concurring.
I concur due to this circuit’s precedent requiring plain error review of unpre-served procedural errors. I write separately because, on these facts, Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), requires remand.
Before Booker, the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) as requiring harmless error analysis of misapplication of the guidelines — which is a procedural error post-Gaii. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). Williams addressed a district court’s upward departure based on both prohibited and authorized grounds. Id. at 196, 112 S.Ct. 1112. After finding the error harmless under § 3742(f)(1), the Court reviewed the decision to depart for “reasonableness” under § 3742(f)(2), a review like post-Gail substantive review. See id. at 203-04, 112 S.Ct. 1112 (reasonableness review involves the appellate court “examining] the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence under the Guidelines, as well as the district court’s stated reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence.”). The Court stated that a “sentence thus can be ‘reasonable’ even if some of the reasons given by the district court to justify the departure from the presumptive guidelines range are invalid, provided that the remaining reasons are sufficient to justify the magnitude of the departure.” Id.
This court has determined that “nothing in Gall [ ] undermines Williams or makes harmless-error analysis inapplicable to procedural sentencing errors.” United States v. Henson, 534 F.3d 922, 924, 2008 WL 2852963, No. 07-1993, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir.2008) (noting that § 3742(f) was left intact by Booker). See also United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir.2008) (applying harmless error post-Gaii); United States v. Greene, 513 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2008) (same); United States v. Huff, 514 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir.2008) (same).
Before Gall, this court ruled that plain error review applies to unpreserved Booker errors. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 548-49 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc). Booker required sentences to be reviewed only for “unreasonableness.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). “Gall v. United States calls for an appellate court to conduct two layers of review, first for procedural soundness, then for substantive reasonableness.” Vickers, 528 F.3d at 1122 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Post-Gaii, this court continues to apply plain-error review to unpreserved procedural errors. See, e.g., United States v. Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir.2008) (applying plain error post-Gaii); United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir.2008), petition for cert. filed, No. 07-11317 (June 4, 2008) (same).
This case illustrates the difficulty of conducting substantive review, after a finding of Gall error. The majority finds a Gall error here, but does not reverse under plain error review because the record does not indicate that the district court would have given a lower sentence had it been aware of its full authority to sentence outside the guidelines. The majority must then proceed to review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, based on the district court’s explanation of the § 3553(a) factors. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (“[T]he appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). Unlike Williams where the appellate court could determine whether the authorized grounds alone jus*886tified the departure, here the court has no basis to judge whether the sentence is reasonable.
When Bain requested the 60-month sentence, the district court stated, “I can’t do that, .... if the Court gives [defendants] more than 45 or 50 percent off for putting their life at risk, the Court of Appeals reverses that as an unreasonable sentence.” The district court did not seriously consider Bain’s arguments for a 60-month sentence; therefore the entire § 3553(a) explanation is tainted by the Gall error. See Vickers, 528 F.3d at 1122-23 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (procedural error “thwarts reasonableness review— that is, it cuts off our review process before we even reach the issue of reasonableness”); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 213 (3rd Cir.2008) (“Our reasonableness review relies on a district court’s reasoning from the starting point of the correctly calculated Guidelines through the § 3553(a) factors.”). The record here does not indicate what sentence the district court believed was “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” Due to the deferential abuse of discretion standard, the majority affirms the sentence based on explanations that may not reflect the district court’s unrestrained opinion.
District courts must “make an individualized assessment” of the correct sentence, and “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (emphasis added). Substantive review under Gall requires this court to defer to the district court’s unrestrained opinion about what sentence is “sufficient but not greater than necessary,” and the reasons therefor. See also Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, —, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.”) (emphasis added).
Since this court has no reliable basis for substantive review, this sentence should be reversed and remanded for resentencing in order to fulfill the mandate of Gall. See United States v. Pepper, 518 F.3d 949, 953 (8th Cir.2008) (reversing and remanding for resentencing — without harmless error, plain error, or substantive review — where the district court “procedurally erred by failing to explain adequately [defendant’s] sentence and by relying predominantly on improper factors to determine the sentence variance”); United States v. Kemp, 530 F.3d 719, 723 (8th Cir.2008) (reversing and remanding because “we are not sure that the district court adopted the guidelines range recommended in the PSR”); United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 665-666 (8th Cir.2008) (reversing procedural error of “relying on an erroneous factor” without harmless error, plain error, or substantive reasonableness analysis). Cf. United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir.2006) (reversing and remanding Kimbrough error because it was unclear whether it would have varied from the guidelines range had it know it had the authority); United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir.2008) (reversing and remanding Kimbrough error because “[w]hen a district court does not consider an argument because it is unaware of its power to do so, [ ] remand is appropriate.”).
Because this circuit’s precedent requiring plain error review of unpreserved Gall error does not allow a remand, I concur in the result.