dissenting.
Defendant, convicted by a jury of three counts of criminal activity in drugs, ORS 167.207, appeals, assigning as sole error the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence taken from his wallet following his arrest on unrelated felony charges. A brief statement of the facts is necessary for a determination of the issue.
On.February 5, 1973, Deputy Sheriff Lynn For-ristahl: .approached- defendant, who was at work outdoors on his father’s berry farm. The officer, advised *135defendant of his Miranda① rights and asked Mm questions regarding ¿- recent burglary. Defendant thereupon entered a nearby housing unit and carried out several items wMch had been reported stolen from a home. The officer asked him if he had the television set that-had been taken in the burglary. Defendant said he had sold it, but- that he thought he could get it back.
Subsequently, while the investigation of the burglary continued, the officer prepared a report② which indicated that on .February 5 the defendant was living at a migrant farm labor camp located on Ms father’s berry farm.
On February 14, 1973, Officer Forristahl, accompanied by another deputy sheriff, returned to the berry farm to find out if defendant had recovered the stolen television set. The officers parked next to a fence and ForristaM questioned defendant, who was working on its other side. Defendant started yelling and screaming profanities and said, “I don’t intend to get it back. I don’t have to get it back.” The officer then said, “You’re under arrest for burglary.” Defendant started walking away. The officer jumped the fence, whereupon defendant turned around with a *136pitchfork in his hands and thrust it at the officer. The officer pushed it aside, subdued and handcuffed defendant. He then again informed the defendant of his Miranda rights.
The officer next searched the defendant. He removed defendant’s red stocking hat, placed it on the hood of the patrol car, and then removed a pipe, a pair of gloves, a pocketknife, a box of candy and a wallet from defendant’s pockets and placed them in the hat. Defendant’s mother had by then walked to the scene and attempted to take the contents of the hat but was directed by the officer not to do so. No search of the wallet was made there, and the hat with its contents was put in the front seat of the patrol ear, the defendant having been put in the back.
Defendant was then transported to the city hall at Estacada en route to jail. There he was asked to state his name, address, date of birth, social security number, occupation and employer in connection with the preparation by the officer of the customary custody report. Defendant refused to answer any question or to say anything. The officer testified he then flipped open the defendant’s wallet, expecting to obtain the desired information from the defendant’s driver’s license. As the officer flipped open the wallet to locate the license, he saw several small plastic bags in plain view “just inside the billfold,” protruding from a compartment. Upon further observation, he saw that five of tírese contained a white substance and a sixth contained a blue substance. The officer asked defendant if he was taking any medication. The defendant continued to refuse to answer. Shortly thereafter, defendant was transported the remaining distance to the county jail.
*137The officer • suspected the contents of these bags were narcotics, and, subsequently, had them and the pipe delivered to the county narcotics detective who determined that the former contained dangerous drugs, and that the latter contained marihuana residue. The motion seeks the suppression of all the seized drugs and their containers.
Defendant’s principal contention is that, since the officer testified he had previously obtained the defendant’s name, address, place of employment, etc., at the February 5 incident, he did not have a valid reason to look into the wallet for that information. Since the defendant had been arrested for a felony, a search of the wallet contents at the time of booking him into jail would be valid under State v. Sorgenfrei, 7 Or App 442, 444, 490 P2d 1040 (1971), Sup Ct review denied (1972), and State v. Kangiser, 8 Or App 368, 372, 494 P2d 450 (1972), had it been done for inventory purposes. But he contends that here it was not done for that purpose but solely to obtain identification data which the officer had already previously obtained.
Defendant relies particularly upon State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973). That case upheld as valid a warrantless inventory search of an impounded automobile as long as it was confined to material in plain view within the vehicle, but held invalid, as unnecessary to such inventory, the search of the contents of a fishing tackle bos tied with red wire.
The court said:
“In a close .case of a warrantless search .and ,impoundment of an automobile there is a delicate balance between conflicting pliblie and private :in*138terests — the need to search to protect law officers and car owners and the invasion of Fourth Amendment protected interests of private citizens. We recognize that there may he exigent circumstances hut none are present in the case at bar. After finding the partially opened cosmetic case with syringes and needles in plain view, a search warrant could have been obtained from a disinterested magistrate on probable cause. The opening and searching of the closed fishing tackle box was an unreasonable search violative of defendant’s federal Fourth Amendment and Oregon Article I, Section 9, constitutional rights.” 265 Or at 629.
See also, State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, Sup Ct review denied (1973).
In the case at bar, the wallet had already been validly seized in a lawful search of his person by the police immediately following the defendant’s arrest for burglary. The defendant had at that time also threatened the officer in anger, with a pitchfork. His arrest was clearly lawful. The officer had ample probable cause to arrest both for burglary, and the alleged assault. State v. Jones, 248 Or 428, 432, 435 P2d 317 (1967).
The defendant’s wallet was not searched incident to his arrest, as in State v. Keller, supra, and State v. O’Neal, infra. It was not “flipped open” as part of an inventory search but later, solely in connection with defendant’s identification. It, together with his other personal belongings, was simply removed from ■ him pending his transportation and booking into jail, and at a time when he was strongly resisting'arrest.
When the defendant, during the preparation of the custody report at the city hall, refused to answer any questions or furnish any information to the officer, I think it reasonable that the officer. sought to *139examine Ms driver’s license in Ms wallet, whether to verify or to supplement data he had received some days before, as here, or as an original investigation necessary to the booMng-in procedure. No improper search of the content of the wallet was here made, since the contraband was in plain view the instant the wallet was flipped open. Unlike Keller and Childers, the opening of the wallet was no part of an investigation related to the discovery of contraband. Here, none was suspected at all. The court concluded the opening of the wallet was done solely in aid of identification and the preparation of the usual custody report made following a lawful arrest. Defendant had alreay been transported to the Estacada City Hall. The preparation of the custodial report by the officer during the stop at the city hall while en route to, rather than at, the county jail does not, in my view, here invalidate the plain view discovery of the contraband within the wallet. It was not part of an inventory search such as was condemned in Keller and Childers. There is ample evidence to support this conclusion.
The majority concludes that State v. O’Neal, 251 Or 163, 444 P2d 951 (1968), is controlling here. That case involved the search of a wallet following a “traffic arrest. There the officer pulled a paper out of the wallet of ah apparently cooperative traffic violator, and a half-smoked marihuana cigarette fell out of the paper which the officer without defendant’s consent unfolded; Here the contraband was in plain view when the wállet was flipped open to ascertain③ relevant *140identification information necessary to complete administrative booking procedures.④ The defendant had refused to furnish any of such data. The officer *141earlier had taken possession of the wallet and the pipe at the time of the arrest and before defendant was transported to the city hall. I think the act of the officer in flipping open the wallet not at all in an exploratory search for evidence of a crime bnt to obtain routine information requisite to customary administrative booking-in procedures was reasonable, particularly when the defendant refused to furnish any such data. See, State v. McCoy, 249 Or 160, 437 P2d 734 (1968); State v. Whitlow, 13 Or App 607, 510 P2d 1354, Sup Ct review denied (1973).
Since the baggies were in plain view the moment the wallet was flipped open for what I believe to have beep lawful reasons, it follows in my view that under the plain view doctrine it was the right and indeed the duty of the officer not only to remove the baggies from the wallet but to have them subjected to analysis. Accordingly, I would affirm.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974 (1966).
The report is not in evidence. Indeed, for reasons which nowhere appear in the record, none of the eight exhibits which were marked at the hearing, the subject of extensive examination by both counsel and obviously considered by the court, were offered or received in evidence. Thus, none of this material is a part of the record on appeal. Furthermore, documents used by the defendant were/not marked nor their content adequately explained. No objection.to such procedures was made by either party. Indeed, each actively participated therein. When a party relies on documentary evidence in support of his position and uses it in cross-examination of witnesses, it is his duty to see that it is made a part of the record.
Concerning the opening of the billfold, the officer testified:
“Q [by prosecuting attorney] Did you get any response from him to the questions? '
.“A None of any kind.
*140“Q What happened after that?
“A I had his billfold and so I seen he wouldn’t answer my questions and I supposed he should have a driver’s license in his billfold and I opened his billfold and he carried in the back, so I —
“Q What was your purpose in looking at the billfold?
“A To obtain his identity, his true identity, his date of birth, social security number, if he had a card showing his correct address, numerous things that we needed for the custody report.
“Q Did you find any of those things in the billfold?
“Á Yes. I found his date of birth on a driver’s license.. I didn’t find the social security card.
“Q Was there anything else in the billfold besides the card that you mentioned?
“A Yes. There was some plastic, little, small, plastic bags.
“Q And where were they located in the billfold?
“A Right at the front. As soon as I opened it up I could see these plastic bags just inside the billfold. * * *”
That there was substantial confusion concerning the accuracy of the data contained in the police report following the February 5 incident referred to in the court’s opinion is shown by the following testimony elicited, on cross-examination:
“Q [by defendant’s attorney] Officer, these apparently are two reports written in your handwriting regarding the investigation of the burglary, is that correct?
“A Yes, sir. Urn-hum.
“Q And those reports reflect the facts that you already knew Mr. Florance, you already knew his date of birth. Is that not correct?
“A This — yes, this would reflect to this, yes.
“Q Now, those were written subsequent to the time that you had originally contacted the defendant on February 5, is .that correct?
“A This was on this report, yes. Um-hum.
“Q Okay.
“A This address here is not his correct address. This is the — this address here he was at another address in Portland. This here is an address of an Oregon City address, or a Portland address, another , man in Oregon City’s address.”