I dissent. The very facts related in the majority opinion make it appear that Rossberg’s specific intent was to sell a house, — not to loan money at an usurious rate. The intent to exact money at an usurious rate must be shown by clear and satisfactory evidence.4 Hardly can it be said that there is such clear and satisfactory proof, where Rossberg, primarily a realtor, got the Holesapples to sign a binding contract to buy a house, accepted $500 from them as a down payment, which he could have retained, volunteered to return it when the Holesapples reneged on their bargain, signed a contract to buy the house himself, but again permitted the Holesapples to change their minds- and sign up for the house anew, tore up his own contract and sacrificed a vested right in their favor, and spent a day and the expense incident thereto in going 172 miles to get $1500 for the accommodation of the Holesapples.
The majority opinion makes much of Rossberg’s statement that the parties from whom the money was to be obtained would want $1600 for the $1500. One wonders what the majority would conclude had Rossberg obtained the money from an industrial loan company, when we recently approved a charge by such a company of 37% interest, far in excess of the percentage involved in this case.5
The law frowns on penalties and forfeitures, and will give no sanction to them unless justified by strong and unequivocal proof, — lacking here.
55 Am.Jur. 437, See. 164.
Seaboard Finance Co. v. Wahlen, 123 Utah 529, 260 P. 2d 556.