Dillon Companies, Inc. v. City of Boulder

MR. JUSTICE KELLEY,

specially concurring:

I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, I disagree with some of the reasoning by which that result was reached.

My disagreement with the opinion of the court involves two closely related propositions. First, Part II of the opinion implies that the planned development ordinance consists of a set of definitive “legislative” standards. Secondly, the opinion states that the city council acted in a legislative capacity when adopting the ordinance, but when reviewing an application it acted in an adjudicative capacity with a ministerial duty to grant the application if the “legislative” standards had been complied with. I believe that both of the above propositions misapprehend the meaning and operation of the planned development ordinance before us in this case and invite unwarranted judicial interference in local zoning.

It is clear, as stated in the opinion, that planned development ordinances represent a modern concept in city planning. It is, in fact, a new zoning device developed to provide for flexibility in zoning. In order to achieve this end Boulder adopted an ordinance in which broad standards were established to guide the city council in permitting planned developments with “compatible uses in harmony with surrounding neighborhoods.” Provision was made in the ordinance for notice and public hearings at every stage of the application process. The council was empowered to attach *125conditions to the planned development to bring it into harmony with the adjacent neighborhood.

The court’s reasoning is not compatible with the planned unit development concept expressed in the ordinance as I interpret it. The “legislative” standards are phrased in broad terms to allow flexibility in rezoning. The standards themselves are flexible and consequently call upon the city council to exercise its discretion as it must in any other legislative matter. The fact that the council first enacted the planned development ordinance does not foreclose it from acting in a legislative capacity under that ordinance.

I know that it is not the intention of the majority to inhibit the use of this new concept in zoning, but I fear that some of the language of the opinion may discourage municipalities looking in that direction.