Appellants filed their brief in this court on March 2, 1953. Respondent filed his brief on May 4, 1953, and invoked Rule on Appeal 43, 34A Wn. (2d) (Sup.) 3, effective January 2, 1953, which reads inter alia:
“No alleged error of the superior court will be considered by this court unless the same be definitely pointed out in the ‘assignments of error’ in appellant’s brief. In appeals from all actions at law or in equity tried to the court without a jury, the findings of fact made by the court will be accepted as the established facts in the case unless error is .assigned thereto. No error assigned to any finding or findings of fact made or refused will be considered unless so much of the finding or findings as is claimed to be erroneous shall be set out verbatim in the brief.” (Italics ours.)
On May 18, 1953, appellants moved this court for leave to file an amended opening brief to cure the failure to assign error to the trial court’s findings of fact. It was made because such amendments cannot be incorporated in their reply brief. Nethery v. Olson, 41 Wn. (2d) 173, 247 P. (2d) 1011; Fowles v. Sweeney, 41 Wn. (2d) 182, 248 P. (2d) 400; and Hill v. Tacoma, 40 Wn. (2d) 718, 246 P. (2d) 458.
Judge Grady, speaking for the court in Hill v. Tacoma, supra, said:
“Upon attention being called to noncompliance with the rule, appellant sought to make correction in its reply brief. We are asked to accept this method, or in the alternative to waive the rule. The argument is made that the purpose of the rule is to assist the court in ascertaining the precise grounds upon which the appellant relies, and this has been done in the reply brief. We desire to add that another purpose of the rule is to have the respondent likewise informed, so he may direct his arguments accordingly and not have to explore anticipatory fields.
“It is also urged that a party litigant should not be denied substantial rights because of a failure to comply with technical rules of appeal, especially where such failure is the act or omission of counsel.
“The arguments made are very appealing, but to accept and act upon them as requested would in effect either nullify the rule or make it necessary that we determine in each case of noncompliance whether it will be followed or waived. This would result in the exercise of a discretion and in dis*83crimination. We must either enforce the rule or abandon it. Its necessity has a long background of experience, and it was promulgated in aid of expeditious and orderly appellate procedure.”
This court has held without exception that failure to comply with Rule 43, supra, will make the findings of fact the established facts of the case. See LaLone v. Smith, 39 Wn. (2d) 167, 234 P. (2d) 893; Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn. (2d) 481, 236 P. (2d) 545; Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn. (2d) 855, 239 P. (2d) 346; Erickson v. Kongsli, 40 Wn. (2d) 79, 240 P. (2d) 1209; In re Boundy’s Estate, 40 Wn. (2d) 203, 242 P. (2d) 165; J. A. Wiley Co. v. Riggle, 40 Wn. (2d) 339, 243 P. (2d) 493; Lopeman v. Gee, 40 Wn. (2d) 586, 245 P. (2d) 183; Evans v. Continental Cas. Co., 40 Wn. (2d) 614, 245 P. (2d) 470; Hill v. Tacoma, supra; Hubbell v. Ward, 40 Wn. (2d) 779, 246 P. (2d) 468; Jones v. Bard, 40 Wn. (2d) 877, 246 P. (2d) 831; Becwar v. Bear, 41 Wn. (2d) 37, 246 P. (2d) 1110; Nethery v. Olson, supra; Fowles v. Sweeney, supra; Wygal v. Kilwein, 41 Wn. (2d) 281, 248 P. (2d) 893; Simpson v. Hutchings, 41 Wn. (2d) 287, 248 P. (2d) 572; Pederson v. Pederson, 41 Wn. (2d) 368, 249 P. (2d) 385; Cugini v. McPhail, 41 Wn. (2d) 804, 252 P. (2d) 290; Mid-County Publishers v. LeMay, 41 Wn. (2d) 852, 252 P. (2d) 268; and State ex rel. Schoblom v. Anacortes Veneer, 42 Wn. (2d) 338, 255 P. (2d) 379.
If there is to be a rule, there must be a point at which failure to comply therewith can no longer be corrected. That point is the filing of respondent’s brief.
The motion is denied.
Hill, Weaver, and Olson, JJ., concur.