Dissenting Opinion by
Chief Justice MINTON.The 1996 Extraordinary Session of the Kentucky General Assembly enacted emergency legislation to effectuate immediate and sweeping changes in Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation system.1 One of the principal changes came in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.125, which established a time limit for reopening claims.2 As we have explained in earlier opinions discussing reopening claims, final workers’ compensation claims are unique because they are subject to reopening, unlike other final judgments. Our legislature in 1996 found it necessary to set time limits on theretofore unlimited rights of reopening to avoid what the legislature saw as a looming financial catastrophe in Kentucky:
Final workers’ compensation awards are subject to the principles of the finality of judgments and are enforceable in circuit court. KRS 342.305. But, unlike other final judgments, they may be reopened on the motion of either party under certain, specified conditions. Among those conditions is a post-award change of disability. KRS 342.125(1). The 1996 Extraordinary Session culminated in a comprehensive revision of Chapter 342 in an attempt to assure that benefits were promptly delivered, to remedy the failure to reduce the unfunded liability of the Special Fund, and to remedy the competitive disadvantage that Kentucky’s employers faced due to the high cost of securing worker’s compensation insurance, all of which are legitimate governmental purposes. 1996 Ky. Acts (1st Ex.Sess.), § 90. In view of what the legislature viewéd as an emergency situation, the amendments took effect immediately upon approval of the governor. Id. [citing to 1996 Ky.Acts. (1st Ex.Sess.), § 90].3
After the 1996 amendments, all claims— with only certain specified exceptions provided in KRS 342.125 — are subject to re*788opening for only four years after “the original award or order granting or denying benefits.4 And until today, Kentucky courts have understood and upheld this four-year time limitation and affirmed the dismissal of reopening claims not filed within four years after the initial grant or denial of benefits (whether called an award or order). We did so despite arguments of unconstitutionality and harshness to workers because we recognized the proper role of the legislative branch to create or amend statutes for the valid purpose of averting what it viewed as a financial crisis threatening the viability of the economy of the Commonwealth and the jobs and well-being of its workforce.5
I must dissent as today the majority blithely overrules binding precedent6 and engages in tortured semantics to allow reopening within four years of any order, not just the original order granting or denying benefits. The plain and simple meaning of the statute mandates a four-year limitations period after the original denial or grant of benefits, as aptly stated by then-Judge Schroder in Wray:
The plain language of KRS 342.125(3) only provides for a four-year limit following the date of the original award. The statute does not provide for a subsequent order or award to have any effect on the four-year period....
The General Assembly could have provided a statute of limitations which imposed a four-year limitation from the date of the original award or four years from the last order on a motion to reopen — whichever is later, but it did not. Therefore, we are bound by the plain-meaning of the statute and cannot expand the period of limitations as [the claimant] asks.7
KRS 342.125(3) prohibits reopening a workers’ compensation claim “more than four years following the date of the original award or order granting or denying benefits” except under specified circumstances. Those specified circumstances include a reopening to obtain temporary total disability (TTD) benefits within the period of an award, but they do not include a reopening to obtain greater permanent disability benefits. Under KRS 342.125(8), the four-year period for reopening applies “to all claims irrespective of when they were incurred ... or the settlement approved.”
I do agree that the Workers’ Compensation Act is social legislation enacted to benefit injured workers. But proceedings under the Act are adversarial. And a worker cannot sit on her rights and let a statute of limitations expire, either with regard to an initial claim or a motion to reopen.
*789Aliene Hall’s initial motion sought both TTD and “all appropriate relief’; but she failed to respond to the employer’s request to terminate TTD or to assert before June 7, 2002, that her permanent disability had increased. The predicates of her rationale for tolling the four-year period of limitations, expired on June 7, 2002, when the ALJ entered the order terminating TTD. The order finally disposed of the TTD question, which was the only matter that had been raised; and KRS 342.125(3) and (8) barred reopening for the purpose of obtaining an increase in permanent income benefits because more than four years had passed since the order approving the initial settlement. So permitting Hall to raise the question of increased permanent disability after June 7, 2002, prejudiced the employer and was inconsistent with the plain statutory language and legislative intent to establish definitive time limits on reopening claims.
I would affirm.
ABRAMSON and VENTERS, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.
.See 1996 Ky.Acts (1st Ex.Sess.), § 90, which declared the amendments to the Workers’ Compensation statutes emergency legislation taking effect immediately upon approval by the governor, stated:
“The General Assembly finds and declares that workers who incur injuries covered by KRS Chapter 342 are not assured that prescribed benefits will be promptly delivered, mechanisms designed to establish the long-term solvency of the special fund have failed to reduce its unfunded liability, and many of the Commonwealth's employers are placed at a competitive disadvantage due to the cost of securing workers’ compensation insurance coverage. These circumstances threaten the vitality of the Commonwealth's economy and the jobs and well-being of its workforce.”
. Johnson v. Gans Furniture Industries, Inc., 114 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky.2003) (citing 1996 Ky.Acts. (1st Ex.Sess.), § 90).
. Johnson, 114 S.W.3d at 855-56.
. KRS 342.125(3).
. See e.g. Johnson, 114 S.W.3d at 858 ("By limiting the time for reopening to a period of four years after the initial award unless one of the exceptions applies, KRS 342.125(3) has the net effect of reducing the cost of workers’ compensation insurance and increasing the competitiveness of Kentucky employers, a purpose that is legitimate. Moreover, the classifications that KRS 342.125(3) creates are reasonable and bear a proper relation to the purpose of the amendments. We conclude, therefore, that the provision does not violate Section 59(24) [of the Kentucky Constitution].").
. Contrary to the majority interpretation, I find no reason to overrule our recent precedent of Cook v. Unicom Mining, No.2003-SC-000616-WC, 2004 WL 1908114 (Ky. Aug.26, 2004), or Cruse v. Aristech Chemical Co., No.2004-SC-000291-WC, 2005 WL 119771 (Ky. January 20, 2005), nor the Court of Appeals case of Wray v. Allied Systems, No.2004CA-002122-WC, 2005 WL 1058862 (Ky.App. May 6, 2005).
. Wray at ** 1-2 (citation omitted).