dissenting.
The justification for forbidding the placement of for-sale automobiles on the public streets—for inspection by potential buyers—is simply obvious: people may be drawn to stand in the street for nontraffic purposes. The act of selling a car in a public street invites prospective buyers into the road to examine the car, and common sense supports a ban on such acts. To read into the First Amendment a requirement that governments go through pointless formalities before they enact such a commonsense rule is, in my view, to cheapen the grandeur of the First Amendment. To require a study, or testimony, or an affidavit, to demonstrate the obvious is to turn law into formalistic legalism. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent requires such a step.
Indeed, Metromedia strongly supports upholding the ordinance without any artificial record evidence requirement. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). In Metromedia, the Supreme Court, in a split opinion, invalidated a city’s ban on off-site billboard advertising because of the extent to which the ban affected noncommercial speech. Id. at 512-21, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (plurality); id. at 521-40, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Under the reasoning of a strong majority of the Court, however, the city’s ban on off-site billboard advertising was determined to be constitutional to the extent that it regulated commercial speech. Id. at 503-12, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (plurality) (ban complies with First Amendment to extent it applies to commercial speech); id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (same); id. at 555-69, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (ban altogether constitutional); id. at 569-70, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). While the reasoning of these various opinions differed, a majority of five justices adopted the reasoning of Justice White’s plurality opinion with regard to the constitutionality of the billboard ban to the extent it dealt with commercial speech. Since the instant case *780deals exclusively with commercial speech, the portion of Justice White’s opinion for four justices (i.e. Parts I-IV), joined also by Justice Stevens, 453 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), is directly controlling for this court. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
That analysis directly supports upholding the ordinance in this case. The Me-tromedia Court majority determined that the ban on commercial speech met each element of the Central Hudson test: (1) the speech did not involve unlawful activity and was not misleading, and thus was entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) the ban sought to implement a substantial government interest; (3) it directly advanced that interest; and (4) it reached no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 453 U.S. at 507-17, 101 S.Ct. 2882. The same result follows in this case. First, the speech does not involve unlawful activity and is not misleading. Second, the “substantial government interests” identified in Metromedia, traffic safety and appearance of the city, are remarkably close to those identified in this case, and Pagan concedes that the Village’s asserted interests are “substantial.”
The “more serious question” in Me-tromedia, as in this case, was the third criterion—whether the ordinance directly advanced the identified interests. The Court majority rejected an argument that the record was insufficient to establish a connection between billboards and traffic safety. 453 U.S. at 509, 101 S.Ct. 2882. Although the record was “meager” on this point, the California Supreme Court, taking into consideration the fact that “[billboards] are intended to, and undoubtedly do, divert a driver’s attention from the roadway,” had refused to strike down a reasonable legislative judgment regarding how to deal best with such distractions. Id. at 508-09, 101 S.Ct. 2882. The United States Supreme Court majority likewise held that San Diego could constitutionally ban commercial speech billboards, hesitating “to disagree with the accumulated, commonsense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety.” Id. at 509, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (emphasis added). The majority concluded:
There is nothing here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable. As we said in a different context:
We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false.
Id.
A closely parallel analysis is dispositive here. The commonsense judgment of Glendale’s lawmakers is, if anything, far more compelling in this case. Simply put, exhibiting cars for sale on the public roadway may interfere with the dedication of such roadways to traffic and its necessary incidents. The ban on placing cars in the roadway for sale undoubtedly directly advances the Village’s interest in traffic safety-
Noteworthy in the Metromedia Court majority’s analysis is the total absence of reliance on record evidence to support its direct advancement rationale. This despite the Metromedia plaintiffs’ assertion that the record was inadequate to support the ban on off-site billboard advertising and the Court majority’s recognition that the California Supreme Court had noted the meagerness of the record. Common sense prevailed in that case, and common *781sense even more strongly supports the conclusion that substantial interests are directly advanced in this case. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995), that even in a First Amendment case applying strict scrutiny, restrictions may be justified “based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’ ” (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992)). See also United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993) (upholding a ban on radio advertisements of lotteries in states where lotteries were illegal and, addressing Central Hudson’s third prong, stating that “Congress plainly made the commonsense judgment that each North Carolina station would have an audience in that State ... and that enforcing the statutory restriction would insulate each station’s listeners ... and hence advance the governmental purpose of supporting North Carolina’s laws against gambling”). Indeed, this court stated in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir.2005), a case upholding against a First Amendment challenge an ordinance against placing leaflets on vehicles, that “[i]n view of the common-sense explanations for these types of laws, they do not invariably require proof that the problem has occurred in the past (a daunting task in view of the 1952 vintage of this law and the understandable absence of information about why the law was passed) or an elaborate study of their present-day necessity (an equally daunting task in view of the difficulty of showing the empirical necessity for a law that has been in place for more than 50 years).” Although the ordinance at issue in Jobe was analyzed as a content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restriction, the analysis is substantially similar, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001), and the same considerations the court highlighted in Jobe are applicable here. Metromedia thus compels the conclusion that the ban on selling cars in the street “directly advances” the traffic safety interest in this case.
The majority in Metromedia relied in part on the large number of similar local laws throughout the country that had previously been upheld when subjected to constitutional attack. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2882. Similarly in this case, Glendale is hardly alone in banning the placement of cars for sale in the public streets. Just within the four states comprising the Sixth Circuit alone there are more than 200 similar ordinances. See Appendix; see, e.g., Flint, Mich., Code of Ordinances § 28-9 (1950); Michigan Uniform Traffic Code for Cities, Townships, and Villages R 28.1814, Rule 814 (2003); Louisville—Jefferson County, Ky., Code of Ordinances § 72.044 (1960); Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code § 351.07 (1997); The Ohio Basic Code § 76.07 (2002); Memphis, Tenn., Code of Ordinances § 11-40-4 (1985). The large number of municipalities with similar ordinances “suggests that the policy behind them is premised on legitimate rather than contrived police-power concerns.” Jobe, 409 F.3d at 269.
To be sure, the Supreme Court held in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993), that a state may not constitutionally ban CPAs from direct contact with potential clients without demonstrating that harms may flow from such contact. Therefore, it is argued, a city may not ban the exhibiting of automobiles for sale on the public streets without first demonstrating the unprotected harms that may flow from such conduct. With respect, such a legal inference falls of its own weight. The ban’s effect on the harm addressed in the CPA case was not clearly established; in the present case *782it is compellingly obvious. The cases are flatly different on their face.
Nothing in our ironclad obligation to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court requires us to read Edenfield beyond the facts of the case to a set of facts that is meaningfully different. In Edenfield, the Court held that a single affidavit was insufficient to support a law banning in-person solicitation by CPAs. 507 U.S. at 771-72, 113 S.Ct. 1792. Although the Court determined in Edenfield that an affidavit was not sufficient, the Court also had before it a report contradicting the Florida Board of Accountancy’s assertions regarding the supposed effects of CPA solicitation. Id. at 772, 113 S.Ct. 1792. It simply does not follow from Edenfield that Glendale is not free, without evidence or studies, to make a commonsense determination that allowing business to be conducted in the street presents certain hazards. Edenfield did not declare that, henceforth, any regulation of commercial speech must be accompanied by studies regarding the harm to be prevented, no matter how obvious that harm may be. Nor did Edenfield mark the death of common sense as a useful tool in the lawmaker’s toolbox. Edenfield cannot be read to require a study or evidence of nonspeech harm any time a city wishes to remove from its roads distractions that are, by their nature, meant to draw pedestrians into the roadway.
Other cases are even less applicable.
In Florida Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995), the Supreme Court upheld a commercial speech ban prohibiting lawyers from sending direct-mail solicitations to victims of recent accidents or disasters, on the ground that the requirements of Eden-field were met given the existence of record evidence supporting the ban. Id. at 626-28, 115 S.Ct. 2371. The Court’s reliance on the record evidence in Florida Bar, however, should not lead this court to mistake sufficiency for necessity, especially given that the Court also emphasized that previous litigants were successful in justifying speech restrictions “by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether ... or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple common sense.” Id. at 628, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The judgment of the Supreme Court in Florida Bar is simply not a holding regarding what is required to meet the third prong of Central Hudson, but is rather a holding as to what is sufficient, and thus adds nothing to the requirements of Edenfield.
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 152 L.Ed.2d 563 (2002), explicitly refrained from holding that the statutory provision at issue failed the third requirement of Central Hudson. The statutory provision at issue essentially provided that “as long as pharmacists do not advertise particular compounded drugs, they may sell compounded drugs without first undergoing safety and efficacy testing and obtaining FDA approval.” 535 U.S. at 370, 122 S.Ct. 1497. Regarding whether the advertising ban directly advanced the Government’s asserted interests related to non-FDA approved compounded drugs, the Court reasoned that, “[assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large scale without advertising, the [statutory] prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed ‘directly. advanc[e]’ the Government’s interests.” Id. at 371, 122 S.Ct. 1497 (emphasis added). The Court proceeded to the final Central Hudson prong on the assumption that the third prong was met. Id. (Under that final prong, the fact that the restrictions were more extensive than necessary invalidated the provision: the *783Court identified numerous ways in which large-scale manufacturing of compounded drugs might be identified without using the proxy of commercial speech. Id. at 372, 122 S.Ct. 1497.)
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556-61, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a ban on advertising for smokeless tobacco or cigars within 1000 feet of a school did directly advance a substantial governmental interest under Central Hudson’s third step. As in Florida Bar, the government was able to point to record evidence in the form of studies to support its contention that the ban on commercial speech directly advanced its asserted interests. Again, however, the presence of studies in Lorillard merely establishes that such studies are sufficient, not that they are necessary, to pass muster under Central Hudson’s third prong. (As in Thompson, only lack of a “reasonable fit,” the fourth Central Hudson inquiry, rendered the provision unconstitutional: the 1000-foot rule would constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers in some geographical areas. Id. at 562, 100 S.Ct. 2343.)
In all of these cases, the only holding that the third step of Central Hudson was not met, in addition to Edenfield, was one aspect of the tobacco sales practices regulated in Lorillard: certain tobacco advertising could not be placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment within 1000 feet of a school. This failed the Central Hudson third step, not for lack of empirical evidence but because the five-foot rule “does not seem to advance th[e] goal” of preventing minors from using tobacco products. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566, 121 S.Ct. 2404. Children under five feet tall, the Court noted, can look up. In contrast, banning the placement of autos in the public streets for sales inspection more than “seems” to advance the goal of traffic safety, it obviously does so.
In short, the Court’s holdings, and Edenfield in particular, do not require the conclusion that without record evidence, a regulation that so obviously advances a substantial interest is invalid. It is true that, as the Court majority stated in Me-tromedia, “[ejach method of communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself and that law must reflect the ‘differing natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each method.” 453 U.S. at 502, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949)). We cannot however simply dismiss the Supreme Court’s decision in Metromedia because the Court pointed out that it was dealing only with billboards. Indeed, the “natures, values, abuses and dangers” of selling cars in the streets are far closer to those of setting up billboards than they are to the direct solicitation of clients by CPAs. The “abuses and dangers” of billboard advertising are indeed very similar to the abuses and dangers of selling cars in the streets: traffic safety concerns and visual aesthetics. The abuses and dangers of direct solicitation by CPAs are entirely distinct: avoiding fraud and maintaining CPA ethics. Thus any argument that a particular Supreme Court holding does not apply because of the differences in methods of communicating ideas would require us to disregard Eden-field long before it would require us to disregard Metromedia. We should disregard neither, but apply each to the extent its reasoning controls on facts meaningfully similar to those in this case.
Of course if the two cases conflict, then Edenfield would control on the theory that the Supreme Court has to that extent overruled Metromedia. We should not rush to that conclusion, however, where *784there is a meaningful distinction between the two cases. With respect to the third prong of Central Hudson, the distinction between the ordinance in Metromedia and the statute in Edenfield is stark: there is obvious “direct advancement” in Metrome-dia and nothing of the sort in Edenfield. Accordingly, while the First Amendment requires record evidence in Edenfield, it does not in Metromedia. The distinction cuts squarely in favor of Glendale in this case. It is not up to us to overrule Me-tromedia, and Edenfield did not do so, either explicitly or sub silentio.
Finally, Glendale’s ordinance also clearly passes Central Hudson’s fourth prong. The ordinance is not more extensive than necessary to serve Glendale’s asserted interests in traffic safety. “The least restrictive means test has no role in the commercial speech context.” Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 632, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (internal quotation marks omitted). Glendale need only demonstrate that there is a fit between its ordinance and the ends it seeks to achieve. Id.
The ordinance exactly serves Glendale’s purposes. Although it is true that cars parked in a private driveway fronting a public street may also prove distracting, it is not true that such activity invites people into the roadway for purposes of inspecting the car that has been advertised for sale. Glendale has properly limited the reach of the ordinance to public property; Glendale could reasonably conclude that the dangers attendant to placing a car for sale in a public street outweigh any harm that may occur when a property owner decides to place an automobile for sale on his own property. Cf. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (“[T]he city may believe that offsite advertising ... presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising.”). Indeed, given Glendale’s interests in ensuring that individuals remain out of the roadway, it makes eminent sense to limit the reach of the ordinance to cars parked on public streets. While it is true that “numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech ... is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable,” Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993), the only apparent alternative for Glendale is to outlaw pedestrians’ presence in a roadway to inspect a vehicle. Of course, this does nothing to eliminate the very enticement that may lead prospective buyers into the roadway in the first place and does nothing to prevent driver distraction.
Because Glendale has crafted an ordinance that goes no further than necessary to address a substantial public concern, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
It is accordingly not necessary to rely in addition on Glendale’s asserted aesthetic interests, and I treat them only briefly here. Those interests appear independently sufficient to support the restriction on commercial speech in this case. A majority of seven Justices in Metromedia concluded that San Diego’s aesthetic interests were sufficient to support San Diego’s ordinance to the extent that it regulated commercial speech. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (plurality); id. at 552, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 559-61, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As with respect to San Diego’s regulation of commercial billboards, Glendale should not be required to come forward with studies to support its conclusion that city aesthetics would be improved by avoiding the transformation of public streets into used car lots or open-air markets. In a less obvious case, the Supreme Court, relying *785on Metromedia’s treatment of an aesthetics interest, upheld a Los Angeles ban on posting signs on public property such as utility poles. Members of the City Coun. of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-807, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). “It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values.” Id. at 805, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Without reliance on empirical evidence in the record, the Court reasoned that
The problem addressed by this ordinance—the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property—constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City’s power to prohibit. “[The] city’s interest in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.”
Id. at 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (citations omitted). A similar conclusion without record evidence is warranted here with respect to cars placed for sale on city streets. Indeed, insisting on a study regarding aesthetics would be particularly pointless given the essentially subjective nature of the topic. The Vincent Court also held that the Los Angeles posting ban was not unconstitutionally broad:
By banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. The plurality wrote in Metromedia: “It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’ ” 453 U.S., at 510 [101 S.Ct. 2882]. The same is true of posted signs.
Id. at 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118. The same can be said of cars placed for sale on city streets.
Finally, I do not address the constitutionality of subsection (C) of the Glendale ordinance. Pagan initially challenged this portion of the ordinance, which prohibits placing vehicles in the road for the purposes of any advertising, as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. However, Pagan withdrew this claim for relief in his motion for summary judgment in the district court, choosing to argue instead that Glendale’s failure to regulate other kinds of signs or to fully enforce the ordinance’s ban on advertising undermined Glendale’s asserted interest in traffic safety with respect to subsection (A). Thus, Pagan expressly limited any consideration of subsection (C) to whether a failure to enforce that subsection undermined Glendale’s arguments about the constitutionality of subsection (A). Given that Pagan himself failed to argue the constitutionality of subsection (C) below, the issue was waived and I have no occasion to address whether subsection (C) violates the First Amendment, Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1172 (6th Cir.1996), or whether, in the absence of any allegation that Pagan intends to engage in activity that violates subsection (C) without violating (A), he would have standing to assert a First Amendment challenge to subsection (C), see Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 474 F.3d 332, 340 (6th Cir.2007).
I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
Ordinances Forbidding the Placement of Cars for Sale in the Public Streets
Kentucky
Alexandria, Code of Ordinances § 72.11 (1988)
Ashland, Code of Ordinances § 72.004 (1983)
Augusta, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
*786Berea, Code of Ordinances § 40.304 (1946)
Bowling Green, Code of Ordinances § 22-4.09 (2001)
Cadiz, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Cold Spring, Code of Ordinances § 71.04 (1997)
Covington, Code of Ordinances § 75.08 (1967)
Crescent Springs, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Crestview Hills, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Danville, Code of Ordinances § 17-35 (1977)
Edgewood, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Flemingsburg, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Fort Mitchell, Code of Ordinances § 72.11 (1988)
Fort Thomas, Code of Ordinances § 72.15 (1983)
Fort Wright, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Hillview, Code of Ordinances § 72.11 (1984)
Louisville—Jefferson County, Code of Ordinances § 72.044 (1960)
Madisonville, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Pikeville, Code of Ordinances § 72.010
Walton, Code of Ordinances § 72.11
Warsaw, Code of Ordinances § 72.11 Michigan
Bingham Farms, Code of Ordinances § 95.10 (2005)
Burton, Code of Ordinances § 71.02
Clinton Township, Code of Ordinances §§ 886.10; 886.11 (1986)
Eastpointe, Code of Ordinances § 480.05 (1988)
Flint, § 28-9 (1950)
Howell, § 430.05
Marshall, § 73.18 (1992)
Mason, § 8.14
Saginaw, Code of Ordinances § 72.22 (1959)
Uniform Traffic Code for Cities, Townships, and Villages, R 28.1814 Rule 814 (2003)
Ohio
Ada, § 351.06
Amherst, § 351.07 (1980)
Avon, § 452.08
Avon Lake, § 452.08
Bay Village, § 351.06
Bedford, § 351.06
Bedford Heights, § 351.06 (1970)
Bellbrook, § 452.08
Bellvue, § 351.06 (2002)
Belpre, § 351.06
Berea, § 751.05 (1988)
Blue Ash, § 351.06
Bowling Green, § 76.09(1965)
Bratenahl, § 351.06 (1960)
Broadview Heights, § 452.08 (1976)
Brook Park, § 351.06
Brunswick, § 452.06
Bryan, § 351.06
Canal Winchester, § 351.06
Carey, § 351.06
Carlisle, § 452.08
Chagrin Falls, § 351.06
Cheviot, § 76.18 (1998)
Circleville, § 351.06
Cleveland Heights, § 351.06
Clyde, § 351.06
Conneaut, § 351.06
*787Cortland, § 351.06
Cuyahoga Heights, § 452.09
Defiance, § 351.06
Delaware, § 351.06 (1967)
Delphos, § 351.06
Dover, § 351.06 (1966)
Dublin, § 76.04 (1980)
East Palestine, § 452.12 (1956)
Elyria, § 351.06 (1945)
Englewood, § 452.08
Euclid, § 351.08
Evendale, § 452.08 (1952)
Fairfield, § 351.06
Findlay, § 351.06
Forest Park, § 73.12 (1961)
Franklin, § 351.06
Fremont, § 351.06
Gahanna, § 351.06
Gates Mills, § 352.08
Geneva, § 452.08
Glenwillow, § 351.06
Green, § 452.08
Greenhills, § 351.06
Greenville, § 452.08 (1960)
Greenwich, § 452.08
Grove City, § 351.06
Groveport, § 351.06
Hamilton, § 351.06
Harrison, § 351.06
Hicksville, § 351.09
Highland Heights, § 351.06
Highland Hills, § 351.06
Hilliard, § 351.06
Hunting Valley, § 351.01
Independence, § 351.09 (1958)
Johnstown, § 351.06
Lakewood, § 351.16 (2001)
Lancaster, § 351.06
Lebanon, § 351.06
Lexington, § 351.06
London, § 452.09 (1998)
Lorain, § 351.06
Lordstown, § 351.06
Louisville, § 351.06
Loveland, § 351.06
Lyndhurst, § 452.08
Macedonia, § 351.06
Mansfield, § 351.06
Maple Heights, § 452.08’(1967)
Marble Cliff, § 351.06
Marietta, § 351.06
Massillon, § 351.06
Mayfield Heights, § 351.08
Mayfield Village, § 351.06
Mason, § 351.06
Maumee, § 351.06
Medina, § 351.06
Mentor-on-the-Lake, § 452.08
Middlefield, § 351.06
Milan, § 351.06
Monroeville, § 351.06 (1978)
Montpelier, § 351.06
Mount Gilead, § 351.06
Mount Vernon, § 351.06 (1988)
Munroe Falls, § 351.06
New Albany, § 351.06
New Lebanon, § 73.06 (1980)
Niles, § 351.06
North Canton, § 351.06
North Perry, § 351.06
North Ridgeville, § 452.08
North Royalton, § 452.08
Norton, § 452.09 (1968)
*788Norwalk, § 351.06
Oberlin, § 351.06 (1957)
Ontario, § 351.06
Orange, § 351.06
Orville, § 351.06
Ottawa, § 351.06
Painesville, § 351.06
Parma, § 351.06 (1997)
Perrysburg, § 452.08 (1964)
Powell, § 351.06
Reading, § 452.08 (1982)
Reminderville, § 351.06 (1990)
Reynoldsburg, § 351.06
Richmond Heights, § 351.06
Riverlea, § 76.07
Rossford, § 351.06 (1966)
St. Bernard, § 351.15
St. Mary’s, § 351.06
Sandusky, § 351.06
Shelby, § 452.09
Sidney, § 351.09
Silverton, § 76.16 (1954)
Solon, § 452.08
South Euclid, § 351.06
Springboro, § 452.08
Streetsboro, § 351.06
Strongsville, § 452.08 (2000)
Stow, § 351.06
Summit County, § 351.06
Tallmadge, § 351.06
Tiffin, § 351.06
Tipp City, § 76.07 (1974)
Toledo, § 351.07 (1997)
Troy, § 351.06
Twinsburg, § 351.06 (1958)
University Heights, § 452.09
Upper Sandusky, § 351.06
Valley View, § 452.09 (1965)
Vandalia, § 452.09
Van Wert, § 76.07(1981)
Vermilion, § 452.08
Walton Hills, § 452.09 (1969)
Wapakoneta, § 452.08
Warren, § 351.06
Warrensville Heights, § 351.12
Waynesville, § 76.08 (1982)
Wellington, § 351.06
Westerville, § 351.06
Westfield Center, § 452.09
Wickliffe, § 351.06
Willoughby, § 452.09 (1971)
Willowick, § 351.06
Wilmington, § 351.06
Woodmere, § 351.06
Woodville, § 351.06
Wooster, § 351.06
Worthington, § 351.06
Youngstown, § 351.06
The Ohio Basic Code, § 76.07 (2002)
Tennessee
Alcoa, § 15-220(6) (1971)
Arlington, § 15-404 (1997)
Belle Meade, § 15-601 (1987)
Bolivar, § 15-1504 (1976)
Brentwood, § 66-293
Bristol, § 70-203 (2006)
Chattanooga, § 24-293 (1986)
Cleveland, § 15-610 (1981)
Clinton, § 15—601(3)(h) (1969)
Farragut, § 15-110
Germantown, § 20-212 (1986)
Johnson City, § 15-1108 (1985)
Knox County, § 62-189 (1991)
*789Knoxville, § 17-291 (1962)
McMinnville, § 15-505 (1982)
Memphis, § 11-40-4 (1967)
Morristown, § 15-809 (1979)
Nashville, § 12.40.150
Oak Ridge, § 15-609 (1969)
Red Bank, § 15-601 (1975)
Sevierville, § 15-603 (1987)
Shelby County, § 20-86 (1992)
Signal Mountain, § 15-706 (1985)
Sparta, § 15-605 (1997)
Winchester, § 15-820 (1983)