John M. Farr, Jr., appeals from an order of the Polk County Circuit Court denying his motion to set aside an order on the mandate and granting Jackye R. Farr’s petition to find him in contempt. On appeal, he argues that both of these rulings were error. We affirm the denial of his motion to set aside the order on the mandate, and we reverse and dismiss the contempt finding.
On January 19, 2005, this court remanded the property division in the parties’ divorce, holding that the trial court erred in failing to divide as a marital asset a $92,000 “receivable” that was engendered by a loan of marital funds to John’s sons from a previous marriage. The $92,000 was a debt that remained from the sons’ failed business venture, and the trial court had concluded the debt was uncollectible.
On November 30, 2005, the trial court entered an order styled “Order on Mandate” that purported to divide the marital property in accordance with our January 19, 2005 opinion. The order, however, not only evenly divided the $92,000 receivable between the parties, but also ordered that Jackye would receive her portion directly from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. John did not challenge the order until September 1, 2006, when he petitioned to set the order aside. Jackye answered the petition and moved to dismiss, asserting that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to modify or set aside the order because more than ninety days had elapsed since its entry. By order entered January 9, 2007, the circuit court denied John’s petition. It specifically found that John “was represented by counsel at the time of the entry of the order, and was aware that the order was entered and when it was entered and had actual knowledge of the order.” The trial court also found that John “did not request a hearing concerning the order prior to its entry, nor properly object to same being entered, nor take an appeal from the entry.”
Meanwhile, the marital residence went to a Commissioner’s sale on August 2, 2006. The notice of the sale specified that the home was to be sold on three months’ credit with a ten-percent bond. John made the high bid of $231,000. On August 30, 2006, he requested the trial court to confirm the sale. John was given fifteen days to tender the purchase price and Jackye, who had been occupying the marital residence, was given fifteen days to vacate.
John failed to complete the sale and Jackye petitioned to have him found in contempt. The grounds asserted in Jackye’s petition were that John had failed to complete the purchase of the marital residence and that he had made duplicate keys to the home and other buildings on the property and placed furniture in the residence “without the knowledge and consent of the Clerk of the Court.” In the same order in which the trial court denied John’s petition to set aside the order on the mandate, the trial court found John in contempt. The trial court adopted Jackye’s allegations regarding making the keys, moving personal property into the residence, and failing to close on the property within the time frame specified as the basis for finding John in contempt. It awarded Jackye $1,000 in damages for having to move from the residence and $2,933.33 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, John first argues that the trial court erred in entering its order on the mandate because it deviated from the directions that we gave it in our opinion and failed to resolve disputed questions of fact and law. We note, however, that John’s petition to vacate was filed approximately nine months after the entry of the order. This time is well beyond the ten days that Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure allows for requesting a new trial and the ninety days specified under Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure during which a trial court may modify or vacate a judgment to “correct errors or mistakes or to prevent miscarriage of justice.” While there are exceptions to the ninety-day limitation specified in Rule 60(c), John does not argue, nor do we find, that any of the enumerated grounds in that subsection apply. It is settled law that a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify a judgment or order after ninety days. Jordan v. Circuit Court of Lee County, 366 Ark. 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to set aside its order because it lacked the jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order.
John next argues that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt and awarding Jackye damages and attorney’s fees. He asserts that no specific order was produced prohibiting him from engaging in the alleged contemptuous conduct and there was no evidence presented at the hearing that established willful disobedience of any valid order of the court. We agree.
We note first that because the finding of contempt appears to be directed at vindicating the dignity of the court and punishing disobedience to its orders rather than compelling compliance with an order, the sanctions imposed in this case were criminal in nature. See Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 356 Ark. 440, 156 S.W.3d 228 (2004). When we review a case of criminal contempt, we view the record in a light most favorable to the trial judge’s decision and will sustain the decision if supported by substantial evidence. Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 11, 901 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1995). However, before one can be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be definite in its terms and clear as to what duties it imposes. Conlee v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007).
Here, by defaulting on the purchase of the marital residence, John did not violate an order of the court, but merely failed to fulfill a sales contract. While it is true that Jackye testified at the contempt hearing that he outbid her for the residence, we find this fact to be of no moment. The trial court never prohibited John from bidding on the residence, and when he did so, his actions were not those of a party to this action, but that of any member of the public at large who chose to enter a bid. We note further that his bid was secured by a ten-percent bond which John — or any other high bidder — would stand to forfeit if he or she failed to complete the sale. We acknowledge that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts, but that power should only be exercised when it is necessary to insure that the authority of the court is continued. Nutt v. Delta Trust & Bank, 79 Ark. App. 257, 85 S.W.3d 927 (2002). John’s conduct in this regard was covered by a contractual remedy and was therefore outside the scope of the trial court’s contempt power.
Regarding the other asserted grounds for finding John in contempt, we have scanned the record, and we found no order that prohibited John from making duplicate keys or placing furnishings in the erstwhile marital residence. Indeed, Jackye’s petition merely alleged that this conduct was contemptuous because it was undertaken “without the knowledge and consent of the Clerk of this Court” or her. Before a person may be held in contempt for violation of a judge’s order, the order alleged to be violated must be definite in its terms as to the duties imposed and the command must be express rather than implied. Sims v. First State Bank of Plainview, 73 Ark. App. 325, 43 S.W.3d 175 (2001). Because there was not an express court order prohibiting such conduct, we hold that it was error for the trial court to find John in contempt.
Finally, Jackye asserted that John caused her to have to leave the marital residence. Her departure from the marital residence was occasioned by the Commissioner’s sale, however, not by any contemptuous conduct on John’s part. We therefore reverse and dismiss the contempt finding and vacate the judgment for damages and attorney’s fees.
Affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part.
Pittman, C.J., Robbins, and Bird, JJ., agree. Griffen and Gladwin, JJ., dissent.