(dissenting) — The majority opinion comes to three conclusions: first, that justice/equity is on its side; second, that Salima Worthington, her children, and her elderly charges do not constitute a family; and third, that Worthington's supplemental use of her home to care for elderly adults is a nonresidential use. I contend that as to each aspect, the majority is in error.
First, the majority suggests that Salima Worthington should be estopped from caring for her adult family members because she was aware of the subdivision covenants prior to purchase, and was later informed of the Mains Farm Homeowners Association's (Homeowners) opposition. However, Worthington's position has been consistent throughout this litigation. She has always argued that the supplemental use of her home to care for her adult family members complies with *828the covenant requiring "single family residential purposes only". As her affidavit reveals:
Prior to purchasing the home I read the covenants which limit use of the property to single family dwellings. I had no intentions of using the property for any commercial purpose and felt my use of the property for my family and my adult family members was permissible. I was not aware that any of my neighbors had any objections to my use of the home until after I moved in.
(Italics mine.) Clerk's Papers (CP), at 158; see also CP, at 128-29. Moreover, Worthington had received information from an authoritative source that her interpretation was a reasonable one:
I contacted my DSHS Supervisor, Cheryl Everett, before I purchased the home and was advised that they do not approve any living arrangements as an "adult family home" which is other than a single family residence.
CP, at 158. If anything, the equities favor allowing Worthington to continue her care of elderly adults.
Second, whether Worthington's adult family home satisfies the covenant's "single family" prong is not an issue before this court. Although the trial court concluded that Worthington's use of her home was more commercial than residential, it also held that the adult family home satisfied the covenant's "single family" requirement. CP, at 15. Neither the petition for review, nor the answer, takes issue with the trial court's "single family" holding. As such, the scope of review is confined to the issues presented by the parties. State v. Rowe, 93 Wn.2d 277, 280, 609 P.2d 1348 (1980); RAP 13.7(b). Moreover, upon failure to challenge this issue, the trial court's holding that Worthington's home constitutes a single family became law of the case. See Folsom v. County of Spokane, 111 Wn.2d 256, 263, 759 P.2d 1196 (1988).
Finally, the majority determines that Worthington's supplemental use of her home to care for elderly adults contravenes the covenant's "residential purposes only" prong. This conclusion is incorrect. In interpreting a covenant, language is to be given its "ordinary and common use". Krein v. Smith, 60 Wn. App. 809, 811, 807 P.2d 906, review denied, 117 *829Wn.2d 1002 (1991). We usually divine the ordinary meaning of words by resort to dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Corbray v. Stevenson, 98 Wn.2d 410, 415, 656 P.2d 473 (1982); Syrovy v. Alpine Resources, Inc., 68 Wn. App. 35, 40, 841 P.2d 1279 (1992), review granted, 121 Wn.2d 1008 (1993). However, the majority rejects dictionary definitions of "residential", relying instead on what "most people" in today's society "probably would conclude". Majority, at 817-18. This approach lacks any principled boundaries.
The dictionary definition of "residential" is "used, serving, or designed as a residence or for occupation by residents[.]" Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1971). A "residence" is defined as "the place where one actually lives... a temporary or permanent dwelling place[.]" Webster's, at 1931; see also Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence Cy. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986), Clearly, Worthington, her children, and her adult family live and dwell in the Mains Farm subdivision. They reside in Worthington's home on a 24-hour basis and stay at the home for an indefinite period of time. In this regard, then, there is no doubt that Worthington's use of her home complies with the covenant's restriction. As one court has noted, "the underlying theory behind establishing such a home is that it serves as a surrogate family arrangement." Blevins, at 408.
Despite these ostensibly residential characteristics, the majority accepts the Homeowners' argument that the "commercial" attributes of Worthington's supplemental use of her home to care for elderly adults violates the covenant's prescription that a use be for "residential purposes only". The pertinent analysis for this issue is found in the 1917 decision of Hunter Tract Imp. Co. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop, 98 Wash. 112, 167 P. 100 (1917).
In that case, a restrictive covenant which limited use to "residence purposes only" was interpreted to allow a home being used as a convent for 12 to 15 Ursuline nuns. Hunter Tract, at 113. The question before this court was if the Ursulines' particular use of the property violated the restrictive language. In making this determination, this court did *830not focus on the characterization of the house as a convent, but on the activities that took place there — "[t]he restriction is not against names, but purposes". Hunter Tract, at 114. This court found that neither the fact of regular religious services, specialized clothing, nor numerous residents negated the residential nature of the home. Hunter Tract, at 114-15. Instead, the crucial inquiry was whether the home was "habitually" used for nonresidential purposes, such as the training of young women for the sisterhood. Hunter Tract, at 115. Although there was some evidence that ceremonies inducting young novices occurred at the residence, this court noted that: "[i]t seems to us there is a wide difference between an occasional and an habitual and customary use. The first is a mere incidental use, the second may, under proper facts, be considered as the main use and purpose." Hunter Tract, at 115.
Although the majority purports to apply Hunter Tract, it errs by not giving sufficient weight to the concept that an incidental business use does not negate a home's residential character. The majority instead relies upon a per se rule announced by the Court of Appeals in another restrictive covenant case, Hagemann v. Worth, 56 Wn. App. 85, 782 P.2d 1072 (1989), which contains the statement that a business use is the antonym of residential purposes only. Majority, at 820-21. For the following reasons, I would adhere to the incidental use approach announced in Hunter Tract.
First, the wisdom underlying the Hunter Tract decision that an incidental use should not override a home's main function remains valid today. As a general matter, it is by no means clear that a commercial or business use always operates to the absolute and direct exclusion of a residential one. Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 326, 317 N.W.2d 611, 29 A.L.R.4th 723 (1982); see also Metzner v. Wojdyla, 69 Wn. App. 405, 411, 848 P.2d 1313 (1993) ("small-scale child care is an activity that is customarily incident to the residential use of property”); Burton v. Douglas Cy., 65 Wn.2d 619, 399 P.2d 68 (1965) (covenant prohibiting business use did not preclude use as a social club). Many people *831derive income from home-based enterprises which are completely compatible with the residential nature of the premises. Such activities might include babysitting, writing a book, working at a home office, or hosting a business dinner. The mere fact that one does more than simply eat, sleep, and watch television in his or her family home does not convert the premises from a residence into a commercial establishment; a residential use has many practical components. See Hunter Tract, 98 Wash. at 115. Instead, "the focus must be on the activity involved and how it parallels the ordinary and common meaning of use for residential purposes". Beverly Island, 113 Mich. App. at 327; accord Hunter Tract, at 114-15; Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1985).
Second, the Hagemann case is easily distinguishable from the current one. Most notably, the covenant in Hagemann specifically prohibited "business, industry or commercial enterprise of any kind or nature". Hagemann, at 87. Worthington's home is not subject to a business exclusion; her use need only be residential. As one court has pointed out, a "restriction allowing residential uses permits a wider variety of uses than a restriction prohibiting commercial or business uses." Beverly Island, 113 Mich. App. at 326. Moreover, the facts in Hagemann revealed a substantial commercial operation. There, the Worths ran a combination boarding home and adult foster care facility which cared for nine elderly adults in a specially designed octagonal structure containing a loft, 11 bedrooms and 6 bathrooms. Hagemann, at 87. In contrast, Worthington's adult family home is small, serves as the primary residence for all her family members, and maintains the neighborhood's residential appearance.
In the current case, the business aspects inherent in running an adult family home are clearly incidental to the primary purpose of the home: it provides a place where Worthington, her children, and the four adults reside. The monthly payments Worthington receives and the care she offers her adult family members do not negate the countless hours all in the home spend living together. See, e.g., Blevins v. Barry-*832Lawrence Cy. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986) (group home not a commercial enterprise); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1985) (incidental commercial characteristics did not negate residential nature of group home); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 303 S.C. 308, 400 S.E.2d 484 (1991) (incidental necessities of running a group home like maintaining records and providing care do not change the primary purpose from a residential one); Metzner, 69 Wn. App. at 411. If it did, anyone who pays rent or works at home would violate the "residential purposes only" covenant. Surely, such a result was never intended.
Furthermore, in seeking an injunction, the Homeowners failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that Worthington's supplemental use of her home to care for elderly adults contravened the covenant, or affected the neighborhood in any manner. Worthington largely runs the adult family home by herself. From the outside, her house does not differ in appearance from the other structures in the neighborhood. Although the residents require 24-hour care, the care is non-health related — the same type of care one would provide for a child or older relative. Although there is some suggestion that her household places additional strains on the subdivision's common water system, the same would be true for any large family. Similarly, there is no evidence demonstrating an increase in traffic beyond what a large family might engender. See, e.g., Metzner, 69 Wn. App. at 411 (noise generated by day-care operation was same as large family).
Thus, I would find that Worthington's use of her property as an adult family home is consistent with the "residential purposes only" portion of the Mains Farm covenant. In doing so, I would reaffirm the reasoning announced 76 years ago in the Hunter Tract decision. The incidental aspects involved in operating a small, adult family home are not sufficient to override the residential character of the use. Unfortunately, the majority's decision to not follow the Hunter Tract reasoning will force Worthington's elderly residents out of the *833Mains Farm subdivision, and severely limit the places where they might relocate.
Johnson, J., concurs with Durham, J.