concurring.
This opinion records my general agreement with Judge Gibson’s opinion and with the result. There are certain aspects of this litigation that in my judgment deserve further individual comment, because of their significance in this and other cases.
1. It seems worth stating my agreement with Judge Eisele that the Voting Rights Act is not “affirmative action” legislation in the sense that there is a constant legal duty imposed on those responsible for redistricting to devise plans that maximize minority group voting power. Turner v. State of Arkansas, 784 F.Supp. 553, 572-7 (E.D.Ark.1991) (three judge court). Such a misunderstanding of the law, widespread as it may be, seems to have caused the filing of these cases, or at least the one in Kansas City, and probably led Dr. Jones to an uncompromising and ineffective role on the Redistricting Commission. While redistricters must devise plans that are fair and equitable to racial groups in the voting population, within the discretion generally granted to such bodies, the overall objective, as I see it, is to be ultimately “race neutral.” See commentary of James P. Turner in Controversies in Minority Voting, Grofman and Davidson, ed. (1992), p. 299.
2. While proportional representation is not mandated, I believe it is a useful test, and, properly understood, may sometimes be dispositive in rejecting a claim of violation of the Act. In the present case, the Kansas City plaintiffs asked us in their pleadings to concentrate attention on eight specified districts in Kansas City. Four of those districts are now, and will almost *1507certainly remain, subject to black voter control. The four other districts are likely to remain subject to majority group control. The black population is apparently slightly less than half the total population of the eight districts; therefore it seems obvious there is no “entitlement” to a fifth district, designed for black control, leaving only three districts subject to control by the white majority in the eight districts.
Similar analysis makes it reasonably clear there is no black entitlement to more districts in St. Louis City, given the racial makeup of the city. A contrary ruling would force redistricters to grant more than proportional representation to blacks.
I agree with plaintiffs that St. Louis County is problematic. If blacks indeed control four districts, they have approximately proportional representation, which is more than the Act mandates. The issue of ability to exercise “usual” control may be debatable, but I agree with the panel opinion that the present record does not permit a ruling that blacks in St. Louis County (or in the St. Louis metropolitan area as a whole) are likely to be underrepresented in the new districts.1 We can also foresee a slight net gain in the number of black-controlled districts.
3. The much-touted' supermajority guideline or requirement (65% of total population or 60% of voting population) as relied on in the leading case of Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir.1984), does not make sense in the present ease, where we are dealing with the major hurdle of winning primary elections2 and where there is evidence that 90% of the black voters are Democrats. There is no evidence of the party affiliation of white voters in the areas in question. It cannot be assumed that the white vote has the same extraordinary political polarization. If not, blacks will find it much easier to win Democratic primaries, to the extent the white vote is either drained into the Republican primary or is too independent to vote in the Democratic primary. This gives blacks a built-in advantage which counterbalances (wholly or in part) the factors supposedly requiring a supermajority.3 It seems to me to be a statistical or analytical error of considerable magnitude to ignore this factor. To the extent the 65-60 rule is *1508generally applicable throughout the country, as Judge Hamilton assumed from expert testimony relating to St. Louis County, it seems fairly applicable only when the entire population is voting in a particular election, or where it can be reasonably inferred that political polarization of white and black voters in a party primary is similar.
If the white voting age population in the most vulnerable black-majority district in St. Louis County (approximately 46%) should be deemed to have enough strength to routinely dominate the Democratic primary selection in that district, black voters would be able to control only 9.4% of the 32 legislative districts in the County, while having 12.6% of the voting age population, generally undispersed. This would create questions for me; under current law I might conclude that the county-line defense is insufficient to avoid a duty to cross into the City to pick up some of the excess black voting strength there in order to establish at least four districts in the County normally controlled by the black vote.4
On the present record, however, I am unable to conclude that the white voting population of District 71 (46%) is likely to be sufficient to exercise general control over the Democratic primary in that district, absent black voter acquiescence in the choice of a popular white representative, currently Representative Molloy. The party polarization of the black vote, the lack of proof of similar polarization of the white vote, the apparent sufficiency of a 51.2% black voting age majority to control the Democratic party primary in District 63 (Ronnie White’s),5 and the insufficiency of proof that the St. Louis area has a usual history of favoring white candidates over credible black candidates in districts with a black voting age majority, causes me to conclude that plaintiffs have failed to prove their case. I also believe the proportional representation defense probably dictates a similar result. Judgment should be entered in favor of defendants.
. It is possible that the panel opinion places an excessive burden on defendants by requiring them to show an extensive history of proportional representation. The Gingles test is one of persistence. 478 U.S. at 77, 106 S.Ct. at 2780. This may simply mean long-term, as distinguished from temporary or occasional. In evaluating the four new County districts, one is forced to predict the future in guessing whether black control will likely be the usual situation during this decade. For reasons stated below, I think this is probable.
. No history has been established tending to show that white Democrats in Missouri will generally vote Republican to defeat a nominated black Democrat for state representative or similar office. There are a substantial number of races in Jackson County where black nominees have prevailed in political districts that are predominantly white, and few, if any, instances where judicial notice or the trial proof could confirm that general elections have been lost because of a racial crossover to elect white Republican nominees. The frequently cited Berkley-Watkins race for mayor in 1979 should perhaps not be counted, as municipal elections are officially nonpartisan, and Bruce Watkins did not have the advantage of a Democratic ballot listing. Even if counted, however, it is not part of a discernible pattern.
. This conclusion is based on simple logic, if the white Republican vote has a materially higher percentage than the black Republican vote, as seems entirely likely. Judicial notice of two Congressional races tends to prove the soundness of the comment. In 1982 the black voting age population was rated at 20% in the Fifth Congressional District. Almanac of American Politics 1988, p. 680. The black contender, Alan Wheat, would not be expected to win as much as 20% of that vote, using the conventional discounting process. In the Democratic primary, however, he won 32% and was nominated because of divided opposition. Id. at 679. He thereafter carried the district on the Democratic ticket. In the same year, after redistricting, Congressman Clay’s district in Eastern Missouri was rated as having a 46% black voting age population. Id. at 671. According to the conventional formula, he could not have been expected to win the Democratic primary against a prominent white opponent (particularly when there were recent controversial aspects of his career, as one is reminded by the Almanac). He won the Democratic primary by 61%, and carried the district with little trouble as the Democratic nominee. Id. at 671.
. I note, however, that the Seventh Circuit (The Ketchum circuit) has introduced a distinction between the liability stage and the remedial state of litigation, which would avoid supermajority analysis in this case. Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Board, 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th Cir.1991). In his concurring opinion in this case, Judge Gaitan indicates discomfort with any general "lowering of the supermajority restrictions” and expresses concern about the polarized white vote. I have no reason to believe that the white vote in the Missouri metropolitan areas is less racially polarized than the black vote. The element of racial pride that affects the black vote is a more admirable trait than the continuing prejudice and sense of estrangement that too frequently affects white voting. This means it is an unusual accomplishment for black candidates to prevail in districts where they find themselves a minority, particularly a decided minority. It is my perception of law and current realism here in Missouri that a majority black voting age district or a 55% district should be relatively easy to control by black voters (with only temporary or intermittent exceptions) in a Democratic primary—and thereafter, with the Democratic label, in the general election.
. His reelection is unopposed, according to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of April 1, 1992, thus suggesting intimidating strength.