dissenting.
When the legislature significantly altered the workers’ compensation laws in 1990, it specifically provided that matters concerning a claim for which a hearing had been requested before May 1,1990, and for which the hearing was convened before July 1, 1990, would be decided pursuant to the pre-amendment law. Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 54(2). I agree with employer that the proceeding held on June 25,1990, was a. sham. Accordingly, I dissent.
Because the 1990 amendments apply to all cases for which a hearing had not yet “convened,” the Board gave notice of and held a “rights preservation conference” on June 25,1990, at a Salem hotel. This case was one of approximately 2,500 that were “convened” that day. The sole purpose of the conference was to enable those cases to be decided under the old law. No issues relating to this case were raised on June 25, and the referee preserved all objections and motions until the regularly scheduled hearing, which was eventually held on December 5,1990. Employer did not attend the June conference, but objected to the rights preservation conference when the hearing was finally held on December 5.
The majority purports to rely on the natural, plain and obvious meaning of the terms “convene” and “hearing.” Although I have no quarrel with that approach, and agree with the definitions offered for the terms, I must disagree with the majority’s application of the definitions.
“Convene” means, according to the majority, “to come together or assemble, usually for some public purpose.” 115 Or App at 741. The record indicates that a proceeding was *745convened when the referee assembled the mass of cases on June 25.
The fact is, however, that the proceeding that was convened was not a “hearing” under any definition of that term, including the majority’s. It defines “hearing” as “an opportunity to be heard” or “a session in which testimony and arguments are presented.” 115 Or App at 742. Having defined the term, the majority then ignores the definition. The transcript, which is quoted in its entirety in note 1 of the majority opinion, shows that the proceeding never provided claimant or employer an opportunity to be heard, nor was any testimony or argument offered or solicited. There simply was not a hearing. The Board’s attempt to preserve claimant’s rights under the old law was nothing but a sham proceeding.
When the legislature adopted the amendments at the special session, it was aware of the Board’s backlog of cases. Had it intended that all claimants whose cases were part of that backlog should have their claims adjudicated under the old law, it simply could have exempted all cases for which a request for hearing had been filed before May 1,1990. It did not. For whatever reason, it specifically provided that the old law would apply only to cases in which requests for hearing had been made before May 1,1990, and a hearing had been convened before July 1,1990. Neither the Board nor we are at liberty to ignore the legislature’s clear directive.
When the legislature exempted from the new law cases for which a hearing had been convened, it meant that the process of adjudicating a disputed claim must have begun. Claimant does not contend — nor could he — that the referee began to adjudicate any disputed issues in his case at the so-called rights preservation conference. Accordingly, I would hold that the Board and the referee erred in applying the old law to this case.
I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Buttler and Edmonds, JJ., join in this dissent.