concurring.
TMs is another case in wMch the appellant in an action at law tried by the court without a jury seeks to obtain a retrial of the facts by broadly criticizing the trial court’s findings of fact instead of alleging precise assignments of error as reqmred by our rules. Hekker *86v. Sabre Construction Co., 265 Or 552, 510 P2d 347 (1973); The scope of our review in this case is accurately stated in Wagner v. Savage, as Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 141, 244 P2d 161 (1952) as.follows:
“This being a law action, the findings of the trial court upon the facts have all the force and effect of a verdict of a jury, and this court is bound thereby if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support theni. We are not permitted to weigh the evidence and arrive at our own independent conclusions respecting the facts, as is the case in equity proceedings which are here tried de novo. * * *”
See, also, Brandt v. Premier Insurance Co., 260 Or 392, 490 P2d 984 (1971); Cronn v. Fisher, 245 Or 407, 422 P2d 276 (1966).
The majority opinion points out that “the evidence was overwhelming to the effect that there was not a substantial performance of this contract by the plaintiff, but that, on the contrary, there was a material breach, if not a willful breach, of the contract by him.” This is a clear finding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the trial court. Instead of ending its consideration of the case at that point the majority is induced by the tactics of the appellant to retry the facts de novo. I decline to join in that procedure.
I concur in the result.