(dissenting).
I would reverse the summary judgment granted to West Valley City on a ground that was briefed by plaintiff but has not been separately considered in the majority opinion.
The City may be liable because it clothed Lyday with apparent authority to commit the offensive acts on plaintiff. Under section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
(1) A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from reliance upon, or belief in statements or other conduct within an agent’s apparent authority.
(2) Unless there has been reliance, the principal is not liable in tort for conduct of a servant or other agent merely because it is within his apparent authority or apparent scope of employment.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265 (1957).
The City invested in Lyday complete control of the explorer program and invited young people in the area to participate. Many of the participants were interested in careers in law enforcement. Lyday taught them about police work in weekly meetings held in the city hall. On police department letterhead, each of the participants in the post was required to commit in writing full allegiance to Lyday’s directions and orders. Disobedience could result in discipline or even expulsion from the post. The abuse here was committed under the guise of Lyday’s teaching plaintiff standard relaxation techniques for police officers. According to plaintiff, Lyday told him that police work was stressful and that it was important to learn relaxation techniques. Lyday then demonstrated the technique by massaging plaintiff’s arm, leg, neck, and chest. On a later occasion, Lyday massaged an area closer to plaintiff’s genitals and, still later, actually touched his genitals. Plaintiff, being young and obedient, did not resist. The abuse occurred in a police car when Lyday was on duty, as he was taking plaintiff home from post meetings or activities. Lyday may have been in his police uniform. He testified in his deposition that it was within his job description to take participants home when necessary and convenient. A jury could reasonably find that the 15-year-old plaintiff had no reason to doubt his leader’s representations and reasonably relied upon them.
In this situation, the City would be liable for Lyday’s tort. An annotation by W. W. Allen summarizes the cases on the subject:
The cases which have involved the point fairly show that if a servant issues a direction or order which falls within the apparent scope of his authority in doing the work of his master, the latter may ordinarily be held liable for injuries proximately resulting to one who acts on the direction or order, and this notwithstanding it was given contrary to instructions or without actual authority.
W. W. Allen, Annotation, Doctrine of Apparent Authority as Applicable Where Relationship is that of Master and Servant, 2 A.L.R.2d 406, 419 (1948). The cases cited in the annotation point out that liability of a master based on the apparent authority of his servant to commit a tort is narrowly applied. Usually the injured party cannot demonstrate that he submitted to the tort (especially if it was intentionally inflicted) in reliance on any authority of the *128servant. Said the court in Smith v. Polukey, 22 Ill.App.2d 238, 252, 160 N.E.2d 508, 515 (1959), “In the usual personal injury case, the injured person does not rely upon apparent authority of any kind in getting hurt.” However, when deceit is engaged in by an employee and the injured person is young or inexperienced and reasonably relies upon that employee’s order or direction, all the necessary elements are present to impose liability on the employer. An illustration provided in section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is helpful in demonstrating this point:
P discharges A, his foreman, who regularly directs those under him where to cut timber. Before the employees have been told of A’s discharge, he tells them to cut trees on B’s land, which they do. P is liable for the trespass.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265, illus. 1 (1957).
Employers have been held liable for injuries sustained by persons who have relied on orders, directions, permissions, and invitations extended by employees acting within the apparent authority with which they have been clothed by their employers. Liability has been imposed notwithstanding that the order, direction, permission, or invitation was contrary to instructions given the employee or without actual authority. 2 A.L.R.2d at 419-20. Moreover, employers have been held liable where employees have extended invitations to third persons to enter nonpublic areas of stores and hotels or to ride on a train or automobile which resulted in injuries. 2 A.L.R.2d at 419-20, 425-28. Liability is not defeated because the employee’s act is of no benefit to the employer. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 262 (1957).
The doctrine of apparent authority has its roots in equitable estoppel. “[I]t is founded on the idea that where one of two persons must suffer from the wrong of a third[,] the loss should fall on that one whose conduct created the circumstances which made the loss possible.” 2 A.L.R.2d at 408; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 615 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex.Civ.Ct.App.), rev’d on other grounds, 621 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.1981).
Our decision in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), does not preclude liability by the City. It was not a case of “apparent authority.” Justice Stewart, writing for the court, carefully pointed out, “Neither Birkner nor Flowers thought their sexual interaction was part of therapy — the service that Flowers was hired to provide.” Id. at 1058. No deception was employed by Flowers. In the instant case, Lyday knew that his touching plaintiff was not part of the training he was to give, but plaintiff, being deceived, was not so informed. Another important distinction is that the victim in Birkner was an adult, whereas the plaintiff here was only 15 years of age. Because of his youth, a jury could find plaintiff’s reliance on Lyday’s representation and conduct entirely justifiable. Lastly, Salt Lake County had done nothing to clothe Flowers with any apparent authority to commit the offensive acts on Birkner.
In summary, the City clothed Lyday with authority to teach the young participants principles and procedures of police work. They were sworn to follow his direction. While teaching plaintiff, Lyday, by deceit, induced plaintiff to submit to abuse, representing that it was part of the instruction. Plaintiff, being obedient, did not at the time question or resist the officer’s advances. If his reliance was justifiable, the City is liable for the tort. See Camp v. Hall, 39 Fla. 535, 22 So. 792 (1897) (where the reliance of a child on the order of foreman to engage in certain dangerous work was held to be reasonable).
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HOWE, Associate C.J.