DISSENTING OPINION
PATTERSON, Justice.Litigants have a right to a fair and impartial judiciary. The State of Texas, as the steward of the judicial system, has the obligation to create such a forum, to promote public confidence in the courts, and to safeguard the courts from even the appearance of impartiality or corruption, including political bias or favoritism. As life and liberty are at issue in a criminal proceeding, a judge’s impartiality — and the parties’ perception of that impartiality — is of critical importance to the parties and society. Indeed, impartiality and the perception of impartiality are a defining feature of the judicial role. Because recusal serves to safeguard that role, I dissent to the Court’s denial of the motion for recu-sal.
The facts are these:
• These accelerated appeals were filed in this Court over three years ago in September 2005.
• The parties filed their briefs and the causes were originally submitted to the Court to be decided on the briefs, without oral argument, in January 2006.
• Cause Nos. 03-05-00585-CR and 03-05-00586-CR (the “Ellis” appeals) were submitted to the panel consisting of Justices B.A. Smith, Patterson and Puryear. The remaining causes (the “Colyandro” appeals) were submitted to the panel consisting of Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop.
• Six months later, these submissions were cancelled without consultation or explanation, and all of the causes were reset for a specially scheduled end-of-summer oral argument on August 22, 2006, before the panel consisting of Chief Justice Law, Justices Pember-ton and Waldrop.
• The Court’s notice instructed the parties as follows:
You are hereby notified that this Court has determined that the above referenced causes should be orally argued. Submission on briefs has this date been canceled and the causes are reset for submission and oral argument on Tuesday, August 22, 2006 at *1349:00 AM, before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop.
• Although these cases were originally assigned to different panels, no explanation was given for the reassignment of the Ellis appeals from the Smith, Patterson, Puryear panel to the Law, Pemberton, Waldrop panel.1
• Two years later, the Court issued its opinion in these accelerated appeals, written by Justice Waldrop.
• On rehearing, the State filed a motion to recuse Justice Waldrop, and on September 25, 2008, Justice Waldrop advised the other justices that he declined to recuse himself.2
The rules of appellate procedure provide that “the challenged judge or justice must either remove himself from all participation in the case, or certify the matter to the entire court, which will decide the motion by a majority of the remaining judges sitting en banc.” Tex.R.App. P. 16.3(b). For the first time, on December 19, 2008, Justice Waldrop circulated to the justices of this Court the required Rule 16.3(b) certification.
I asked the clerk of this Court on more than one occasion — in writing with notice to the other justices — to request a response to the State’s motion. The three-judge majority has opposed the request for a response and, to date, a response has not been requested or otherwise submitted.
Without a response, the facts alleged in the State’s motion are uncontroverted. The State asserts that, while in private practice before accepting his appointment as a justice on this Court, Justice Waldrop served as counsel for the group Texans for Lawsuit Reform (TLR) and filed several pleadings in the civil cause of action related to these criminal proceedings now before us. The plaintiffs in the civil proceedings served TLR with a deposition by written questions and a subpoena duces tecum seeking documents and records reflecting TLR’s communications with Texans for a Republican Majority Political Action Committee (TRMPAC) and its representatives, including the defendants in these appeals John Colyandro and Jim Ellis. In April 2004, as TLR’s counsel, Justice Waldrop signed and filed pleadings on behalf of TLR objecting to the plaintiffs’ requests, insisting that TLR had no information related to the plaintiffs’ allegations, and referring to the plaintiffs’ case as a “politically motivated lawsuit.” In later pleadings, Justice Waldrop argued that plaintiffs and their counsel were “attempting to use the discovery process in this lawsuit to harass a political opponent,” and he declared that TLR “would resist any attempts by plaintiffs to harass political opponents.” All of the pleadings referenced in the State’s motion were signed by Justice Waldrop as counsel for TLR. The State asserts — and it is uncontroverted— *135that the issues in the civil case centered around the same conduct now before us in the instant criminal proceedings and that Justice Waldrop filed pleadings “denigrating the case as ‘politically motivated.’ ”
The rules of appellate procedure require a party to file a motion to recuse an appellate justice or judge “promptly after the party has reason to believe that the justice or judge should not participate in deciding the case.” Tex.R.App. P. 16.3(a). The State asserts that it has complied with the rule to promptly file a motion to recuse because it “just discovered in the last few weeks” the grounds it now urges as the basis for Justice Waldrop’s recusal. Although the State admits that it has known of Justice Waldrop’s representation of TLR, the State seeks to recuse Justice Waldrop only from further participation in these appeals on a going forward basis. The State urges that it had no reason to question Justice Waldrop’s impartiality until the Court’s opinion in these proceedings was released and it then discovered the pleadings signed by Justice Waldrop that are the subject of this motion.
The language of our rules is clear and straightforward: the grounds for recusal of an appellate justice or judge are the same as those provided in the rules of civil procedure. Tex.R.App. P. 16.2. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b provides that “[a] judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which ... his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a). This language is mandatory, and the standard is objective, not subjective. Id. It calls upon the judge — in the first instance — to assess his impartiality. A reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of recusal.
As a supreme court justice who recused himself explained in Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.1995) (Gammage, J.) (declaration of recusal), the problem is one of perception. When considering a motion to recuse, we should ask “whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all of the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.” See id. at 881 (Enoch, J., concurring). Applying this standard of reasonableness, based on this record, I conclude that Justice Waldrop should recuse himself from further participation in these appeals.
Justice Waldrop’s conduct as a private litigator in the related civil proceedings is sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality in these appeals. As a private attorney, Justice Waldrop represented a group that was aligned with and had similar interests with the defendants.3 From the pleadings before us, it appears that his client was the subject of discovery requests in the related civil lawsuit. Justice Waldrop’s representation was not unrelated to the proceedings now before us as it occurred in the civil proceedings arising out of the same conduct at issue in these appeals — namely, the alleged money laundering by a political action committee for the purpose of influencing Texas elections. It is Justice Waldrop’s role as an advocate in those related proceedings — as well as the statements made in the pleadings — that call into question his impartiality in these appeals.4
*136By its motion, the State challenges the fundamental legitimacy of the adjudication. While the timing of the State’s motion is troubling because it was made only after a decision was rendered, the rules contemplate that the motion must be raised “promptly after the party has reason to believe that the justice or judge should not participate in deciding the case.” In light of the panel reassignments and the inordinate delays in this Court’s handling of these accelerated appeals, and in the absence of a response controverting the State’s allegations, I can only conclude that the State has complied with the rule’s requirement to raise its motion promptly.
Moreover, in the absence of any disclosure by a judge of his involvement in related litigation — either at the time the parties submit their case to a panel of judges or at any time to his colleagues to allow them to properly assess any impartiality or appearance of impartiality — it would not be appropriate to place this burden upon the parties. Indeed, disclosure at the outset would ensure the transparency necessary for the parties to assess any bias and then move for disqualification or recusal or to waive any objection.5 Without disclosure of any kind, the burden of tracking down information falls to the litigants. It is unrealistic and surely undesirable for a litigant who is notified of the identity of three members of an appellate panel to whom a case is submitted to then investigate any possible ground for disqualification or recusal. In this case, given the relationship between the parties, surely disclosure of pertinent information would have resolved the dilemma before us now in some manner — either by resolution in a timely fashion that would have saved the parties time and money, or by waiver. Although such disclosure is not mandatory, the AJBA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. A judge’s obligation not to hear or decide matters in which there is a reasonable doubt concerning his impartiality applies regardless of whether a motion for recusal has been filed.
One of the hallmarks of our judicial system is judicial integrity. Judicial decisions rendered in the face of uncontroverted allegations of bias, prejudice, or favoritism, undermine the integrity of the courts and thwart the very principles on which our judicial system is based. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex.1989) (Spears, J., concurring on reh’g). Public policy demands that any judge who sits in a case act with absolute impartiality. See Prendergass v. Beale, 59 Tex. 446, 447 (1883). Beyond this, our rules and judicial canons require that a judge also appear to be impartial, so as not to call into question the fairness or integrity of the court. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a); Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1 & 2. Even when the circumstances giving rise to the question of impartiality are beyond the judge’s volition or control, judges and courts should be vigilant in protecting the integrity of our judicial system. The rules do not require proof that a judge engaged in any biased *137or prejudicial conduct, but they do require the judge to recuse himself if “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the test is not our own subjective impression of the judge’s ability to discharge his duties in an impartial manner. Rather, the polestar is an objective assessment of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality.
Although the Court had written notice that I requested a response to the motion to recuse, and that I would write in dissent if we were not to request a response, this Court proceeded to deny the motion in a one sentence letter issued to the parties on October 8, 2008. In the absence of a response, and given the uncontroverted facts in the State’s motion to recuse, I come to this decision reluctantly, but I must conclude that on this record Justice Waldrop’s impartiality has “reasonably be[en] questioned” and, for these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of the motion to recuse.
STATEMENT ON TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 16.3(b) CERTIFICATION
G. ALAN WALDROP, Justice.In late 2005, I was assigned to hear the appeals of the trial court’s rulings on pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus filed in these cases. Upon notice of the assignment, I followed my standard practice in evaluating whether disqualification was required or recusal was appropriate. There was no basis for disqualification and recusal was not appropriate. While judges have an obligation to recuse themselves where recusal is appropriate, there is a corresponding obligation for judges not to recuse themselves where recusal is not warranted. Kirby v. Chapman, 917 S.W.2d 902, 909 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (quoting Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Tex.1995) (Enoch, J., quoting United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.1992))). On September 28, 2008, after the panel opinion in these cases had been issued, the district attorney filed a motion to recuse me from en banc reconsideration and consideration of his motion for rehearing. I considered the district attorney’s motion as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.3 and on September 25, 2008, I declined to remove myself from the pending proceedings, informed the remainder of the court of my decision, and certified the matter to the entire court. My decision not to recuse myself when originally assigned, as well as my decision not to recuse myself at this point in the proceedings, are based on the following.
• I did not and do not have a bias for or against any party in these cases or in other cases that might be affected by these cases. I did not and do not have a personal bias or prejudice as to the subject matter of these criminal habeas corpus proceedings. If I had a personal bias or prejudice in these cases or was not impartial, I would have recused myself promptly and without hesitation as I have done in other matters.
• I have never represented, counseled, met with, or had any contact with either of the Appellants, Mr. Ellis or Mr. Colyandro.
• Although he is not a party to these cases, Tom DeLay appears to be the focal point of interest because of the possibility that the rulings in these cases might impact his criminal proceedings. Thus, it is relevant to note that I have never represented, counseled, met with, or had any contact with Mr. DeLay.
• I had not formed any opinion regarding the issues presented in these erim-*138inal pretrial habeas corpus proceedings — (1) the facial constitutionality of the particular election code provisions in question, and (2) the proper interpretation to be given the pre-2005 money laundering statute including the legal question of whether the court should reach the interpretation issue in the context of a pretrial habe-as corpus proceeding — before being assigned to the cases. I had not researched these issues, nor were they part of any work I did in private practice.
• I did not and do not have any personal knowledge of any disputed evidentiary facts in these criminal habeas corpus proceedings. As a legal matter, there are no disputed evidentiary facts in these types of pretrial proceedings. Nonetheless, I do not have any personal knowledge of any of the facts alleged in the criminal indictments at issue in these cases, whether they are ultimately disputed or not.
• In 2004, I represented Texans For Lawsuit Reform (“TLR”) in its efforts to resist a third-party document request from the plaintiffs in the civil lawsuit Clayton, et al. v. Texans For a Republican Majority, et al. TLR was not a party to that civil suit and was not involved in it other than receiving and successfully resisting a third-party document request. The plaintiffs’ underlying claims against the named defendants were not made against TLR and were not at issue in the work I did in objecting to the document request. Mr. Ellis and Mr. Co-lyandro were not parties to the third-party document request dispute. As retained litigation counsel for TLR, I represented TLR in successfully resisting a third-party document request. I did not represent any party with respect to either of the legal questions before me in these criminal habeas corpus proceedings. The parties and the legal and factual issues involved in the third-party document request dispute were different from those in these cases.
• As retained litigation counsel for TLR with respect to the third-party document request in the Clayton civil suit, I pointed out to the court that the document request served on TLR was served by lawyers who, in addition to representing the plaintiffs in the civil suit, also represented Texans For Public Justice (“TPJ”), a political opponent of TLR. It was TLR’s view — a view that I communicated to the court as TLR’s lawyer — that the lawyers for the plaintiffs were attempting to use the discovery process in the civil suit to inappropriately advance TPJ’s ongoing political battle with TLR. The primary point of TLR’s pleadings was to illustrate that the underlying claims made by the Clayton plaintiffs against the Clayton defendants, whether meritorious or not, had nothing to do with TLR. The fact that TLR viewed the Clayton civil suit as “politically motivated” is neither surprising nor a comment on the merits of the claims in the Clayton suit. It certainly does not demonstrate or evidence a personal bias or lack of impartiality on my part with respect to the unrelated legal issues in these criminal habeas corpus proceedings.
• The State was not a party to the civil suit. The State’s money laundering charges against Mr. Ellis and Mr. Co-lyandro, being criminal charges, were not at issue in the civil suit. The legal questions that I considered in these criminal proceedings — having to do with whether the State’s prosecution may be attacked by way of a pretrial *139writ of habeas corpus — were not at issue in the third-party document request dispute in which I participated as counsel for TLR.
• The district attorney’s office was either aware or should have been aware of my representation of TLR with respect to the third-party document request in the civil suit both when I was assigned to these criminal eases and during the time they have been pending. My work on behalf of TLR relating to the third-party document request in the civil suit was a matter of public record, known to all of the parties and their lawyers in the case, and widely reported in 2006 when I was assigned to these criminal cases as well as a separate criminal case involving criminal conspiracy charges against Tom DeLay. The district attorney’s office did not indicate to anyone at the time I was assigned to these cases that I should consider re-cusal or that they would seek to re-cuse me. The district attorney’s office, in fact, did not seek to recuse me either in these eases or in the prior case involving criminal conspiracy charges. I served in the criminal conspiracy case through its finality at the Court of Criminal Appeals, without the district attorney making a comment or objection. I served in these habeas corpus cases until the panel opinion was published, without the district attorney making a comment or objection. It is significant to note that the district attorney, in his recu-sal motion, has not claimed that he was unaware of my representation of TLR in the Clayton third-party document dispute. He has only alleged that he was not aware of what was written in the publicly-filed pleadings until immediately after our court’s decision in these cases. This is a dis-
tinction without legal significance from the standpoint of promptly and properly looking into and raising a recusal issue.
The distinction between the legal issues and parties involved in these criminal ha-beas corpus proceedings and the third-party document request dispute is an important distinction. The district attorney asserts that the civil lawsuit originated from the “same matter in controversy” as these criminal proceedings, and suggests that this somehow affects whether I should consider the motions for rehearing in these cases. This allegation is wrong, but more importantly, it is irrelevant to whether I should recuse myself. I was not a lawyer representing any party to the civil suit. I represented a nonparty in resisting a third-party document request. The parties to the third-party document request dispute are not the same as the parties to these cases, and the legal issues involved are not the same. These criminal habeas corpus proceedings involve two entirely different legal issues that were not involved in the third-party document request dispute.
The parties to the third-party document request dispute in the Clayton civil suit— the plaintiffs and TLR — are not parties to these criminal habeas corpus cases. I have not represented, counseled, advised, or met with any parties to the criminal habeas corpus proceedings. The legal and factual issues I dealt with as retained counsel for TLR in connection with the third-party document request dispute are not the same as or related to the constitutional and habeas corpus issues I addressed as a judge in the these cases. Neither my limited and brief involvement in resisting the third-party document request in the Clayton civil suit nor anything else has caused me to form a bias or prejudice regarding the parties or subject *140matter in these criminal habeas corpus cases. I do not believe that a reasonable person in possession of all of the facts would reasonably question my impartiality. Justice Brian Quinn of the Amarillo Court of Appeals has eloquently stated the mov-ant’s obligations when seeking to recuse a qualified judge:
First, it is beyond gainsay that jurists have a duty to entertain and resolve pending causes unless disqualified or legitimately recused. Thus, one assessing the ability of a jurist to perform his duties viz-a-viz a particular matter must begin with the premise that he is qualified and entitled to sit until proven otherwise. More importantly, to prevent the jurist from sitting takes more than mere innuendo and conclusory allegations, Rather, those endeavoring to remove him must tender proof establishing the purported disqualification or basis for recusal. Simply put, they must prove, through admissible evidence, that the judge cannot sit.
Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (citations omitted).
The district attorney has not and cannot satisfy this burden. Nor has he filed his motion to recuse in a timely manner. Consequently, I do not believe there was or is a basis to recuse myself from these cases.
. Because of the unexplained reassignment of these cases and their apparent consolidation before a different panel, I dissented from the Court's decision not to hear these appeals en banc.
. It is questionable whether this communication satisfies the requirement of the rule. See Tex.R.App. P. 16.3(b) (requiring certification). Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "certify" to mean "to authenticate or verify in writing." See Black's Law Dictionary 220 (7th ed.1999). At least one court of appeals to consider the matter has held that the filing of a motion to recuse initiates a "more formal process of consideration.” See Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). In that case, the challenged Justice “certified the reasons why he does not believe he should recuse himself to the two members of the court who are not the subjects of the recusal motion and has stated in some detail his reasons for doing so.” Id.; see also Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.2004) (Gammage, J.) (declaration of recusal).
. Although the State has not sought to disqualify Justice Waldrop, this Court has previously held that a judge is subject to disqualification if he advised a person who is not a named party, but whose interests are so aligned with a named party that the one stands in place of the other. See Williams v. Kirven, 532 S.W.2d 159, 160-61 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
. Cf. Tex.R. Prof. Conduct 1.06 (prohibiting lawyers from representing opposing sides in *136the same litigation); 1.10(e) (regarding successive government and private employment and prohibiting lawyer serving as public officer from participating in matter involving client that lawyer represented in private practice).
. Rule 18b(5) provides that parties to a proceeding "may waive any ground for recusal after it is fully disclosed on the record." Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(5).