with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
Because I believe the majority opinion erroneously holds that Zabek’s February 22, 1992 hearing served to “cure” the City’s violation of her due process rights, I dissent from the court’s decision to deny Zabek a remedy beyond the date of that determination.
I also believe the majority’s facile treatment of Zabek’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is mistaken. Zabek should be allowed to press her due process and statutory claims to their legitimate conclusions. The majority opinion erroneously and prematurely cuts off her right to do so.
I. DUE PROCESS
All of the members of the court agree that the City violated Zabek’s due process right to a pre-termination hearing, and there can be little dispute on this issue, as both the facts of her initial termination and the law regarding this claim are clear. However, there are two aspects to the due process analysis in this ease. The majority correctly analyzes step one but stumbles on step two.
The majority holds that the City complied with due process at its February 22 hearing even though it denied Zabek the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses or present testimony of her own. It concludes that a hearing procedure which allowed Za-bek one-half hour to argue her position, but *1302did not allow her to present evidence or confront the city’s witnesses, was sufficiently “adversarial” to pass due process muster.
The majority cites four Alaska cases to bolster its analysis. However, none of these eases is persuasive support for the conclusion that Zabek received due process of law. In fact, Alaska law strongly supports the opposite result.
Only Degnan v. Bering Strait School District, 753 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1988), recognized by the majority as “similar in some respects” to Zabek’s case (Op. at 1298-99 n. 6) allows a result comparable to the court’s holding in Zabek’s case. But' Degnan is legally and factually distinguishable.1
The other three Alaska cases cited by the majority are Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1973); Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Education v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1984); and McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hospital, 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982). None of these cases support the conclusion that Zabek should receive less due process protection than any other governmental employee fired for misconduct.
In Nichols, 504 P.2d at 1365, the court said: “Where the nature and consequences of the charge are serious, ... the right to present witnesses on one’s behalf is manifest. ...” Nichols, a teacher terminated for incompetency, was held to have the right to present her defense “by testimony and other evidence.” Id. Zabek, a police dispatcher terminated for misconduct, is inexplicably found not to be entitled to this adversarial right.
The majority distinguishes Nichols by saying that “Zabek’s termination was not based on serious charges that would call her very character or capacity for employment into question, charges such as incompetency, misconduct, or dishonesty.” Op. at 1298. This conclusion mischaracterizes the charges that resulted in Zabek’s termination. Zabek lost her job because of charges of misconduct against her. The consequences of those charges were undeniably serious. And although the majority says “her termination was based solely on the revocation of her APSIN clearance,” this characterization is incorrect.
Zabek’s termination letter summarized the charges against her. It said:
Your actions on August 30,1991, which led to a subsequent investigation of your conduct by the Alaska State Troopers, were improper, unacceptable, and in violation of the North Pole Police Department Rules and Regulations. Since you are presently out of state, the issue of department disciplinary action relating to your misconduct cannot be appropriately addressed and at this point would perhaps be academic.
The same termination letter refers to another letter, written one day previously, in which the Alaska State Troopers revoked Zabek’s APSIN clearance. That revocation letter specified in detail the “misconduct” the City chief of police referred to in the letter which terminated Zabek’s employment. The same allegations of misconduct were repeated by the chief in a letter to Zabek’s lawyer. The allegations were publicized in a number of newspaper articles that became *1303part of the evidentiary record in Zabek’s lawsuit.2
The majority uncritically accepts the City’s selfserving characterization of this aspect of Zabek’s firing. It mischaracterizes the record by oversimplifying, treating the termination as a simple credentials issue in spite of the fact that the circumstances clearly indicate that it involved very serious misconduct charges.
After the majority opinion erroneously minimizes the seriousness and consequences of the charges against Zabek, it goes on to deprive Zabek of due process rights recognized by previous Alaska eases. These cases, cited by the majority but not extensively discussed, require more due process protection than Zabek has been given.
In Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Education v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Alaska 1984), a teacher received a post-termination hearing at which he could have presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses. He waived the right to do so. In McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hospital, 646 P.2d 857, 859 (Alaska 1982), an anesthesiologist who lost his staff privileges at a hospital received a post-suspension evidentia-ry hearing that included two days of live testimony. The court held the hearing met due process requirements. “The facts adduced at the second hearing, and the procedural due process afforded McMillan at that hearing ... were sufficient to support a post-hearing suspension.... McMillan was given ample opportunity to confront witnesses against him and to present evidence in his own behalf.” McMillan, 646 P.2d at 866-67. In Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Alaska 1973), non-tenured teachers dismissed for incompetence were given a post-dismissal hearing at which they were denied the right to call witnesses. The court held, “we conclude that [the teachers] must be given the opportunity to present their own defense by testimony and other evidence.” Nichols, 504 P.2d at 1365.
In all three of these cases the court held or implied the right to present testimony and cross-examine to be a requirement of due process in circumstances virtually identical to Zabek’s. The majority cites no Alaska cases which allow denial of these rights on the theory of the majority opinion, which is that the scope of due process protection for terminated governmental employees is defined by the label the terminating authority attaches to the termination. Similarly, no Alaska case has held that the due process rights of such employees are so limited as to require only a post-termination hearing at which the right to present testimonial evidence is denied, the right to confront and cross-examine is denied, and the evidentiary record is supplemented after the hearing by affidavits only.
The majority also glosses over a number of important issues raised by Zabek throughout the proceedings below. Zabek argued that she should have been allowed to present evidence in support of her contentions that her behavior was not illegal. Her other contentions were that the City had tolerated similar behavior on a number of occasions, and that the City should have interceded on her behalf with AST as it had done successfully on behalf of another employee whose APSIN privileges had been suspended. Za-bek also implicitly argued that the City’s overly simplistic reliance on the APSIN privilege revocation as its sole reason for Zabek’s termination was a pretext or sham intended to avoid difficult political and legal issues.
The majority says, “because the City’s decision to terminate Zabek was based solely on her loss of APSIN clearance, however, the post-hearing supplementation of the record with witness affidavits provided Zabek with all the process due to her.” Op. at 1299. The record does not adequately support the “because” part of this proposition. At the very least the available evidence creates a substantial factual dispute which required an *1304adequate due process hearing for proper resolution.
The record also shows that Zabek’s termination procedure fell far short of complying with due process. The City personnel review board affirmed Zabek’s termination without discussing many of the issues raised by her arguments. It made no findings, and simply concluded that Zabek’s termination was “lawful.” Zabek was not allowed to present evidence before the Board and confront and cross-examine witnesses against her. The administrative record does not show that her defenses were given meaningful consideration.3
The question of what process was due Zabek is affected by a line of cases starting with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In Roth, the court said that dismissal of a government employee accompanied by a “charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community” would trigger the due process right to a hearing at which the employee could refute the charges and publicly clear his name. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707. In subsequent cases, the court extended this principle to require such a name-clearing hearing even if the accusations did not “cause” the employment termination, if the accusations received extensive publicity and “occurred in the course of termination of employment.” Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 633 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1406 n. 13, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).
Cross-examination and the presentation of evidence are important due process elements of such hearings. See Adams v. Sewell, 946 F.2d 757, 765 (11th Cir.1991) (emphasizing importance of cross-examination in due process analysis of post-termination proceedings); Campbell v. Pierce County, Ga., 741 F.2d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir.1984) (“While the features of such a hearing itself have been prescribed with considerable flexibility, courts have required that the claimant have notice of the charges which have been raised against him, and an opportunity to refute, by cross-examination or independent evidence, the allegations which gave rise to the reputa-tional injury.”).
With regard to the majority’s conclusion that the February 22 hearing “cured” the City’s due process problems, there is persuasive case law authority to the contrary. For example, in Adams, the court affirmed a § 1983 damages verdict where a post-termination procedure included evidentiary hearings, stating:
The County contends that its three-step grievance process, which culminated in the Step III hearing, satisfied Adams’s right to post-termination due process of law. The Step III hearing before the County’s Grievance Adjustment Board (the “Board”) allegedly provided Adams with an opportunity to present his case and cross-examine the witnesses against him in an impartial forum. This court has emphasized the importance of cross-examination in due process analysis; post-termination proceedings have been held inadequate because a terminated employee “had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accuser in the presence of the decision maker.” Kelly [v. Smith], 764 F.2d [1412,] 1415 [ (11th Cir.1985) ].
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Although the Step III proceeding included the procedural formalities of an evidentia-ry hearing, at trial Adams contested the adequacy and fairness of the hearing, as well as the impartiality of the presiding Board, and introduced evidence to support his allegations. These claimed deficiencies in the post-termination process are important because, as noted above, Adams alleged significant procedural flaws in the County’s pre-termination process. Under these circumstances, the pre-termination problems were not “cured” by the post-termination hearing, and reasonable jurors could find that the pre- and post-termination procedures provided by the County were inadequate. Accordingly, we deny the County’s appeal of the jury verdict for *1305Adams on his procedural due process claim.
Adams, 946 F.2d at 765-66. Adams was denied due process because his post-termination hearing had “significant procedural flaws.” In comparison, Zabek’s hearing procedure was flawed in even more significant ways. We should not “cure” the City’s due process problems under these circumstances.
II. ZABEK’S SECTION 1983 CLAIM
In one paragraph, without citation of any authority, the majority extinguishes Zabek’s § 1983 claim. On its own rationale, the court affirms summary dismissal of Zabek’s § 1988 claim, because of its holding that the February 22 post-termination hearing cured the City’s due process problems.4 I think this conclusion is wrong for a number of reasons.
First, the majority holds that due process was violated by the initial summary firing. How can one say then, as the majority does, that Zabek’s subsequent § 1983 claim is left “without an underlying deprivation of constitutional right upon which [the claim can be] based”? Op. at 1300. The court has found such an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right in Section III.B.l. of its opinion. The seriousness of that deprivation and its remedies are factual matters that are traditionally decided in § 1983 lawsuits.
We should also recognize that Zabek has claimed both procedural and substantive due process violations in her § 1983 claim. The first set of claims attacks the procedural deficiencies of the City’s administrative appeal process. The second set of claims relates to improper political motivation and pretextual firing. Zabek has established a procedural due process violation as a matter of law. She should be allowed to litigate her remedy for that violation. She should also have the opportunity to pursue her additional claims, which were never considered or resolved at the administrative level.
Substantive due process claims are properly part of § 1983 actions. Adams, 946 F.2d at 766; Barnett v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571, 1577-78 (11th Cir.1983). Zabek has never had an opportunity to litigate them and we should not cut off her right to do so on the poorly supported assumption that “the City’s decision to terminate Zabek was based solely on her loss of APSIN clearance.” Op. at 1299.5
Finally, the question of damages has not been explored in any great depth here or at the trial court level, so the record does not clearly disclose what specific damages are being sought. The amended complaint asks for “lost employment, emotional distress, and damage to [Zabek’s] reputation” and for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
The majority does not address the question of what damages Zabek has claimed pursuant to § 1983. She may be entitled to claim § 1983 pain and suffering damages. See Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 789 (4th Cir.1993). In addition, she may be entitled to recover § 1983 compensatory damages such as attorney’s fees spent to obtain the ruling that her due process rights were violated. Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1216-17 (7th Cir.1980). Claims for punitive damages are also allowed.6 Id. at 1217. Mental distress damages may be available. See Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 781 (9th Cir.1982). Damages for injury to reputation may be appropriate also. See Endicott, 644 F.2d at 1217; Campbell v. Pierce County, Ga., 741 F.2d 1342,1344-45 (11th Cir.1984).
*1306Zabek should be entitled to prosecute her § 1983 claim independently. Since the only relief available to her at the administrative level was for lost wages, her right to pursue additional damages pursuant to § 1983 should be preserved.
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In ruling that Zabek’s § 1983 claim was barred by collateral estoppel, the trial court said:
It’s my judgment that Count I is barred by collateral estoppel, that branch being specifically res judicata. The claims that are being brought forward here are the factual claims that have been and are being litigated on the administrative side and Ms. Zabek chose to pursue those administrative remedies. Had she completely foregone her administrative rights, clearly she could have brought this action. However, having once brought the administrative action, she is subject to State procedural requirements such as collateral estoppel, as the Court determined in Diedrich v. City of Ketchikan. These facts are inherently bound up in — the facts here on the 1983 claims are inherently bound up in the decisions that are being made in the administrative process. It’s also clear, given the broad grant in the North Pole Code Of Ordinances, that Zabek could have pursued the 1983 action there. I conclude that res judicata precludes its submission here, given the decision that she made and I rely on Diedrich, as I said, and Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, the Ninth Circuit case from 1988.
This basis for dismissal is erroneous also. First, Zabek has established a violation of due process in the failure of the City to provide a pre-termination hearing. She cannot be collaterally estopped from asserting a claim she has prevailed on. Nor can she be precluded from asserting in a § 1983 action claims to damages she was unable to receive in the administrative process. Second, the City’s subsequent administrative procedures fell far short of meeting due process requirements. And finally, neither Diedrich v. City of Ketchikan, 805 P.2d 362 (Alaska 1991), nor Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1988) support the trial court’s ruling.
In Eilrich, the federal appellate court, applying California law, invoked collateral es-toppel doctrine to bar § 1983 relief for a terminated city police officer who had been given a “14-day proceeding resembling a trial” at which both sides were entitled to call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, were represented by counsel, and were given the right to brief and orally argue the officer’s first amendment claim. Id. at 634. Under these circumstances, the court held that the officer clearly “had an adequate opportunity to litigate his first amendment claim with these procedures.” Id. at 635.
In Diedrich, we applied the Eilrich reasoning to preclude Diedrich from litigating § 1983 claims because he “was afforded ample opportunity to litigate his termination before the Board” and because the allegations in the § 1983 complaint were “essentially the same as the issues Diedrich presented to the Board.” Diedrich, 805 P.2d at 369-70.
As Eilrich makes clear, however, issue preclusion arising out of administrative proceedings is only justified if the administrative agency is acting in a “judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Eilrich, 839 F.2d at 633. Also, the issue necessarily decided at the administrative proceeding must be “identical to the one sought to be relit-igated” in the § 1983 lawsuit. Id. These requirements were not met in Zabek’s case.
Zabek’s administrative proceedings did not encompass or resolve most of the issues she tried to raise, she was kept from litigating those issues by the administrative tribunal’s limitation of evidence and issues, and she received almost no adversarial rights. Thus the issues litigated at the administrative level were not identical to Zabek’s § 1983 claims, and Zabek clearly did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate those issues in the administrative setting. Neither Eilrich nor Diedrich should be read as authorizing such expansive preclusive effect as the City received in the court below.
*1307IV. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion makes the following laudable statement in support of its decision to validate Zabek’s claim of constitutional violation:
Indeed, one of the reasons a pre-termi-nation hearing is required is to give the employee the opportunity to present in her defense facts which, if developed, might weigh against her termination. Even if it appears almost certain that the employee will be unable to do so, due process requires that she be given the opportunity to try.
Op. at 1298.
Unfortunately, this reasoning is used only to provide a pyrrhic solution for Zabek. Followed to its logical conclusion, it would allow her to press for more complete relief. Used in a selective way, it simply results in a convenient but inappropriate end to all of Zabek’s claims. Her remaining due process and § 1983 claims should not be resolved summarily. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Degnan did not receive an adversarial hearing before his termination from public employment. Degnan’s employment was illegal, and thus void ab initio, because of a state statute prohibiting nepotism in school district hiring practices. Even so, Degnan was held to he entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Degnan, 753 P.2d at 149 n. 6. Although he was given an opportunity to dispute the claim of illegality, Degnan did not dispute the facts that proved the illegality of his employment or deny that illegality. Id. at 148. It was in this context that the Degnan court said “[a]t the time Degnan was called into the superintendent's office, he simply possessed no interest protected by due process." Id. at 150 (emphasis added). Degnan would be better cited as support for the majority's conclusion in Section III.B.l of its opinion that Zabek’s due process rights to notice and a pre-termi-nation hearing were violated by her summary termination. By contrast, Degnan is rather weak support for the majority's conclusion in section III.B.2 that Zabek, whose employment contract was legally valid, and who claimed that her firing was pretextual and politically motivated, was not entitled to a due process hearing involving anything more than thirty minutes for her to state her position before the city personnel review board.
. The fact that the charges were widely publicized is important because of the law regarding the scope of due process protection available to an employee whose dismissal is accompanied by publicity that might be damaging to her reputation. See Vanelli v. Reynolds, 667 F.2d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir.1982) ("The procedural protections of due process apply if the accuracy of the charge is contested, there is some public disclosure of the charge, and it is made in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized by state law.”). The law regarding this question is discussed in more detail below.
. In 1994, Zabek finally got a hearing where evidence was presented and cross-examination was allowed. The Board made findings and gave reasons for its decision. Comparison of this decision with the original only emphasizes the deficiencies of the February 22, 1992 procedure.
. The trial court ruled that Zabek's § 1983 claim was barred by collateral estoppel. That decision is discussed in the next section of this dissent.
. Section 1983 allows litigation of due process claims even after unsuccessful administrative due process challenges to employment terminations. Adams, 946 F.2d at 764. A direct § 1983 action independent of administrative proceedings may also be litigated. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Barnett, 707 F.2d at 1578.
.I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Zabek’s slander claim. The § 1983 claims are not solely based on the slander allegations, so dismissal of the slander claim should not preclude her from pursuing relief pursuant to § 1983. She may have stipulated her right to punitive damages away by dropping Police Chief Lamm from her lawsuit. See Endicott, 644 F.2d at 1216-17.