Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.

*212KEETON, Justice.

In a proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board, dependent minor children of deceased, Ralph E. Dunn, were awarded compensation.

At the time of deceased’s death he was in the employ of appellant as an iron welder. He was an able bodied man, thirty-four years of age, in good health; and during his lifetime had no known physical weaknesses or imperfections. At the time of his death he was climbing an enclosed ladder to a place where welding was to be done and collapsed. His death was apparently instantaneous. There was no evidence of violence or recent damage, by force or otherwise, to the body. Dr. Wendle, attending physician, conducted a post mortem and attributed the probable cause of death to coronary occlusion. Another physician, Dr. Tyler, expressed the opinion that death was caused by ventricular fibrillation. After a detailed analysis of the testimony, the Board concluded that the exact cause of death was unknown; ' was probably due to coronary occlusion which occurred quickly and left no mark of violence on the physical structure of the body other than the stoppage of the heart; and found that death was hastened by the character of the work deceased was doing “and while deceased was accustomed to such work as a part of his regular job, it nevertheless was strenuous work which brought on an unexpected cardiac standstill”. The Board concluded that death was due to an accident. This conclusion is supported by no fact or facts whatsoever developed by the testimony. Doctors and physicians could not, and did not, determine the cause of death, and their testimony and opinions failed to show there was an accident. So far as the record discloses testimony tending to prove an accident is a vacuum.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the dependents of a person who dies suddenly on the job, from no known or determinable cause, and no accident being shown which resulted in death, are entitled to an award for compensation for such person’s death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

*213Under the provisions of the Act, Sec. 72-201, I.C. and death benefits which result from death caused by accident, Sec. 72-301 I.C., compensation is payable only where there is injury caused by accident. Death to be compensable under the Act must have occurred because of an “injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of * * * employment

* * Sec. 72-1013, I.C. provides:

“ ‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’ includes death resulting from injury * * * but is not to be construed as being synonymous with accident. An ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ to be compensable must be the result of an accident.”

Death itself is simply a termination of life. It may happen anywhere or at any time and may be caused by an accident, but without something more than death while on the job being shown, it is not compensable in an industrial accident proceeding.

A detailed examination of the transcript of the evidence produced cannot be construed by inference or otherwise as establishing that there was “an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event,” connected with the industry causing an injury. Sec. 72-201 I.C.

The word “accident” as used in the Act, Sec. 72-201, I.C. refers to the cause of the injury, and an undesigned, unexpected, unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, must first occur and result in injury to give an employee, or in case of his death his dependents, a right to compensation. One performing the usual, ordinary, customary work of the occupation in which he is engaged, even though the work be hard and strenuous, and who suffers a fatal heart attack, not caused by an accident, or who dies on the job from natural or unknown causes, does not suffer death due to injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Hence the death for which compensation is here claimed, under the circumstances presented, is not compensable.

Similar situations as are here presented were held to be noncompensable in Wade v. Pacific Coast Elevator Co., 64 Idaho 176, 129 P.2d 894; Walters v. City of Weiser, 66 Idaho 615, 164 P.2d 593; Carrie v. Carrie, 73 Idaho 503, 254 P.2d 410; In Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho 32, 257 P.2d 552; Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017; Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines, Inc., 50 Ariz. 349, 72 P.2d 432.

The burden of proving that an accident occurred, as defined by the Law, is on the claimant. Brooke v. Nolan, 59 Idaho 759, 87 P.2d 470.

The facts presented here do not fall within the class of cases where a pre-existing injury, disease or ailment is suddenly accelerated by an accident or extraordinary or unusual circumstance, happening in the course of employment. Hence cases cited by respondent, In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087; Cook v. Winget, 60 Idaho *214561, 94 P.2d 676; Bishop v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 64 Idaho 806, 137 P.2d 963; Smith v. Sunshine Mining Co., 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 87; Teater v. Dairymen’s Co-op. Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 are not authority in conflict with the conclusion here reached.

We conclude that the order of the Board awarding compensation should be reversed and set aside, and the proceeding dismissed, and it is so ordered. Costs to appellant.

GIVENS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.