(concurring) — I concur in the result reached by the majority but write separately to clarify my reasoning in that regard. In my opinion the rights that we deal with in this dispute were vested, as that term is understood and used in analyzing pension laws and pension rights. However, the right to status as a disabled firefighter is subject to dispute, as it was in the instant case, and is not vested.
Helgeson settled a bona fide dispute over his status, received a valuable benefit, a disability pension, but gave up any claim to the medical benefits that were attendant to his status as a disabled firefighter. Both parties to the dispute had a great deal at stake. If Helgeson did not prevail he would receive nothing under the act but a right to future benefits pursuant to the alternative vesting provisions of RCW 41.26.090(2), subject to certain conditions, and certainly would not have been entitled at the time of his discharge to any medical benefits. Conversely the City of Marysville, if it did prevail, would have owed Helgeson nothing except possible future benefits. One thing that appears certain on this record is that neither party to this appeal had in mind these future benefits under RCW 41.26.090(2) at the time of settlement or at the time of trial and appeal of this matter. Until raised by this court, by this writer, all were concerned with Helgeson’s disability status and the validity of his actions in resolving the dispute with regard to that status.
Vallet v. Seattle, 77 Wn.2d 12, 459 P.2d 407 (1969) does stand for the proposition that a pension claimant cannot be put to an election with respect to his pension rights that is tantamount to a waiver of any of those rights as they are prescribed by the applicable pension laws. Vallet does not stand for the proposition that there is a vested right to have a particular status under the applicable laws. Indeed, when one carefully reviews the Vallet decision, it is apparent that it was Vallet’s status as a member of the system that was at is sue, and one on which he did not prevail, at least in part.
Here, Helgeson did not retire; he was discharged. Had he not sought disability status, he would have been put to an *190election by the statute as to whether to retain membership in the system under RCW 41.26.090(2) with whatever rights and benefits were attendant thereto, or to take his contributions and move on. On this record we do not know what Helgeson did or would have done with respect to his election. He may or may not be a current member of the retirement system under this section. Only if he is does he have any claim to medical benefits and then only if the 1972 amendments do not apply. We cannot reach the issue of the effect of the 1972 amendments for two reasons: First, we do not know Helgeson’s status under RCW 41.26.090(2). Second, we do not know whether the changes wrought by those amendments would apply to a person otherwise qualified under RCW 41.26.090(2) leaving employment as a firefighter prior to the effective date of the amendments. An answer to the second question would require the vested rights balancing of benefits and burdens required by Vallet v. Seattle, supra, Bakenhus v. Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 695, 296 P.2d 536 (1956), and Dailey v. Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 733, 344 P.2d 718 (1959), issues not raised, briefed, or argued by the parties. Here, I disagree with the majority insofar as it attempts to determine Helgeson’s rights under RCW 41.26.090(2) and whether they were vested.
Thus, we are left with only the issue of the scope of Val-le t’s proscription of waivers. On this issue I am in full accord with the majority opinion that the public policy in favor of settlements is controlling. To the extent that a settlement of a dispute as to an employee’s status under an applicable pension law is otherwise valid, it is not rendered invalid because the employee may by the fact of settlement give up some other right contingent on that settlement, such as the right to medical payments as a disabled member.