In this probate proceeding, William Gollyhorn, an heir to an estate, filed an objection to the final accounting filed by the personal representative, Sharon Springer. The trial court did not enter an order approving the final account and decree of final distribution or otherwise close the estate, but found that the personal representative breached her fiduciary duty because she failed to comply with the statutorily prescribed duties of a personal representative. The trial court then awarded Gollyhorn a personal judgment against the personal representative in the amount of $2,279.08 along with his attorney fees and costs. The personal representative appeals those decisions, assigning error to each. We dismiss the appeal.
We state the facts as found in the transcript of the proceedings below and the record on appeal. On July 25, 1994, testator died, leaving an estate of about $25,000. He was survived by four adult children, including the parties before us. After initially consulting an attorney to file a petition for probate of the will, the personal representative proceededpro se. In November 1995, the personal representative filed a final accounting for the estate.
The personal representative incurred some expenses associated with the estate’s administration, the bulk of which centered on long distance dealings with a bank regarding the bank’s unauthorized release of certain monies from one of decedent’s accounts to Gollyhorn and the personal representative’s attempts to have the bank collect that money for inclusion in the estate assets for distribution.
After filing the final accounting with the court, but before receiving the court’s approval, the personal representative issued checks to the estate heirs, as required by the accounting. All four of testator’s children were to receive an equal amount of $4,047.80. However, the personal representative deducted the value of the property that Gollyhorn had taken from decedent’s house shortly after the death, plus the expenses incurred to recover money improperly paid to Gollyhorn from one of decedent’s bank accounts. As a result, Gollyhorn received a check for $22.06.
*392Gollyhom filed an objection to the personal representative’s final accounting, seeking only a hearing on the objections. The hearing was held on December 21,1995. That morning Gollyhorn filed with the court a memorandum in support of objections, raising for the first time the questions of holding the personal representative personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty and his entitlement to attorney fees and costs.
At trial, evidence was adduced that the personal representative failed to fulfill the duties prescribed by statute for a personal representative. That evidence came in by way of the personal representative’s testimony during the presentation of Gollyhorn’s case. The trial court concluded that the personal representative’s own testimony settled all of the factual questions regarding Gollyhom’s contention that the personal representative had breached her fiduciary duty. Moreover, the trial court accepted Gollyhorn’s rough accounting in establishing his portion of the estate. Because it concluded that the factual issues were settled, the trial court did not allow the personal representative to present evidence to explain her actions. Gollyhorn’s rough accounting disallowed a number of the personal representative’s expenses, and the personal representative was not given the opportunity to challenge Gollyhorn’s figures or to legitimize her expenses.
On January 24,1996, the court entered a document entitled Findings, Order and Money Judgment, awarding Gollyhorn a $2,279.08 judgment against the personal representative as his portion of the estate and his attorney fees and costs. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the personal representative argues that the trial court erred in holding her liable for breach of fiduciary duty because it calculated Gollyhorn’s portion of the estate based on materials that were not in evidence. She further argues that it erred in refusing her the opportunity to present evidence about what Gollyhom had challenged and to justify some of her expenses. The personal representative also contends that the trial court erred in awarding Gollyhom attorney fees and costs because he failed to comply with the requirements of ORCP 68 C.
*393We do not reach the merits of this case. Appellate courts have a duty to examine their jurisdiction, sua sponte, and to dismiss any case that lacks the requisite basis for appeal. Goeddertz v. Parchen, 299 Or 277, 701 P2d 781 (1985).
An order entered in a probate proceeding is not appealable if it fails to settle the controversy completely and finally. Harrington v. Thomas, 63 Or App 292, 295, 663 P2d 1298, rev den 295 Or 617 (1983). The trial court purported to establish Gollyhom’s share of the estate when it entered its Findings, Order and Money Judgment.1 To the best that we are able to determine from the trial court file, however, the court did not otherwise approve or disapprove a final account or decree a final distribution of the estate, ORS 116.113(1), thereby closing the estate and conclusively determining the extent and character of Gollyhorn’s interest in the estate and that of all successors in interest to the estate. ORS 116.113(4).
This case is like Harrington because the trial court’s purported judgment in this case does not, as a matter of law, finally settle the rights and liabilities of any of the parties with an interest in an estate any more than did the order in Harrington.
The premise of the dissent is that the instrument on review is a judgment — but that merely begs the question. While it is true that all judgments must be so labeled, all documents so labeled are not necessarily judgments. An instrument is not a “judgment” simply because it is labeled as such. It is well established that the character of an instrument is determined by its contents, not by its title. Cockrum v. Graham, 143 Or 233, 242, 21 P2d 1084 (1933). With the exception of judgments entered pursuant to ORCP 67 B, a judgment is final, and therefore appealable, only if it finally determines the rights and liabilities of all parties on all issues in an action. ORCP 67 A. Until a decree of final distribution is made, any determination of the interested parties’ rights, no matter what it is called, is not final and is subject to *394modification. ORS 116.113(4).2 The trial court failed to complete the final accounting process, and it follows that the “judgment” against the personal representative has no more effect than an interim order and is not final. It is freely subject to change by the trial court.3 Accordingly, the matters in controversy are not concluded by the trial court’s “Findings, Order and Money Judgment.”4
Moreover, the trial court could not have approved the final account or otherwise closed the estate, as a matter of law, because the personal representative testified that she did not file any documentation concerning the payment of the necessary state income and personal property taxes. ORS 116.113(2). The personal representative’s testimony even fails to reveal if those taxes were paid in the first place. It follows, therefore, that ORS 19.033(4)5 is not applicable. See Parnicky v. Williams, 302 Or 150, 727 P2d 121 (1986).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on our own motion for want of appellate jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
The order provides, in part:
“1. [The personal representative] shall pay $2,279.08 to William R. Golly-horn as his portion of the estate of William A. Gollyhorn.”
ORS 116.113(4) provides:
“The decree of final distribution is a conclusive determination of the persons who are the successors in interest to the estate and of the extent and character of their interest therein, subject only to the right of appeal and the power of the court to vacate the decree.”
The dissent’s contention that our holding here has placed the personal representative in a “conundrum” is unfounded. We cannot make it any clearer than to say that the purported “judgment” here, although labeled as a judgment, for all intents and purposes is only preliminary — -it is interim in nature, unenforceable, and the trial court is free to revisit it.
Our conclusion is consistent with the purpose of prohibiting interlocutory appeals, which is to conserve appellate court time by barring decisions that may become unnecessary because of further action of the court that is required to dispose of the case. See Lulay v. Earle v. Wolfer, 278 Or 511, 564 P2d 1045 (1977).
ORS 19.033(4) provides:
“Notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal, the trial court shall have jurisdiction, with leave of the appellate court, to enter an appealable judgment if the appellate court determines that:
“(a) At the time of the filing of the notice of appeal the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment; and
“(b) The judgment from which the appeal is taken is defective in form or was entered at a time when the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the cause under subsection (1) of this section, or the trial court had not yet entered an appealable judgment.”