(dissenting):
I cannot concur in the ruling that there was sufficient evidence of damage to allow it to go to the jury. The majority states that the appropriate measure of damages is based on market value. But there is no *899evidence, in my view, of market value in this case. Even if it be conceded that the plaintiff's out-of-court statement as to the value of the well is sufficient to establish the value of the well, the testimony falls far short of providing a reasonable basis for determining market value of the whole parcel without a working well. Surely in this case such evidence would not have been hard to come by. The point cannot be avoided by the general principle that some uncertainty in evidence of damage is to be expected. That principle has especial application in cases dealing with lost profits because of lost sales, see Winsness v. M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 1303 (1979); loss of good will; losses occasioned by inability to reduce unit costs; etc. These types of losses inevitably are burdened with considerable uncertainty because of the nature of the factors which must be considered. Market value, as a measure of damages, may give rise to conflicting testimony, but the basic factors to be considered are not so difficult to evaluate. In any event, there must be some evidence of market value, and there is none.
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.