dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the plain language of the contract establishes that defendant was obligated to purchase an annuity that would pay the specified amounts for the life of the child, not merely to purchase an annuity promising life-long payments. Defendant has not met that obligation.
A settlement agreement is a contract and must be construed and enforced like any other contract. Recreational Development Co. v. American Construction Co., 749 P.2d 1002 (Colo.App.1987). An unambiguous contract will be enforced according to the express provisions of the contract, giving words their plain and generally accepted meaning. Heller v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 800 P.2d 1006 (Colo.1990).
According to the agreement: “[Lutheran] will pay to Roemmieh the sum of $1,750,-116.00 in cash and will purchase an annuity which will pay $7,930.00 per month commencing June 1, 1984 ($95,160.00 per year) for the life of Jennifer Roemmieh, 30 years certain, compounding annually at 6%.” (emphasis added)
The word “will” is an auxiliary verb commonly having the mandatory sense of “shall” or “must.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (5th ed. 1979). In the agreement, “will” refers both to “purchase” and “pay”; thus, defendant was obligated to purchase an annuity that would pay the specified benefits for the life of the child. The “will pay” language specifies that this specific payment of money shall continue throughout Jennifer Roem-mich’s life. The subsequent bankruptcy of the initial insurance company does not change the terms of the contract.
In my view, from reading the plain language of the contract, the defendant’s obligation was to assure that monthly payments were delivered to plaintiffs until such time as the specific amounts set out in the agreement are paid.
This interpretation is not unreasonable, especially considering that defendant, not plaintiffs, was the owner of the annuity. Cf. Gray v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn.App.1995) (settlement agreement provided that “defendants shall purchase and deliver to Donald Gray, as father and natural guardian of Kristine Gray, an annuity”)(emphasis added).
The majority reasons that its interpretation of the contract is proper because “to construe this language as qualifying defendant’s obligation, rather than the annuity, would impose a substantial financial obligation on the defendant.” However, in my view, the substantial financial obligation is better borne by defendant who chose to satisfy its obligation by this form of agreement. Based on this record, defendant could have specified more clearly that its obligation ended by merely purchasing the annuity or by affirmatively stating that it was not obligating itself as a guarantor.