Appellant, Norma Webster, was employed as a teacher for the 1976-77 school year by the Board of Trustees of School District No. 25. During that year, periodic teacher evaluations and written reports were made concerning Webster’s teaching. In the spring of 1977, the Board, following a recommendation received from the principal of the school where appellant worked, placed Webster on probation. She received notification of her probation by letter dated April 6,1977. The notification did not indicate when the probation would end. Thereafter, she was offered and accepted a contract for the 1977-78 school year- The evaluation of Webster continued during that second year and she was informed by letter dated May 12, 1978, that she would not be offered a contract for the 1978-79 school year. This letter informed her of the reasons for such action and advised her of her right under I.C. § 33-513(5) to request an informal review by the Board. Upon receiving her request, the Board conducted an informal review. After the review, the Board’s decision not to offer a teaching contract remained unchanged.
Webster filed suit alleging violations of her statutory due process rights under I.C. § 33-513(5) and seeking reinstatement for the 1978-79 school year and damages. After a trial to the court, a memorandum decision was filed. Judgment was entered and filed in favor of the Board. Webster appeals. We affirm.
The central focus of this case is the construction of I.C. § 33-513(5). Specifically, what statutory rights are granted by this section to certificated employees who are not on renewable contracts pursuant to I.C. § 33-1212. An ancillary question arises: what, if any, procedural due process rights accrue to the benefit of an employee under § 33-513(5).
As applicable to this cause, I.C. § 33-513(5), 1976 Idaho Sess.Laws ch. 86, p. 293, 295-96 (currently I.C. § 33-513(6)), provided the board of trustees of the school district with the following powers and duties:
“[t]o establish criteria and procedures for the supervision and evaluation of certificated employees who are not employed on a renewable contract, as provided for in section 33-1212, Idaho Code. Such procedures shall require at least one (1) evaluation prior to the beginning of the second semester of the school year, and *344when any such teacher’s work is found to be unsatisfactory a probationary period shall be established which shall continue until the time for the reissuing of the yearly contract as provided in this paragraph. This procedure shall not preclude recognition of unsatisfactory work at a subsequent evaluation and the establishment of a reasonable period of probation. In all instances, the teacher shall be duly notified in writing of the areas of work which are deficient, including the conditions of probation. Until the third year of continuous employment by the same school district, including any specially chartered district, each such certificated employee shall be given notice, in writing, whether he will be reemployed for the next ensuing year. Such notice shall be given by the board of trustees no later than the fifteenth day of May of each such year. If the board of trustees has decided not to reemploy the certificated employee, then the notice must contain a statement of reasons for such decision and the employee shall, upon request, be given the opportunity for an informal review of such decision by the board of trustees.”
The prime function of this Court when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. E.g., Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Idaho Public Utilities Commission v. V-1 Oil Company, 90 Idaho 415, 420, 412 P.2d 581, 583 (1966). It is argued that Webster’s procedural due process rights were violated when she was given no written notice of probation during the 1977-78 school year. To clarify the situation, Webster does not have an interest which gives rise to a full due process analysis under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The procedural due process rights involved in this case have their genesis in the statute and not the United States Constitution. We are concerned with what procedural rights are granted by § 33-513(5) and whether Webster was accorded the protection offered by these rights.
From the language of the statute, a probation period is mandated if a teacher’s work is found to be unsatisfactory during an evaluation prior to the beginning of the second semester. The probation in such instance shall continue until the time for the reissuing of contracts as provided by the statute. It is argued that the probation thereby established is curtailed as a matter of law by the offer of a new contract. We do not agree. We are of the opinion that the probation period established by this provision is at minimum to run until the time for reissuing of contracts and that the board is not precluded from continuing a probation from one year to another. We find support for this conclusion in the following language of the statute which qualifies the above procedure: “This procedure shall not preclude recognition of unsatisfactory work at a subsequent evaluation and the establishment of a reasonable period of probation." (Emphasis added.) Webster was placed on probation in the spring of 1977 pursuant to the immediately preceding quoted language of the statute.1 There*345fore, she was entitled to a “reasonable period of probation.” From our examination of the record, we conclude that there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the probation established in the spring of 1977 was still in effect during the 1977-78 school year. This finding has not been shown to be clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed on appeal. I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Under § 33-513(5) Webster was also entitled to written notice of the board’s decision not to renew her contract including a statement of reasons and the opportunity for an informal review by the board of its decision.2 The record supports the trial court’s findings that Webster was accorded these rights.3
We next consider Webster’s contention that the trial court erred by excluding rebuttal testimony of a witness offered by Webster concerning her performance as a teacher. Webster failed to contest the validity of the reasons for nonrenewal at the informal review and the propriety of the board’s decision based upon these reasons was not at issue before the trial court — the question was whether Webster was provided her procedural rights. Therefore, the exclusion of testimony concerning Webster’s performance as a teacher by the trial court was proper on grounds of relevancy and materiality. See Mountain States Tel.
i & Tel. Co. v. Jones, 76 Idaho 241, 280 P.2d 1067 (1955); Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 73 Idaho 13, 245 P.2d 1045 (1952); Adamson v. Mattson, 32 Idaho 493, 185 P. 553 (1919).
No costs allowed.
Affirmed.
BAKES, McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.McFADDEN, J., registered his vote prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.
. The body of the letter dated April 6, 1977, which provided notice of Webster’s probation read:
“Pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Idaho State Board of Education you are hereby notified that on the 23rd day of March, 1977, the Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, at a properly constituted meeting, approved Mr. Hammond’s recommendation, dated March 21, 1977, that you be placed on probation. Poor student control and program management, lack of communication with the administration, and general weaknesses in teacher/pupil relationships are the reasons for placing you on probation.
“The Board of Trustees hope that this probationary period will be a period of growth and development in these areas. Since education of the students of School District No. 25 is our paramount concern, they pledge support of the administration and supervisory personnel in assisting you.
“Mr. Hammond will establish a program of supervision utilizing resources in School District No. 25 that will assist you. To keep you and the Board of Trustees informed of your *345progress, Mr. Hammond will submit evaluation reports on a regular basis.”
. The body of the letter dated May 12, 1978, which provided notice of the board’s decision not to renew read:
“On April 6, 1977, you were notified of the action taken by the Board of Trustees placing you on probation. This probationary action was on Mr. Dale Hammond’s recommendation because of your performance in the classroom. Your poor performance was outlined in that correspondence as poor student control, program management, lack of communication with the administration, and general weaknesses in teacher/pupil relationships.
“Mr. Hammond, at the direction of the Board of Trustees, did establish a program of supervision in order to assist you in overcoming these problem areas. Periodically, Mr. Hammond submitted to Mr. Strah evaluation reports outlining your progress. These evaluation reports have been related to the Board of Trustees.
“Unfortunately, your progress in these problem areas has not been corrected to the satisfaction of the administration and therefore, the Board of Trustees has acted upon Mr. Hammond’s recommendation and you will not be offered a teaching contract for the 1978-79 school year.
“Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 33-513, you have the right to request and be given the opportunity for an informal review of this decision by the Board of Trustees.”
. Webster requested an informal review which was provided as reflected by a letter admitted into evidence addressed to her from the chairman of the board of trustees, Boyd Neider, dated June 6, 1978. This letter advised Webster that the board adhered to its original decision not to renew.