*2OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.This is an appeal in forma pauperis from a conviction for the offense of arson.
The facts of the case are simple, if not sparse. Defendant Dudoit was seen leaving a rooming house lavatory. At the same time Dudoit was observed leaving, a small fire was discovered in that lavatory. Some testimony was presented as to Dudoit’s suspicious actions and reactions regarding the fire. There was also testimony as to the presence of newspapers, cardboard, and pieces of rug inside the washroom in question. There was expert testimony that the fire was not electrical in origin. No evidence was introduced as to the origin of this fire other than the physical presence of newspapers, cardboard, and pieces of rug.
One of the most fundamental principles of the common law is that the occurrence of a crime must be proved before anyone can be convicted of the offense. The establishment of this corpus delicti, the body of the offense, is an essential element of the state’s case.
Proof of the commission of a crime consists of three elements, each of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the basic injury, such as . . ., the burning in arson,. . ., (2) the fact that the basic injury was the result of a criminal, rather than a natural or accidental cause, and (3) the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The first two of these elements constitute the corpus delicti or body of the crime, which is proved when the prosecution has shown that a crime has been committed by someone. [Citations omitted.] State v. Hale, 45 Haw. 269, n. 277, 367 P.2d 81, n. 86 (1961) (Emphasis added).
The concept of criminality thus requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt a criminal, rather than a natural cause. This has been the law in Hawaii, that “[i]n reality the term corpus delicti means the actual commission of a crime by someone.” Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335, 344 (1949).
In order to convict defendant Dudoit of the crime of arson, an essential element that the State of Hawaii had the burden *3of proving beyond a reasonable doubt was that the fire was kindled by other than natural or accidental means. The only proof submitted by the state to meet that burden was evidence of the presence of debris in the washroom. The presence of these newspapers, pieces of rug, and a cardboard box are all that the state relies on to raise the inference of a criminal agency in kindling the fire.
The state’s main witness testified that he was employed for the purpose of cleaning such debris out of the washroom. It further appears from the testimony that it was not unusual for the items in question to be present in the washroom. State witness Kahalekomo testified that he sometimes saw newspapers in the washroom. We find the presence of this debris equivocal proof at best.
This court has adhered in the past to the “substantial evidence” test in reviewing criminal appeals. State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 347, 475 P.2d 684, 691 (1970). We do not find the state’s proof of corpus delicti to be supported by substantial evidence in this case.
The presence of material which has incendiary properties only incidental to their primary purpose is not substantial evidence. We would distinguish this case from Republic of Hawaii v. Tokuji, 9 Haw. 548 (1894), where the facts showed the fire to have started in three distinct places and where oily wicking and matches were found nearby. In the case at hand, only the presence of debris is shown, a presence that is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.
The state did not establish nor attempt to show that the materials present were somehow related to the fire’s origin. The state has resources not available to defendants, especially indigent defendants. City fire inspectors or other experts could have been used to tie the debris to the cause of the fire. The burden is on the state to overcome the presumption that a fire has natural or accidental origins. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 778, 782, 160 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1968). We feel that the equivocal evidence presented did not overcome this presumption nor was it substantial evidence of a criminal agency.
*4Joseph M. Gedan for appellant. Douglas H. Ige, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, Prosecuting Attorney, with him on the brief) for appellee.When the state undertakes to overcome the presumption of natural origin through circumstantial evidence it must meet the further burden of disposing of any reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.
The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence, but, as is the rule in all cases where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the state of facts must be inconsistent with any theory other than the guilt of the accused and the facts and circumstances disclosed and relied upon must be irreconcilable with the innocence of the accused in order to justify his conviction. State v. Whisler, 231 Iowa 1216, 1219, 3 N.W.2d 525, 527 (1942).
The state may rely on the circumstantial presence of incendiary material as in State v. Tokuji, supra, to establish a corpus delicti. However, where the material present is of an ambiguous nature reconcilable with the innocence of the accused, as in this case, the state has not met its burden. The state by the expert testimony available to it must at least establish a causal relationship between the debris and the burning in order to show a criminal agency.
We reverse for failure of the corpus delicti and award attorney’s fees on appeal to counsel for the appellant.