DISSENTING OPINION
KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice.The majority correctly determines that relators James Madison Nabors and Julia Nabors were not required to present an affidavit in support of their motion to transfer venue and that the Texas Department of Family Protective Services (“Department”) is not the “parent” of T.D.P. and D.E.P. (hereinafter the “Children”). But the majority incorrectly determines that the Naborses are entitled to a mandatory venue transfer upon a showing that the Children’s principal residence was in Fort Bend County for more than six months at any time in the past. Instead, under the applicable statute as well as precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas and this court, to have been entitled to a mandatory venue transfer under section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code, the Naborses had to prove that the Children’s principal residence was in Fort Bend County throughout the six-month period ending on the date the Naborses filed the suit to modify. Because the uncontrovert-ed evidence shows that the Children’s principal residence was in Harris County during the last fourteen days of this period, the Naborses did not show entitlement to a mandatory venue transfer under the only ground asserted in their motion or under the applicable statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying the Naborses’ motion to transfer, and this court should deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
*200Factual and Procedural Background
The Naborses filed both their suit to modify and their motion to transfer venue on November 9, 2007 (the “Filing Date”). In their motion, the Naborses correctly stated the legal standard for a mandatory venue transfer under section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code: “[t]he principal residence of the children is in Fort Bend County, Texas, and has been in that county during the six-month period preceding the commencement of this suit.” 1 This is the only basis upon which the Naborses sought a transfer; yet, they presented no proof that the principal residence of the Children was in Fort Bend County through the Filing Date. Rather, the undisputed evidence before the trial court on February 4, 2008, the date the trial court denied the motion to transfer venue, showed the following:
• Between May 16, 2006 and October 26, 2007, the principal residence of the Children was in Fort Bend County, Texas, with the Naborses.
• Between October 26, 2007, and February 4, 2008, the principal residence of the Children was in Harris County, Texas.
The Children’s supervisor at Harris County Children’s Protective Services testified as follows:
• The Department has been the sole managing conservator of the Children since August 8, 2007.
• The Department placed the Children with the Naborses as foster parents.
• On October 26, 2007, the Department removed the children from the Na-borses’ home due to allegations of physical abuse and policy violations that were later validated.
• The Children were then placed in a home in Harris County.
• The Children have not resided with the Naborses since October 26, 2007.
• Since October 26, 2007, the Children have continuously resided in Harris County.
This testimony was not controverted. The evidence before the trial court showed that, from October 26, 2007 forward, including on the Filing Date, the Children’s principal residence was in Harris County. Simply stated, the Naborses did not prove the factual predicate asserted in their motion to transfer venue.
The Naborses’ Burden of Proof
The Naborses are relators in this original mandamus proceeding. As such, they have the “heavy” burden of presenting a record and petition that show they are entitled to mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.2 The inquiry mandated by prece*201dent is whether the Naborses have established their entitlement to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus, not whether the real party in interest (the Department) has shown that the relators are not entitled to mandamus relief.3 Indeed, though a court of appeals may not grant mandamus relief without requesting a response, a real party in interest is not required to file a response, and any action or inaction on their part in responding to the mandamus petition is not a proper basis for granting mandamus relief.4
According to the majority, the only arguments that the Department asserts in its briefing as to why mandamus should be denied are its arguments as to why the procedures from Chapter 15 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code apply.5 The majority states that, even though the Department “limited its appellate argument” to these matters, the majority addresses the proper interpretation of section 155.201(b) because this issue is raised in this dissenting opinion.6 There is both a factual defect and a legal defect in this reasoning.
Factually, the Department’s procedural argument is not the only argument the Department has asserted in this court. Though the Department stresses its procedural argument, it also asserts that Harris County should be considered the Children’s county of residence because the Department should be treated as a parent of the Children. In addition, in its briefing, the Department notes that, in its response in the trial court, the Department pointed out the fact that the Children have been residing in Harris County since October 26, 2007, and have not been residing with the Naborses since that date.
Legally, the majority’s reasoning reverses the burden of proof in a mandamus proceeding from the burden imposed by mandatory precedent. There are several possibilities when an appellate court asks a real party to file a response: (1) a real party may brief one or more arguments showing why the relators are not entitled to mandamus relief; (2) a real party may brief one or more arguments in opposition to mandamus relief, none of which have merit; or (3) a real party may exercise its right not to file a response at all. Regardless of which course the real party takes, the relator keeps the “heavy” burden of presenting a record and petition that show the relator is entitled to mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.7 The Naborses assert that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by not granting their motion to transfer venue to Fort Bend County under section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code. The Naborses have the burden to show that the denial of their motion was a clear abuse of discretion and that they are entitled to mandamus relief to correct it. Therefore, this court needs to address the issue of the proper construction of section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code, re*202gardless of the arguments asserted by-the Department.
The Language of Section 155.201(b)
When a party files a modification suit and a motion for mandatory transfer, the party is entitled to a mandatory transfer “if the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer.”8 Therefore, for the Naborses to be entitled to a mandatory transfer to Fort Bend County, the Children must “have resided” in Fort Bend County for six months or longer as of the Filing Date. The verb forms “has resided” and “have resided” are in the present perfect tense. This tense either (1) represents an action as having been completed at some indefinite time in the past, or (2) indicates that an action continues to the present.9 If the first sense of the present perfect tense applies to section 155.201(b), then a child may have resided in various counties for at least six months at some indefinite time in past, prior to the filing of the modification suit. If the second sense of the present perfect tense applies, then the child would have had to reside in the other county for at least six months up to and including the date on which the modification suit was filed.10 To see which sense was intended, this court should look to other parts of the statute.
Under section 155.202(a), “[i]f the basis of a motion to transfer a proceeding under this subchapter is that the child resides in another county, the court may deny the motion if it is shown that the child has resided in that county for less than six months at the time the proceeding is commenced.” 11 Section 155.201(b) provides the only basis for transferring a proceeding under this subchapter that is based on the residence of the child. Therefore, in section 155.202, the legislature describes a transfer under section 155.201(b) as being based on an allegation that “the child resides in another county.” 12 Thus, section 155.202(a) is strong support that the legislature intended the second sense of the present perfect tense in section 155.201(b).
The language in section 155.201(b) “if the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer” shows that the legislature envisioned that there would be only one other county.13 This language is consistent with the legislature intending the second sense of the present perfect tense in section 155.201(b), and it is inconsistent with the legislature intending the first sense of the present perfect tense in section 155.201(b).
Under section 155.203, courts determining a child’s residence must examine the child’s principal residence throughout the six-month period preceding the commencement of suit.14 Section 155.203 shows that the legislature intended the second sense of the present perfect tense in section *203155.201(b), rather than the first sense.15 The majority incorrectly concludes that the legislature intended the first sense of the present perfect tense, which would mean that the child only has to have resided in the other county for at least six months at some indefinite time in the past, before the modification suit was filed.16
Based on the language of Texas Family Code section 155.201(b) and related statutory provisions, for the trial court to have been required to transfer venue to Fort Bend County, the Children’s principal residence must have been in Fort Bend County throughout the six-month period ending on the Filing Date.17 The majority states that this analysis adds to the statute words not contained therein and that, if the legislature wanted to require the child to be residing in the transferee county when suit was filed, it could have said so.18 However, no words have been added to the statute in this dissenting opinion; rather, the objective of this statutory analysis is to seek the meaning of the words used. Courts should not ignore what is, based on what might have been.19 That is, the fact that the legislature could have used more precise or clearer words does not change the court’s mission to give effect to the words actually used. Because there is sufficient evidence to support an implied find-*204mg that the Children’s principal residence was not in Fort Bend County for the last fourteen days of this period, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to transfer.20 Therefore, this court should deny the mandamus petition.21
Conflict with PRECEDENT FROM the Supreme Court of Texas
The majority’s analysis and disposition conflicts with the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Cassidy v. Fuller.22 In Cassidy, a father filed a motion to modify the divorce decree slightly more than six months after the decree was rendered in Reeves County.23 At the same time, the father filed a motion to transfer venue of the proceeding to Clay County based on the undisputed fact that his children resided there and had resided there for more than six months.24 The trial court denied the motion to transfer, but the Cassidy court held that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in doing so.25 The Cassidy court concluded that the legislature intended venue for suits affecting the parent-child relationship to generally be in the county in which the child resides.26 The high court stated that usually the current circumstances affecting the child may be best shown in the county in which the child resides.27
When Cassidy was decided, former section 11.06(b) contained language similar to the language now contained in sections 155.201(b), 155.202(a), and 155.203 of the Texas Family Code.28 The Cassidy court held that former section 11.06(b) required transfer of the proceeding to the county in which the child was residing and had resided for more than six months; however, the trial court had discretion to deny motions for change of venue based on the child’s residence in another county if the child had resided in the other county for less than six months.29 The Cassidy court noted that this provision operated to “forestall *205forum shopping.”30 Though the Cassidy court did not explicitly state how this statute did so, it is clear from the opinion that the high court concluded that the statute forestalled forum shopping by preventing a party from changing the child’s residence for a brief period to obtain a mandatory venue transfer.31 Instead, to obtain a mandatory venue transfer, the movant would be required to show the child was residing in the other county and had been residing in that county for at least six months at the time the petition to modify was filed.32
Under the majority’s interpretation of section 155.201(b), instead of preventing forum shopping, the statute is construed to promote forum shopping, by allowing a party to obtain a mandatory venue transfer to any county in which the child resided for at least six months at some time in the past. Given our increasingly mobile society, children very well may reside in a number of different Texas counties for at least six months before they reach adulthood. Today’s interpretation allows a party to shop among all of these counties before choosing which county the party would like to be the county in which the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is located. In addition, if a party is not pleased with the trial judge in the first county to which the case is transferred, the party then could file a motion to enforce or perhaps a second petition to modify and invoke section 155.201(c) to mandate a second transfer to one of the other counties in which the child resided in the past for at least six months.33 The majority’s statutory construction conflicts with the Cassidy decision.
Conflict with This Court’s Precedent
In addition, in In re T.J.L., this court construed section 155.201(b) to require that the child be a resident of the other county at the time the suit to modify was filed before a party could be entitled to a mandatory venue transfer under section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code.34 This court held that the trial court erred in denying a party’s motion to transfer under section 155.201(b) based on the allegation and undisputed evidence that the child resided in another county during the six-month period ending on the date the petition to modify was filed.35 By holding that section 155.201(b) does not require the child to reside in the other county when the petition to modify is filed, the majority creates a conflict with this court’s prior decision in In re T.J.L. 36
Conflict with the Language of the Statute
In section 155.202(a), the legislature described a transfer under section 155.201(b) as being based on an allegation that “the child resides in another county.”37 By holding that section 155.201(b) does not require the child’s principal residence to be in the other county when the petition to *206modify is filed, the majority renders meaningless this language in section 155.202(a).
The majority's analysis also conflicts with language in section 155.201(b): “if the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer.”38 The italicized words clearly show that the legislature envisioned that there would be only one “other county.” This is consistent with the requirement that the child be a resident of the other county at the time the suit to modify is filed before a party could be entitled to a mandatory venue transfer under section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code. It is inconsistent with the majority’s analysis.
The majority’s analysis also conflicts with the following emphasized language in section 155.203:
In computing the time during which the child has resided in a county, the court may not require that the period of residence be continuous and uninterrupted but shall look to the child’s principal residence during the six-month period preceding the commencement of the suit.39
In their motion, the Naborses asserted that the Children’s principal residence was in Fort Bend County throughout the six-month period preceding commencement of the modification suit; however, the majority applies a different and incorrect standard, namely, whether the Children had a principal residence in Fort Bend County during any six-month period before commencement of the suit.40
Under section 155.203, courts determining a child’s residence must examine the child’s principal residence throughout the six-month period preceding the commencement of suit and must not require uninterrupted or continuous presence.41 Under the plain meaning of section 155.203, there may be more than one county of principal residence during the six months preceding the commencement of suit.42 In this case, *207the Children had a principal residence in Fort Bend County for most of the six-month period before commencement of suit; notably, however, they did not have a principal residence in Fort Bend County during the last fourteen days of this period.43 Therefore, the trial court had discretion to deny the motion to transfer.44 The trial court’s denial does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
The Naborses stated the correct legal standard in their motion to transfer venue but failed to establish the necessary factual predicate to prevail on their motion. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to transfer venue. Today, this court constructs a new legal standard that contradicts the language of the applicable statute as well as decisions from the Supreme Court of Texas and this court. Under the correct legal standard, the Na-borses have not established their entitlement to mandamus relief. Therefore, this court should deny their mandamus petition. Because it does not, I respectfully dissent.
. (Emphasis added). In quoting from the ground in the motion, the majority omits the part in which the Naborses allege that the "[t]he principal residence of the children is in Fort Bend County, Texas....” See ante at 192. The majority later states that the Na-borses moved for a transfer based on the ground that the Children had resided in Fort Bend County for more than six months preceding the filing of the motion to modify. See ante at 193. These statements are incorrect. The Naborses did not request a venue transfer on these bases. The Nabors requested a venue transfer based on their allegation that the principal residence of the Children was in Fort Bend County, Texas, on the Filing Date and had been in that county during the six-month period preceding the Filing Date.
. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.3, 52.7; Canadian Helicopters, Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.1994) (orig.proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding); In re Nelson, No. 14-04-00578-CV, 2004 WL 1516156, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 8, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.).
. See Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., 876 S.W.2d at 305; In re Yamin, No. 14-07-01035-CV, 2008 WL 442575, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.).
. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.4; In re Yamin, 2008 WL 442575, at *1 (denying mandamus petition because "[rjelator has not established his entitlement to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus”).
. See ante at 196.
. See id.
. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.3, 52.7; Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., 876 S.W.2d at 305; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re Nelson, 2004 WL 1516156, at *1.
. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(b) (Vernon 2008).
. Bryan A. Garner, Gamer's Modem American Usage 779 (Oxford University Press 2003).
. While the majority criticizes this grammatical analysis of the applicable statute, it also cites the part of the Code Construction Act, in which the legislature states that “words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." Tex. Gov.Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005); see ante at 197.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.202(a) (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added).
. See id. (emphasis added).
. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(b) (emphasis added).
. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.203 (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added).
. The majority states that courts should not base their construction of a statute on the verb tense used by the legislature because the Code Construction Act states that "words in the present tense include the future tense.” Tex. Gov.Code Ann. § 311.012(a) (Vernon 2005); see ante at 197, n. 8. However, if section 155.201(b) also includes the future tense, then the part of the statute focusing the inquiry on the six-month period before filing of the suit would be rendered meaningless. Though the Code Construction Act was in effect when the Supreme Court of Texas decided Cassidy v. Fuller, the high court still construed the applicable statutes as requiring a transfer to the county in which the child resides and has resided for at least six months; the Cassidy court did not conclude that under the Code Construction Act, a transfer is also required to the county in which the child will have resided for more than six months in the future. See Act of May 24, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 455, § 2.02, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1036, 1037; Cassidy v. Fuller, 568 S.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Tex.1978). Research has not revealed any Texas case that has used section 311.012(a) of the Texas Government Code in interpreting a statute. See Brown v. Blum, 9 S.W.3d 840, 845-46 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet dism’d w.o.j.) (declining to use section 311.012(a) of the Texas Government Code in interpreting a statute).
. This is the principal legal standard articulated in the majority opinion. See ante at 193, 194, 196, 199 (stating that, for the Na-borses to be entitled to a mandatory transfer to Fort Bend County, the Children must have resided in Fort Bend County for six months or longer "preceding” the filing of the modification suit).
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 155.201(b), 155.204(b); Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 846-47; In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d 257, 263-65 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); In re Wheeler, 177 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); Blacklock v. Miller, 693 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief because, even though children’s principal residence may have been in different county for more than six months in the past, the children’s principal residence changed from that county 12 days before filing of suit to modify and therefore, their principal residence was not in that county on the day suit was filed). The majority suggests that the Blacklock court erroneously applied general venue principles that conflicted with the Family Code. See ante at 199. This is incorrect. The Blacklock court quoted and applied former section 11.06(b); it did not apply general venue principles that are contrary to the requirements of the Family Code. See Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652.
. See ante at 196-97.
. See Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia, 150 S.W.3d 682, 700 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
. See Tex FamCode Ann. § 155.201(b); Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652. The majority relies on In re Karst and In re Gore; however, these cases involved children whose principal residence was in the other county during the six-month period preceding the commencement of suit. See In re Kerst, 237 S.W.3d 441, 442, 444-45 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re Gore, No. 07-07-0290-CV, 2007 WL 2403366, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Aug.23, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.). Therefore, these cases are consistent with the analysis in this dissenting opinion.
. In the same motion to transfer, the Na-borses asserted in the alternative that they were entitled to a discretionary transfer under section 155.202(b). Though the Naborses seek mandamus as to the trial court’s denial of their motion, which would include the denial of this relief, the Naborses’ petition does not contain any argument, analysis, record citations or legal authority in support of the proposition that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying this part of the motion. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.3(h). Therefore, they have waived this issue. See In re Citizens Supporting Metro Solutions, Inc., No. 14-07-00190-CV, 2007 WL 4277850, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2007, orig. proceeding).
. See 568 S.W.2d at 846-47.
. See id.
. See id.
. See id.
. See id. at 847 (relying on statutory language similar to that currently codified at section 103.001 of the Texas Family Code).
. See id.
. See Act of May 25, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 543, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1414 (amended 1981, recodified 1995, amended 1999) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 155.201(b), 155.202(a), 155.203).
. See Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 847.
. Id.
. See id.
. See id.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(c).
. See In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d at 264.
. See id. at 260, 264-65.
. See id. In In re Wheeler, the First Court of Appeals adopted this court's analysis in In re T.J.L. See 177 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding). Therefore, the majority's analysis also conflicts with the First Court of Appeals’s decision in In re Wheeler. See id.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.202(a) (emphasis added).
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(b) (emphasis added).
. Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 155.203 (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added).
. See ante at 193, 194, 196, 199.
. For example, if prior to October 26, 2007, the Naborses had spent two weeks visiting relatives in Harris County, that would not mean that the Children’s principal residence would switch to Harris County during this period. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the Children were continuously present in Fort Bend County from May 16, 2006 through October 26, 2007, and continuously present in Harris County after October 26, 2007. Therefore, the trial court had no occasion to require continuous presence in the county of residence. The majority cites Martinez v. Flores. See 820 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). The Martinez court held that the children's extended visitation period with their father, who did not have the right to designate their residence, did not change the children's residence from the county designated by the Children's mother. See id. at 939-41. This holding is consistent with the analysis in this dissenting opinion. The Martinez court does state in an obiter dictum that the six-month period stated in the predecessor statute to section 155.201(b) is meant as a "guide” and that courts can look beyond the six-month period to determine whether the children’s residence has changed to a new county. See id. at 940. This dictum is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, and, prior to today’s decision, had not been cited by any court.
. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 155.203; Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652 (denying mandamus relief because, even though children’s principal residence may have been in different county for more than six months in the past, the children’s principal residence changed from that county 12 days before filing of suit to modify and therefore, their principal residence was not in that county on the day suit was filed).
In part of its opinion, the majority suggests that, under section 155.203, this court should *207look to the six-month period preceding suit and determine which county was the child’s principal residence for the majority of this period. See ante at 197-98. This construction conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute and the Blacklock decision. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 155.203; Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652. In addition, language substantially similar to the language of section 155.203 was contained in former section 11.06(b). See Act of May 25, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 543, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1414. Therefore, this construction also conflicts with Cassidy and In re T.J.L., which require the child to be currently residing in the other county, rather than to have a principal residence in that county for a majority of the six-month period prior to suit. See Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 846-47; In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d at 263-65.
. The majority is simply wrong when it states that, under the analysis in this dissenting opinion, removing children from one county to another for a few days or a few hours would thwart an otherwise meritorious motion to transfer venue under section 155.201(b). See ante at 196-97, n. 6, 198. If parties were to engage in such manipulative behavior, the trial court would be justified in concluding that the children's principal residence had not changed. Of course, if the evidence shows that children in a particular case had a bona fide change of their principal residence back to the county of the original court of continuing jurisdiction shortly before a timely motion to transfer was filed, then the facts simply would not satisfy the bright-line rule established by the legislature for determining when the county for the court of continuing jurisdiction must be changed. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(b); Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.201(b); Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 846-47; In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d at 263-65; In re Wheeler, 177 S.W.3d at 353-54; Blacklock, 693 S.W.2d at 652.