embolus, a blood clot caused by the gunshot wounds which occluded the artery to the lungs.
The State rested its case in chief. Defendant’s motion for judgments of acquittal [was] overruled.
Defendant testified that on the morning of September 6, 1986, he went to Riverfront Park. There he met two men with whom he pooled his money for the purchase of a fifth of wine. He and one of the men moved about in that general area of town during which time the man mentioned having a .38 caliber pistol but needed shells. They went to Service Merchandise where this person purchased a box of cartridges upon signing the log and entering an identification number. They returned to Riverfront Park and then to defendant’s camp site where defendant did target practice with the man’s pistol. At noon he went to lunch and returned to the camp. The men were still at his camp. Later defendant walked to Lebanon Road and Fessler’s Lane where he was arrested. He acknowledged being brought back to the Riverfront Park. He testified that he did not know he was in a line-up. When shown a picture of the line-up he identified one participant as the man who purchased the shells that morning.
Defendant explained that his statement to Sergeant Jacobs of having never fired a gun had reference to a gun used to murder someone. He was unable to explain why he had first said his dog had been with him all day and changed to say the dog was not with him all day. He denied shooting the Wallaces.
The State called Billy Joe Camden as a rebuttal witness. This was the man who had purchased the box of shells at Service Merchandise on lower Broadway. Camden made the purchase at the request of the defendant. While they were together the defendant did not have his dog with him. After the purchase of the ammunition they went their separate ways. He did not go to the defendant’s camp site nor witness him fire a gun. He was taken from Riverfront Park for the line-up. Camden testified that he owned a .22 caliber rifle but never owned a .38 caliber pistol.
State v. Bell, No. 88-138-11, 1989 WL 86583, at *1-4 (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug.4, 1989). After hearing closing arguments and deliberating, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both murder counts against Bell. Bell was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder of Jean Lynn Wallace and received a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the second degree murder of Herman Harrison Wallace.
Also among the state’s witnesses at Bell’s trial was William Davenport, a convicted felon held with Bell in the Nashville jail during the period prior to Bell’s trial. In September 1986, Davenport contacted the Davidson County District Attorney General’s Office by letter, indicating that he had information about the Bell case. On October 13, 1986, Ronald Miller, the prosecutor assigned to Bell’s case, met with Davenport. Notes taken by Miller during that meeting document Davenport’s report that Bell admitted murdering the Wallaces. They also suggest that Davenport desired a transfer into a different *229facility, the “Red Building,” and movement into a work release program. The notes also seem to refer to Davenport’s parole eligibility status. In November 1986, following Miller’s meeting with Davenport, the district attorney’s office, through a separate attorney, elected not to prosecute four criminal counts pending against Davenport. Davenport received concurrent sentences on two remaining charges.
When called by the government at Bell’s March 1987 trial, Davenport testified that Bell said that he shot Herman Wallace during the course of an argument in which Bell was inebriated or “messed up.” According to Davenport, Bell said that he shot Jean Wallace because “she was there” and expressed no remorse for either killing. Bell’s defense counsel, Ross Aider-man, attacked Davenport’s account on cross-examination, suggesting that Davenport was an incredible witness due to his criminal history and his prior Ku Klux Klan membership. During his closing argument, Alderman again challenged Davenport’s veracity, emphasizing Davenport’s criminal history and parole status. Miller attempted to undermine Alderman’s implication that Davenport had an incentive to lie to the jury and denied that Davenport’s decision to testify had anything to do with any promises from his office. He stated at closing, “Mr. Alderman would have you believe that [Davenport] wants an early parole through our office or through me. Well, I don’t have any say-so with the Parole Board; they are going to let him go soon enough anyway. I have nothing to do with what they do in their own respective realms.” Shortly after Bell’s trial, however, Miller did send a letter to the Board of Pardons and Parole on Davenport’s behalf requesting parole “at the earliest possible date.” Davenport was granted early parole in June 1987.
Following his conviction, Bell filed a direct appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, raising a number of claims. The appeals court denied the ap•peal on all grounds on August 4, 1989, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied Bell’s petition for review on November 6, 1989. Bell then sought post-conviction relief in state court. On November 2, 1992, the trial court denied him relief, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial on August 4, 1994. Bell sought permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, but the state supreme court denied his appeal on January 3,1995.
On June 12, 1995, Bell filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The court transferred Bell’s petition to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. After the court denied Bell’s motion for partial summary judgment on March 31, 1997, there was no further action in the case for more than a year, and, as a result, the court dismissed the case without prejudice on October 23, 1998. Bell moved to reopen the case, and the court granted the motion on June 2, 1999. In an amended petition, filed September 6, 2000, Bell alleged fourteen constitutional violations. Two of those claims are relevant to the matter before us. Bell argued that the prosecution violated the Fourteenth Amendment by withholding favorable evidence from him in contravention of Brady, thereby depriving him of due process. He further claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate his history of alcoholism and mental illness and to place those issues before the jury as factors undermining the government’s proof of premeditation. The government thereafter moved to *230dismiss the petition, and the district court granted that motion on April 26, 2002, as to nine of Bell’s claims on procedural default grounds. As to the remainder of Bell’s claims' — including his Brady and ineffective assistance claims — the court decided that them resolution would require discovery.
The district court conducted an eviden-tiary hearing on January 22 and 27, 2004. On January 22, Bell introduced an expert report prepared by Dr. Pamela Mary Au-ble. Dr. Auble’s report detailed Bell’s lengthy history of alcohol and drug abuse and his mental health problems. The report concluded that Bell’s intoxication or mental illness could have compromised his mental state at the time of the Wallace murder, thus eliminating his ability to engage in a premeditated killing. Alderman testified at the hearing that he did investigate Bell’s mental health history and alcoholism but defended his decision not to pursue these issues as a possible defense tactic because Bell insisted upon his innocence and wanted Alderman to assert an identity defense, that is, that Bell was not the killer. In addition, Alderman represented that because Bell had been ruled competent to stand trial, he could not prevail on a theory of insanity. Finally, Alderman testified that, although he submitted a discovery request to the government prior to trial, he received no information concerning Davenport’s communications with the prosecution or his criminal background. Nevertheless, Alderman acknowledged that he knew that Davenport was seeking early parole and that he had been able to argue at closing that Davenport provided testimony in order to receive the benefit of early parole.
At the hearing’s continuation- on June 27, Miller testified. He conceded many of the facts-related to his interactions with Davenport. However, Miller expressly denied promising Davenport anything in exchange for his testimony. In explaining his decision to submit a letter to the parole board on Davenport’s behalf, Miller stated, “I didn’t promise Davenport anything, and I didn’t make any agreements with him, but he testified at trial against someone I thought was dangerous, and I felt that he would now be labeled as a snitch, and it might be best that I did whatever I could do to get him out of prison, whenever the parole board thought he would be eligible.”
On March 26, 2004, the district court issued a written order denying all of Bell’s remaining claims. As to Bell’s Brady claim, the court ruled that Miller’s letter to the parole board was created after trial and thus could not have been disclosed pretrial. The court determined that the prosecution should have turned over the materials tending to prove that Davenport was seeking favors from the government in exchange for his testimony but held that Bell had not shown that the omission of these documents deprived him of a fair trial. With respect to Bell’s claim that his counsel was deficient, the court held that Alderman did adequately investigate Bell’s history of substance abuse and blackouts and ordered a pretrial mental evaluation of Bell. Because Bell was found competent to stand trial and because Bell insisted on his innocence, Alderman pursued a defense based on identity. The district court concluded that this tactical decision was consistent with Sixth Amendment standards. Bell appealed to this court after receiving a certificate of appealability from the district court on his Brady and Sixth Amendment claims.
On appeal, a divided panel of our court reversed, concluding that the prosecution unlawfully withheld evidence of a tacit agreement between Davenport and Miller, the notes documenting Miller’s meeting with Davenport, and sentencing records *231from the separate criminal proceedings against Davenport. Concluding that there was a reasonable probability of a different result had these materials been properly disclosed, the panel granted relief on Bell’s Brady claim. The panel affirmed the denial of Bell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Warden successfully sought rehearing en banc, and the original panel decision was vacated.2
II.
A.
In assessing the correctness of the district court’s decision on Bell’s petition, we evaluate the district court’s factual findings for clear error and review the district court’s ultimate refusal to grant habeas relief de novo. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir.2000). As to the standard applicable to any relevant state court rulings, Bell asserts that the highly deferential review standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), does not apply to his claims because he filed his initial petition before the enactment of the statute. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The Warden responds that the district court dismissed Bell’s original petition without prejudice, and Bell’s amended petition was filed after AEDPA’s effective date. Therefore, argues the Warden, AEDPA applies.
The parties’ dispute is immaterial. In the present case, AEDPA’s applicability is relevant only to the extent that we must review a state court’s ruling on Bell’s claims. As explained infra, Bell failed to present either of his claims to the state courts, and there is, therefore, no state court decision on these issues for us to review. We accordingly apply de novo review to Bell’s constitutional claims. See Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 284 (6th Cir.2006).
B.
Bell seeks habeas relief on the ground that the prosecution failed to turn over impeachment materials relating to William Davenport, a government witness. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. A successful Brady claim requires a three-part showing: (1) that the evidence in question be favorable; (2) that the state suppressed the relevant evidence, either purposefully or inadvertently; (3) and that the state’s actions resulted in prejudice. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).3
*232Bell cites three items that he contends constituted favorable impeachment evidence subject to disclosure under Brady. First, Bell points to notes Miller took during his October 1986 meeting with Davenport. Those notes reveal that Davenport sought consideration for his assistance in the proceedings against Bell. Second, Bell argues that the prosecution was obligated to turn over the sentencing records from the case against Davenport. Those records show that the district attorney decided not to prosecute Davenport on two charges of grand larceny and two charges of concealing stolen property. They also show that Davenport received concurrent sentences on two additional criminal charges. Third, Bell claims that Davenport and Miller had an implied agreement or understanding that Miller would seek early parole for Davenport in exchange for his inculpatory testimony against Bell. That agreement, Bell argues, was subject to disclosure pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). We consider each of these items in light of the three-part test outlined above.
1.
The Brady rule applies to evidence that is exculpatory in nature as well as evidence that a defendant could use at trial to impeach a government witness. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). As to the notes from Miller’s October 1986 meeting with Davenport, we agree with the district court that the prosecution was under an obligation to turn those notes over to Bell prior to trial. The documents from that meeting include four notations of significance: (1) an indication that Davenport unilaterally contacted the district attorney’s office to provide assistance in the Bell case; (2) a note that Davenport “want[ed] to go to the Red Building”; (3) what appears to be an outline of Davenport’s scheduled prison1 release dates; and (4) a reference to a work release program. Collectively, Miller’s notes, though cryptic, confirm that Davenport sought out the district attorney’s office and provide support for the claim that he requested preferential treatment — in the form of a facility transfer or work release — in return for his assistance. This information is proper impeachment materi*233al and should have been disclosed to Bell prior to trial. See United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303 n. 5 (3d Cir.2006) (“There can be no dispute that the information in question is favorable to the defense because [a witness’s] expectation of lenience in the state proceedings could have been used to impeach him.”). The sentencing documents arising out of the proceedings against Davenport are also impeachment material, qualifying as evidence of his prior convictions, and should have been disclosed. See Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 998 (7th Cir.1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the state did, as a matter of law, improperly withhold [witness’s] criminal history record from [defendant].”)
We take a different view, however, of Bell’s assertion of a tacit agreement or “understanding” that was subject to disclosure under Brady. It is well established that an express agreement between the prosecution and a witness is possible impeachment material that must be turned over under Brady. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763. The existence of a less formal, unwritten or tacit agreement is also subject to Brady’s disclosure mandate. See, e.g., Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir.2005). If Bell could prove that Davenport and Miller had reached a mutual understanding, albeit unspoken, that Davenport would provide testimony in exchange for the district attorney’s intervention in the case against him, such an agreement would qualify as favorable impeachment material under Brady. On the record before us, however, we are unable to conclude that such an agreement existed here.
In support of his assertion of an implied agreement, Bell relies in part on the notes from Miller’s discussion with Davenport on October 3, 1986. He argues, in addition, that the events following this meeting— specifically, the resolution of the case against Davenport — confirm the existence of an agreement between Davenport and Miller. The record confirms Bell’s claim that Davenport contacted the district attorney’s office in the hope of receiving a benefit in exchange for his assistance. Indeed, Miller testified at the evidentiary hearing before the district court that, although he was not certain what Davenport wanted, “[everybody wants something, and I’m sure Davenport wanted something.”
The fact that Davenport desired favorable treatment in return for his testimony in Bell’s case does not, standing alone, demonstrate the existence of an implied agreement with Miller. A witness’s expectation of a future benefit is not determinative of the question of whether a tacit agreement subject to disclosure existed. See id. at 325 (“[W]hat one party might expect from another does not amount to an agreement between them.”). Although Davenport may have been seeking more lenient treatment in his own case, we find no evidence of a corresponding assurance or promise from Miller. Miller testified at the evidentiary hearing before the district court that he did not promise Davenport anything in exchange for his testimony, stating unequivocally that he “made no agreements with Mr. Davenport at all.” When asked at his parole hearing about Miller’s letter to the parole board and Davenport’s participation in the Bell case, Davenport stated that he “got nothing out of that whatsoever.”
Nor do we believe that the handling of Davenport’s case after his meeting in October 1986 proves the existence of an understanding. As to the disposition of the six counts pending against Davenport, Bell does not direct us to any reliable evidence that the prosecutor or judge assigned to Davenport’s case had any awareness that *234Davenport was planning to render assistance in the Bell case.4 Without evidence to the contrary, one could just as reasonably conclude that the result in Davenport’s case merely reflects the standard operations of the criminal justice system, in which the state offers leniency to defendants in exchange for their pleas of guilty. Cf. Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 324 (“[M]ost criminal cases are disposed of pursuant to plea agreements that involve concessions on [the government’s] part.”). Moreover, Bell relies too heavily upon Miller’s subsequent decision to transmit a letter to the parole board. In his letter, Miller mentions Davenport’s cooperation in the case against Bell, but also notes the threat of possible retaliation by other prisoners as a reason for granting Davenport early parole. In light of Miller’s sworn statement before the district court that he had no agreement with Davenport, we have no reason to believe that an undisclosed agreement was the true reason for Miller’s letter to the parole board.
In sum, although we do not take issue with the principle that the prosecution must disclose a tacit agreement between the prosecution and a witness, it is not the case that, if the government chooses to provide assistance to a witness following a trial, a court must necessarily infer a preexisting deal subject to disclosure under Brady. “The government is free to reward witnesses for their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.” Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir.2003) (emphasis in original). To conclude otherwise would place prosecutors in the untenable position of being obligated to disclose information prior to trial that may not be available to them or to forgo the award of favorable treatment to a participating witness for fear that they will be accused of withholding evidence of an agreement.
Bell has not adequately demonstrated the existence of an understanding between Davenport and Miller concerning his testimony at Bell’s trial. “Without an agreement, no evidence was suppressed, and the state’s conduct, not disclosing something it did not have, cannot be considered a Brady violation.” Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 849 (7th Cir.2002).5 The result advocated by Judge Clay in his dissenting opinion would create a new definition of Brady material that includes possible post-trial witness favorable treatment — something never previously considered by any court to be within Brady’s ambit.6
2.
We next consider whether a Brady violation occurred because the prosecu*235tion did not disclose the favorable evidence-the sentencing records and the notes from Miller’s 1987 meeting. With respect to the sentencing records, the Warden argues that those records were publicly available and that Bell could have obtained access to them.
The Warden is correct that the sentencing records were available to Bell. Moreover, because Davenport’s testimony derived from statements Bell made to him while they were in jail together, Bell easily could have pursued any pending charges against Davenport and their disposition. In fact, Davenport mentioned a pending charge as a reason for his incarceration during his testimony. Under such circumstances, our court has made clear that a Brady violation does not occur. See Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir.2007) (‘Where, like here, ‘the factual basis’ for a claim is ‘reasonably available to’ the petitioner or his counsel from another source, the government is under no duty to supply that information to the defense.”) (citation omitted); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998) (There is no Brady violation where information is available to the defense “because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.”).
The dissent faults the majority’s reliance on our case law regarding withheld information that is readily available to the defense from another source. Instead, it says that this issue is controlled by two Supreme Court cases: Strickler and Banks. The dissent reasons that Strickler and Banks compel the conclusion that a Brady violation occurred because the prosecutor in this case represented to Bell’s counsel that he had turned over all discoverable information in his file.
In our view, Strickler and Banks do not call our precedents into question and do not counsel a conclusion that there was a Brady violation with respect to the nondisclosure of the sentencing records. Neither case involves information remotely similar to the public sentencing records not given to the defense in this case. Rather, both involve information known to investigating officers that defendants had no reason to know about and that could not have been discovered by defendants without an extensive and possibly fruitless investigation. In Strickler, the withheld information consisted of notes taken by a detective during interviews with a key witness and letters from the witness to the detective. 527 U.S. at 266 & 273-75, 119 S.Ct. 1936. In Banks, the undisclosed evidence included the status of one witness as a paid police informant who had provided information about the defendant’s involvement in the case and interviews that police and prosecutors conducted with another witness who denied in his testimony that he had spoken to anyone about his testimony. 540 U.S. at 675-76, 124 S.Ct. 1256. Given these facts, the Supreme Court readily concluded that Strickler and Banks had shown cause for failing to present their Brady claims in state court because they had reasonably relied on the prosecutor’s open file policy and assertions during state proceedings that everything known to the government had been disclosed.7 Strick-ler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936; Banks, 540 U.S. at 698, 124 S.Ct. 1256.
*236By contrast, in this case the known fact of Davenport’s incarceration strongly suggested that further inquiry was in order, whether or not the prosecutor said he had turned over all the discoverable evidence in his file, and the information was a matter of public record. See Matthews, 486 F.3d at 890-91 (concluding that witness’s withdrawal of original guilty plea, plea to reduced charges, and resentencing were public information and that government could not have “disclosed” information “readily available to the defense”); Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 611(6th Cir.2004) (holding that where evidence is available from sources other than the state and defendant was “aware of the essential facts necessary for him to obtain that evidence,” the Brady rule does not apply). The absence of reasonable reliance distinguishes this case from Strickler and Banks.
3.
Turning to the notes from Miller’s 1987 meeting with Davenport, which were not otherwise available to Bell, we examine whether the failure to disclose those notes amounted to constitutional error. The Supreme Court has held that error of constitutional magnitude occurs only when the production of the evidence would have created a “reasonable probability” of a different result. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. As the Court noted in Kyles v. Whitley:
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”
514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). Thus, if Bell *237can show that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict,” he will prevail. Id. at 435,115 S.Ct. 1555.
Without question, Miller’s notes would have provided support for the defense theory that Davenport expected some benefit in return for his testimony against Bell and was therefore not a credible witness. Despite the absence of the notes, however, Alderman did challenge the purity of Davenport’s motives during his closing argument, stating:
[Y]ou have got to decide whether you want to believe somebody who was on parole, violated that parole, was in jail, all this involving a crime involving fraud and false dealings, theft— I [Davenport] want you to believe [my testimony] ... because I have got a parole hearing coming up in a matter of months and if I can go to the Parole Board and I can say, ‘I have helped convict Stephen Michael Bell,’ that they might cut me some slack because they violated my last parole when I committed another crime.... That is why I called the District Attorney’s office; that is why I spoke to the police and the District Attorney and that is why I came to testify, but you believe me.
The notes from Davenport’s meeting with Miller could have bolstered Bell’s credibility attack on Davenport’s motives, but any assistance would have been modest. The jury was apprised of Davenport’s status and the possible other reasons for his decision to testify, namely, that he wished to secure early parole as a result of his participation in the Bell case. Documentation would not have permitted the development of alternate theories or different lines of argument. Thus, the inclusion of the withheld material could not “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555.
We conclude, therefore, that Miller’s notes from his meeting with Davenport were not material, and the district court correctly denied relief on Bell’s Brady claim.
C.
Bell also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we agree with the original panel’s resolution of this issue, affirming the district court’s denial of relief on Bell’s claim, we reinstate the original panel decision as to that claim. See Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 315 (6th Cir.2007); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir.1998).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court denying Bell’s claim for habeas relief.
. Because petitioner and respondent share the same last name, we refer to petitioner as “Bell” and respondent as "the Warden.”
. Judge Moore’s dissenting opinion questions the justification for granting en banc review in this case, asserting that the case does not present a question of exceptional public importance but only a difference of opinion as to what facts permit the inference of a tacit agreement. As explained infra at note 6, it is precisely the panel majority’s conclusion that the facts of this case permit such an inference that would create a new definition of Brady material and a new legal rule broadly applicable in federal criminal prosecutions as well as habeas proceedings. If the panel majority's opinion remained as binding precedent, the impact would be enormous. While ordinarily factual issues do not merit en banc rehearing, this one does.
. The Warden argues that we are not permitted to entertain Bell’s Brady claim because he failed to present it to the state courts prior to bringing his claim in federal court and his claim is now procedurally defaulted. For his part, Bell does not contest the Warden’s rep-*232reservation that he did not assert a Brady violation in state court. Under both the pre-AEDPA and AEDPA regimes, Bell was required to exhaust the remedies available to him in Tennessee’s courts prior to seeking relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (1996). Where a petitioner fails to exhaust his state remedies "and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claim in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred ... there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas..." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (emphasis added). Because Tennessee law limits an inmate to only one postconviction petition, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), Bell is precluded from returning to state court to exhaust his Brady claim properly, and his claim is therefore procedurally defaulted. A habeas petitioner who defaults on his federal claims in state court is barred from bringing those claims in federal court unless he "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,, or demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. As the Supreme Court explained in Barilcs v. Dretke, the cause and prejudice standard tracks the last two elements of a Brady claim: suppression by the government and materiality. 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936). We therefore choose to focus our attention on the merits of Bell's claim with the understanding that our decision on the merits resolves any issues as to procedural default.
. Bell notes in his brief that the attorney prosecuting Davenport’s case, Katie Novak, "later became Miller's wife,” implying that Novak was somehow complicit in the purported arrangement between Davenport and Miller. Bell's bare suggestion is not enough to convince us that this was the case, however.
. Bell also argues that Miller’s letter to the parole board was Brady material. However, as the district court correctly observed, Miller drafted that letter after Bell’s trial and could not have disclosed it pretrial. The letter is useful to Bell only as evidence of a possible agreement between Davenport and Miller concerning Davenport’s testimony. For the reasons set forth above, we do not believe that the materials Bell cites, including the letter, amount to proof of an understanding, implied or otherwise.
.Such an expansion of the definition of Brady has legal implications as well as factual ones. And because prosecutors so frequently use cooperating witnesses in criminal trials, the practical effect of such a definition is great.
. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court observed in Banks that the cause and prejudice standard tracks the last two elements of a Brady claim: suppression by the government and materiality. 540 U.S. at 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936). The cause analysis adopted by the Court includes examination of whether a defendant reasonably relied on the government’s representation. Id. at 692, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (citation omitted). Similarly, analysis of whether material was suppressed by the government involves consideration of reasonable reliance. Id. at 698, 124 S.Ct. 1256. Cf. Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2007) ("[T]here was no *236suppression of [a] tape” where defendant had knowledge of a witness and "had within his knowledge information by which he could have ascertained her statement.”); Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir.2004) ("Though defense counsel could have conducted his own investigation, he was surely entitled to rely on the prosecution's representation that it was sharing the fruits of the police investigation.”) The terminology provides opportunity for confusion, however, because the government’s withholding of evidence does not necessarily mean that it has suppressed the evidence for purposes of ascertaining whether a Brady violation has occurred. And whether a Brady violation is ultimately found is not determinative of the extent of the prosecutor's broad duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. The Court itself recognized in Strickler the differing uses of the terms:
This special status explains both the basis for the prosecution’s broad duty of disclosure and our conclusion that not every violation of that duty necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust. Thus the term “Brady violation” is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence— that is, to any suppression of so-called "Brady material” — although, strictly speaking, there is never a real "Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.
527 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936. In this opinion we use the term "Brady violation” in the strict sense of the term. Thus, saying that a particular nondisclosure was not a Brady violation in no way suggests that the prosecutor did not have a duty to disclose the information.
. The record is unclear as to when exactly Davenport was eligible for parole. At Petitioner's trial, Davenport testified that his parole eligibility date was December 5, 1987. A handwritten note on a copy of the letter written by Miller suggests a parole eligibility date of November 25, 1987.