OPINION
HERNANDEZ, Judge.Defendants were charged by indictment with violation of § 40A-19-3(F), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6). Defendants’ motion to quash the indictment was granted and the State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court rule 5(4) (§ 21-2-1(5) (4), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 1970)).
The trial court order quashing the indictment held that § 40A-19-3, supra, was unconstitutional and found, in part:
“1. That Section 40A-19-3(E) [N.M. S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6)] proscribes as a felony the activities defined as a petty misdemeanor in Section 40-19-2(D), and by virtue thereof, there exists unconstitutional uncertainty as to the punishment of violation of either.
“2. That the Defendants are charged with violation of Section 40-19-3 (F) which attempts to impose felony punishment of activity fundamentally identical to the activities proscribed as a petty misdemeanor in Section 40A-19^1(B), and as such there exists an unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty regarding punishment for the commission of that activity.
“3. That the total intent of the legislature in regulating general gambling activity throughout the state can not be carried out by severing any section of N.M.S.A.Comp. Section 40A-19-3, and by reason thereof, no sub-section of such statute is severable from the remainder of such statute.”
We hold that the trial court’s finding number 2 with respect to the constitutionality of § 40A-19-3(F), supra, is in error. Section 40A-19-3(F), supra, provides in part:
“Commercial gambling consists of either:
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“F. setting up for use, for the purpose of gambling or collecting the proceeds of, any gambling device.”
The section further provides that a violation of this subsection is a fourth degree felony. Section 40A-19-4(B), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6) provides in part:
“Permitting premises to be used for gambling consists of:
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“B. knowingly permitting a gambling device to be set up for use for the purpose of gambling in a place under his control.”
Defendants’ contention that § 40A-19-3(F), supra, is void for vagueness and uncertainty is without merit. A statute violates due process if it “. is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1972). The vagueness doctrine is based on notice and applies when a potential actor is exposed to criminal sanctions without a fair warning as to the nature of the proscribed activity. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).
A common sense reading of the two statutes demonstrates to us that § 40A-19-3(F), supra, requires a positive act by an accused relating to. commercial gambling, whilé § 40A-19-4(B), supra, connotes mere passive acquiescence in permitting a “ . . . gambling device to be set up for use for the purpose of gambling in a place under his control.” Each statute relates to a different activity. Permitting a gambling device to be set up and to set up a gambling device are not identical acts; an individual could not be held accountable under both sections for the same act. See State v. Gleason, 80 N.M. 382, 456 P.2d 215 (Ct.App.1969).
Defendants further contend that the term “gambling device” as defined in § 40A-19-1 (C), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6) is vague. That section states:
“C. “Gambling device” means a contrivance which, for a consideration, affords the player an opportunity to obtain anything of value, the award of which is determined by change, even though accompanied by some skill and whether or not the prize is automatically paid by the device; . . . ”
Defendants argue that since gambling is not defined, a television set or a gun could be in “the category of gambling devices.” We disagree. Words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. State v. Orzen, supra. No contrary intent appearing in the statute, the ordinary and usual meaning is clear, that is, those devices which are normally associated with gambling. Gambling device is defined with acceptable clarity, given the legislative dilemma of drafting criminal statutes general enough to escape legalistic evasion while specific enough to give fair warning of proscribed conduct. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) and Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22, 132 P.2d 715 (1942).
We did not consider defendants’ arguments that §§ 40A-19-3(F), supra, and 40A-19-4(B), supra, are void for vagueness because they provide different punishment for the same act since we have previously determined the two statutes don’t relate to the same activity.
Because the trial court’s finding number 2 indicates and the briefs of both parties concede that defendants were charged with a violation of § 40A-19-3(F), supra, we conclude that defendants have no standing to challenge § 40A-19-3(E), supra, and § 40A-19-2(D), supra. The trial court’s conclusion that these two subsections are unconstitutionally vague was erroneous because of the defendants’ lack of standing. Defendants may not challenge the constitutionality of a statute or a portion of a statute under which they have not been charged. We do not review hypothetical or academic questions. The constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack only by a person whose rights are affected thereby. State v. Hines, 78 N.M. 471, 432 P.2d 827 (1967); State v. Klantchnek, 59 N.M. 284, 283 P.2d 619 (1955).
Having ruled on the trial court's findings numbers one and two as we have, we need not reach the issue of the severability of the statute.
Reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the trial court’s order to quash the indictment and reinstate the matter on the trial docket.
It is so ordered.
HENDLEY, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., specially concurring.