I generally concur in the judgment and reasoning of the majority opinion. I write separately, however, because I am not *671convinced, as is the majority, that the prosecutor committed error under People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]. Further, unlike the majority, I would dismiss two of defendant’s claims on the merits as well as on procedural grounds.
I. Davenport Error
The majority correctly reject all but one of defendant’s claims of Davenport error on the merits. The majority, however, appear to find merit in one of defendant’s claims, but hold that the claim was waived by failure to object at trial. In that claim, defendant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly argued that the lack of evidence under factor (d)1 relating to extreme mental disturbance was a factor in aggravation. I would reject this claim on the merits, as well as on procedural grounds.
The prosecutor’s brief argument relating to factor (d) reads: “Well, the only indication that we have of any mental or emotional disturbance would have been the fact that he was scared because she was going to go call the police and that would not seem to qualify under ‘extreme mental emotional disturbance.’ He was scared, he was angry. He was frustrated. It would not be the kind of thing that would mitigate the crime that he committed in any way. It just tells us a little more about the defendant’s character.” (Italics added.)
In my opinion, the prosecutor’s argument properly, if perhaps inartfully, urged that factor (d) was inapplicable as a factor in mitigation given the evidence presented at the penalty phase and that the absence of this factor indicated that the defendant was less deserving of leniency, rather than more deserving of death. Argument of this type does not violate the rule set forth in Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 288-290. (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788-790 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
II. Prosecutor’s Argument Regarding Factor (k) Evidence
Among the evidence presented by the defendant during the penalty phase was evidence of certain selfless acts to help vulnerable people. Relying upon People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1], defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly argued that this evidence showed that the death penalty was appropriate because defendant had demonstrated that he was capable of living a constructive life but had chosen not to do so. The majority “express no view” regarding whether the *672prosecutor’s comments amounted to misconduct. In my view these comments were permissible.
Unlike the prosecutor in Edelbacher, the prosecutor in this case did not tell the jury that facts from appellant’s background and history could be an aggravating factor. (Cf. People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1033.) Rather, the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible attempt to rebut defendant’s factor (k) evidence by demonstrating that the evidence showed that this factor was inapplicable and did not give rise to an inference that defendant deserved leniency. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 788-790; cf. People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) As we have previously observed, a prosecutor does not overstep the boundaries of proper argument by urging that defendant’s factor (k) evidence, including age and missed opportunities, does not excuse the crime, but instead makes the defendant less deserving of leniency. (People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1062-1063 [251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680], cert. den. (1989) 490 U.S. 1040 [104 L.Ed.2d 414, 109 S.Ct. 1944].) As in Caro, the prosecutor’s argument in this case properly addressed the meager weight the jury should accord defendant’s mitigating evidence.
III. Instruction on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
I agree with the majority that the invited error doctrine bars defendant’s claim on appeal that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a modified form of CALJIC No. 8.84.1.1 would further hold, on this record, that defendant cannot state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based upon this error.
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove both representation falling below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failing, a more favorable result would have been obtained. (In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 950 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222], cert. den. (1993) 507 U.S. _[123 L.Ed.2d 269, 113 S.Ct. 1648]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) If prejudice cannot be shown, there is no reason to determine whether defendant’s representation was deficient. (E.g., People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 831 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249], cert. den. (1993) 507 U.S. _ [123 L.Ed.2d 272, 113 S.Ct. 1651].)
In my view, defendant cannot show the requisite prejudice. While the language added to the standard penalty phase instruction improperly permitted the jury to find any of the factors to be aggravating or mitigating, it is *673apparent from the record that the jury was not misled; therefore, no prejudice accrued to defendant.
The prosecutor argued, as aggravation, evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)); defendant’s criminal activity involving force or violence (factor (b)); defendant’s prior felony conviction (factor (c)); and defendant’s age at the time of the crime (factor (i)). In my view, the prosecutor further properly argued the lack of evidence to support the application of the remaining factors.
Defense counsel’s argument followed the prosecutor’s argument. Defense counsel reviewed at length the mitigating evidence. Defense counsel did not concede that any of the evidence concerning defendant’s family background, therapy, prison or other life experience addressed by the prosecutor in her argument were aggravating factors. Rather, defense counsel argued as mitigating factors defendant’s background, particularly the circumstances of his childhood, and contested the prosecutor’s view that there was little mitigating evidence before the jury. Defense counsel also quoted the factor (k) language and told the jurors that anything before them could be considered a mitigating factor.
In light of the arguments and the instructions taken as a whole (People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 899 [258 Cal.Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294], cert. den. (1990) 494 U.S. 1090 [108 L.Ed.2d 964, 110 S.Ct. 1835]), I cannot conclude that the instructional error misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the defendant. In my view, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail for lack of prejudice.
Lucas, C. J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1993.
References to “factor” throughout this opinion are to the aggravating and mitigating factors specified in Penal Code section 190.3.