(dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the opinion rendered herein. It sustains an order of the Corporation Commission granting a certificate to the Magic Empire Express of Tulsa, authorizing it to operate a Class A motor carrier express service from, to and between some 130 cities and towns, and over certain routes and highways. The certificate supersedes a previous one held by the company and increases to a considerable extent the territory over which the company may operate. Oklahoma City, Edmond, Poteau, and many other towns are among those which the order authorizes the company to include in its service, and which it did not previously serve.
The Corporation Commission is empowered by Title 47, § 166, O.S.19S1 to issue or deny certificates to motor carriers as in its judgment, the public convenience and necessity may require.
“Under the provisions of the Constitution, this court on appeal from an order of the Corporation Commission, is required to review the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the order appealed from it supported by substantial evidence, and when there is such evidence reasonably tending to support the order of the Commission, such order must be sustained; and, conversely, if the order is not so sustained, the Commission’s order will be reversed.” Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway Co. v. State, Okl., 275 P.2d 274, 275.
I am of the opinion that the order appealed from is not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, should be reversed. I deem it unnecessary to point out or analyze in detail wherein the evidence is insufficient, but shall refer to the same as a whole. Much of the testimony produced by the company in support of its application shows that the witnesses were testifying about his or her company’s need or desire for additional service without relation or application to the needs or convenience of the general public. In several instances the witnesses were not informed as to the transportation schedules and facilities available to their needs, as furnished by the several companies, most of which are classed as express carriers, such *871as bus lines, motor truck, railway express agency, and railroads.
The order results in' a duplication of service to several points, without any apparent increase in service or benefits to the public.
“In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 126 Okl. 48, 258 P. 874, wherein this Court had under consideration the first motor carrier statute said: ‘By the act it is not intended to promote competition between and among common carriers, but, on the other hand, it is intended that common carriers, railroads and motor carriers alike, should receive a fair measure of protection against ruinous competition, with a view that the public may be better served. It has never been the policy of Legislatures to enact legislation for the benefit of individuals or classes of individuals, except so far as the same would directly affect the public interest. In attempting to define or limit the term “necessity”, as used in the act, we must deal with something to which the public is entitled.’ ”
With the exception of some smaller cities or towns, the evidence shows that adequate express service is available to the public. As to those points not adequately served, service may be had by minor changes in existing routes without a blanket order effecting a radical and unwarranted change in routes over a large territory.
The opinion refers to a policy followed by the applicant, Magic Empire Express, as well as its chief competitor, Mistletoe Express, whereby the entire charge on a shipment is retained by the delivering carrier, although picked up and carried part way by another, when it originates at a point served by both carriers but delivery is made at a point served only by one carrier. Such situation should be remedied by an order directing a proper division of the carrying charge, and not by granting an additional permit.
The first syllabus of the opinion apparently holds that the situation or conditions therein stated with respect to the carriers was competent evidence to support the order of the Commission. Such holding, as I view it, is unwarranted. The express service rendered by the respective carriers designated as “A” and “B” along and over U. S. Highway 66 and Turner Turnpike is not evidence of the necessity for additional routes or service over other territory, and the syllabus is erroneous in so holding or indicating.
I consider the evidence insufficient to sustain the order of the Commission and, therefore, respectfully dissent.