dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that the prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments of the penalty phase of Beuke’s trial did not infect the trial with unfairness resulting in an *656unconstitutional denial of due process, I respectfully dissent.
I.
While it is obvious that the crime for which Beuke was convicted was heinous and the evidence presented against him was voluminous, it is in exactly such circumstances that we, as officers of the Court, must ensure that Beuke receives a fair trial in front of an impartial jury. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509, 91 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971) (“In essence, the right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process ... This is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies.”).
The prosecutorial misconduct was so egregious and inflammatory, that I have grave doubts about the fairness and integrity of Beuke’s penalty phase hearing. Justice Wright, dissenting from the Ohio Supreme Court’s upholding of Beuke’s conviction, stated it well: “[wjhile isolated instances of prosecutorial misconduct or overzealousness may be tolerated in many circumstances and indeed prove ‘harmless,’ there comes a point where the cumulative effect of improper remarks and of untoward conduct by the state constitutes reversible error.” State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274, 291 (1988).
II.
As stated by the majority, in order for this Court to reverse Beuke’s conviction, a prosecutor’s comments must so infect the trial “with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). We have held that “reversal is required if the prosecutor’s misconduct is ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant.’ ” Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir.2005). To succeed on his claim, Beuke must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and flagrant. Id. at 641. We first determine if the challenged conduct was improper. It is obvious to any objective observer that the closing arguments of the prosecution were blatantly improper.
The majority analyzes five categories of statements made by the prosecutor that are challenged by Beuke: (1) statements indicating that the death penalty sends a deterrent message to criminals and a reassuring message to the law-abiding public; (2) statements where the prosecutor allegedly relied on his own personal experience to persuade the jury; (3) statements about the victims of the attempted murders, Wahoff and Graham; (4) statements indicating the prosecutor’s personal fear of Beuke; and (5) statements warning the jurors that Beuke could be paroled if he did not receive a death sentence.
The majority actually concedes that the second and fifth categories — the prosecutor’s personal fears and warnings about Beuke killing again — were improper. I would hope so. The prosecutor stated that he was “scared to death of that man,” and he did not “want him out on the street again.” It is beyond question that such personal arguments are grossly improper. See Bates, 402 F.3d at 644 (“It is well-established law that a prosecutor cannot express his personal opinions before the jury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The majority also found improper the prosecutor’s likening of Beuke to a “can-*657eer” that needed to be “cut-out” so that it would not “kick back up again and spread.” The majority found these statements were improperly calculated to appeal “to the juror’s fears that Beuke would commit additional crimes if he was [sic] eventually released from prison.”
But the majority found the rest of the statements to be appropriate. I do not agree.
The beginning of the prosecutor’s closing argument was “Make a message ring out. Criminals and potential criminals in this community, we won’t tolerate this.” After Beuke’s attorney objected and was overruled, the prosecutor went on, stating the death penalty was “a message of justice, to the law-abiding people in this community,” and “the only way they can be satisfied, to feel that justice has been done, is if capital punishment is measured out in a certain specific situation.” The prosecutor concluded his argument by stating that “There is no other verdict that we can possibly come up with which would be a just verdict, which would be a verdict that we could live with, where we could say to ourselves that justice has been done in our community.” The majority characterized these statements as “general background information on the death penalty and the need to punish guilty people, rather than an impassioned command that the jurors must recommend death based on some amorphous societal obligation.” I respectfully disagree. I cannot imagine a more impassioned plea to a jury than a prosecutor beginning his closing argument by asking the jury to “[m]ake a message ring out.” I fail to see how that statement deals with the general background of the death penalty. It is obvious that the prosecutor made a calculated decision to attempt to “arouse passion and prejudice and to inflame the jurors’ emotions” regarding the mad hitchhiker killings “by urging them to send a message.” United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir.1991). We have explicitly outlawed this type of prosecutor behavior. In Soli-van, we stated that “[a] prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking.” Id. (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C.Cir.1984)). The majority’s holding should be identified for what it is, a contrived after-the-fact interpretation with expediency— rather than justice — as the end goal.
The prosecutor’s statements regarding the victims of the attempted murders, Wa-hoff and Graham, were also improper. The majority held that it was proper for the prosecutor to discuss these victims because in order for Beuke to be death-penalty eligible, his murder of Robert Craig must have been part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to Mil two or more persons — Wahoff and Graham. While the majority is correct in this statement, it is incorrect that the prosecutor is then allowed to purposely “make statements calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors.” Bates, 402 F.3d at 642 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor asked the jury to “think about Mr. Wahoff, first of all, and his little babies.” He continued:
If you want to start feeling sorry for the defendant ..., think about Mr. Wahoff and his little girl. His little girl, who he will never dance with because he is paralyzed. Think about his little boy that he talked about. He will never run with that little boy. He will never play baseball .... And he will never be able to dance with that little girl when she goes to high school. He will never play ball with that little boy.
While it is true that the shootings of Wa-hoff and Graham were aggravating circum*658stances under the law, the impact of those shootings on their families is not an aggravating circumstance and is in no way related to the murder of Robert Craig. Accordingly, I believe it is patently obvious that the prosecutor intentionally made “inappropriate and inflammatory remarks in violation of what this Court has described as the cardinal rule that a prosecutor cannot make statements calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Beuke also challenges the statements regarding the prosecutor’s personal opinion that Beuke’s case fit the specifications needed to be eligible for the death penalty.
And if there ever was a case for the death penalty, it is this case right here. [Objection overruled]. If there ever was a case for a verdict of death and for the penalty of death, it is this case. If there ever was a case that fits the specifications more closely to a course of criminal conduct, shooting, killing people, it is this case right here. You think about the past 10 years, the kind of crimes that have been committed in this community, this crime. [Objection overruled]. This crime stands out in your mind as being a terrible act, something that just can’t be forgotten by the members of this community.
Once again, the majority characterizes these inflammatory statements as not an appeal to the prosecutor’s personal experience, but to the jury’s past experience. I do not think the majority’s holding is an accurate interpretation of the prosecutor’s statements. It is obvious that the prosecutor believed this to be a heinous crime that the community had not seen in over a decade, and probably one of the worst in his career. He put his imprimatur on these opinions, imploring the jury to agree with him that this was a crime with no comparison in the community. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (“[T]he prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”). Such conduct is unmistakably improper. “In the capital sentencing context, prosecutors are prohibited from expressing their personal opinion as to the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the appropriateness of the death penalty. Jurors are mindful that the prosecutor represents the State and are apt to afford undue respect to the prosecutor’s personal assessment.” Bates, 402 F.3d at 644.
Additionally, in the prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument, he expressed his personal fear of Beuke, stating that he was “scared to death of that man. I don’t want him out on the street again.” He then went on to say that for every mistake the criminal justice system has made in sentencing someone to death, he could “bring in five killers on parole, that kill again.” This line of argument is grossly improper, as we have held many times before. See id. at 648 (finding improper a prosecutor’s argument at death penalty hearing warning of future murders if defendant was not put to death). By describing his own personal fear of Beuke and the possibility that he could kill again if not put to death, “the prosecution attempted to place the government’s thumb on the scales by repeatedly interjecting personal opinion into the record.” Id. Such conduct, again, is grossly improper.
Having determined that the prosecution’s closing argument at the penalty phase of Beuke’s trial was laced with repeated improper statements, it is not difficult to find that the prosecutor’s conduct was flagrant, and Beuke was unconstitutionally prejudiced. We analyze the chai-*659lenged conduct of the prosecutor to determine if Beuke was prejudiced under the following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the prosecution’s remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against the defendant. Id. at 641. And, as in this case, if we are dealing with a death penalty sentencing hearing, this Court must grant relief it if finds that the prosecutor’s misconduct “influenced the jury’s decision between life and death.” Id.
First, there can be little doubt that the prosecutor’s repeated improper statements mislead the jury and prejudiced Beuke. The prosecution stated that he personally was afraid of Beuke, and implied that there was a real possibility that he would kill again if paroled. Most flagrantly, the prosecution compared Beuke to a cancer that needed to be cut out, and not allowed to remain and fester. Just as in Bates, “[t]his type of appeal to fear and emotion clearly poisoned the hearing.” Id. at 648.
Second, as I think is made clear from the discussion above, the prosecution’s improper remarks were also extensive. The prosecution’s entire closing argument was “laced ... with personal opinion, [ ] and undignified and unprofessional appeals to hatred and fear.” Id.
The third factor also weighs in Beuke’s favor. The improper remarks were unquestionably deliberate. Beuke’s trial counsel objected multiple times, only to be overruled, and to have the improper conduct continue. “The intentionality of the prosecutor’s improper remarks can be inferred from their strategic use.” Id.
Finally, I address the total strength of the evidence against Beuke. It is important to note that we are not addressing the evidence of defendant’s guilt — Beuke’s conviction for the underlying murder was a foregone conclusion at the penalty phase. Instead, the inquiry must be focused on the appropriate punishment. Id. Importantly, in the death penalty context, we must distinguish between evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying criminal charge and evidence of any attendant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. “Overwhelming evidence of guilt can often times be sufficient to sustain a conviction despite some prosecutorial misconduct, but overwhelming evidence of guilt does not immunize the sentencing phase evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors.” Id. at 648-49. “[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-tencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). As we have held before, “[pjrosecutorial misconduct in the sentencing hearing can operate to preclude the jury’s proper consideration of mitigation.” Bates, 402 F.3d at 649 (“When a prosecutor’s actions are so egregious that they effectively foreclose the jury’s consideration of ... mitigating evidence, the jury is unable to make a fair, individualized determination as required by the Eighth Amendment.”) (quoting DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 748 (6th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is clear that the extensive and egregious nature of the prosecution’s closing argument at the penalty phase precluded the jury’s proper consideration of mitigation. See id. (“In this capital sentencing context, such flagrant misconduct by the prosecutor cannot be considered harmless error. The prosecutor’s unnecessary and intolerable *660conduct injected such vitriol into the proceedings, as to question the fairness of the entire sentencing hearing.”)- It is clear that the prosecution’s improper and flagrant conduct “influenced the jury’s decision between life and death.” Id. at 641.
III.
Accordingly, because the prosecution’s closing argument unconstitutionally poisoned Beuke’s penalty phase hearing, I would reverse the district court and grant Beuke’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.