(concurring in the result):
I concur in the result which remands this case to the trial court to determine whether *1280the plaintiff exercised diligence in ascertaining the last known address of Bos.
It is well established that a state may, as a condition precedent to the use of its highways by a nonresident motorist or by a resident motorist who later departs from the state, enact a statute providing that such motorist consents to the appointment of a state official as his agent for the acceptance of service of process in actions arising out of the operation of his motor vehicle within that state. The right of the state to do so rests on the exercise of its police powers to prescribe regulations necessary for public safety and order in the operation of motor vehicles. 61 C.J.S. § 502(l)(a). The validity of such statutes has been upheld provided they contain a provision making it reasonably probable that notice of suit or notice of service on the state official designated as agent will be communicated to the defendant who is sued. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927). It has been pointed out that “such consent may be a pure legal fiction where the nonresident user of the State’s highways is not aware of the statutory mandate, but the use, related as it is to the public safety and security, is of a nature such as to justify the fiction.” Whalen v. Young, 15 N.J. 321, 104 A.2d 678 (1954). Such statutes greatly benefit the residents of the state in that they may bring legal action and recover an in personam judgment against a nonresident motorist or a departed resident motorist in the state where the accident occurred. They are not forced to pursue their action in a foreign state.
Because nonresident motor vehicle statutes such as our Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-8 rest on a distinct basis as explained above, I do not find it relevant or helpful to determine in this action whether our decision in Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), was correct and whether we misinterpreted Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Neither of those cases involved nonresident motor vehicle statutes which for fifty years have been held constitutional. Both cases arose from an entirely different set of facts. The reservations expressed in Graham v. Sawaya about obtaining an in personam judgment by publication and mailing of process under the facts of that case were not meant to apply to actions arising under section 41-12-8. That case involved a suit against a nonresident for his fraud in procuring investment funds and then converting them to his own use.
In the instant action, we need only concern ourselves with whether the plaintiff made diligent inquiry in attempting to ascertain Bos’s last known address. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra. As explained in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of Justice Stewart, this requirement does not mean the last address known to the plaintiff, but the last address known to persons who would be expected to know it, and the last known address is the one that is most likely to give notice to the party to be served. 61 C.J.S. § 502(5)(b). See Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
It is interesting to note that several courts have held that a plaintiff bringing an action as late as two years after the accident may rely on an address furnished by the nonresident motorist to the proper public authority (usually the police) at the time of the accident, and there is a continuing duty on the nonresident or departed motorist to keep that address current for a reasonable time. Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1947); Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964); Swift v. Leasure, 285 A.2d 428 (Del.Super.1971). Nevada’s nonresident motor vehicle statute (Nev.Rev.Stat. § 14.070) provides that process may be mailed to the defendant at the address given in his accident report, if any, and, if none is given, then to the best address of the defendant which is available to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of that state advised that the plaintiff in his affidavit should state the source of the address of the defendant which he uses. By so doing, the plaintiff establishes his good faith and diminishes the possibility of fraud. Mitchell v. Second Judicial Dis*1281trict Court, 82 Nev. 377, 418 P.2d 994 (1966).