dissenting.
I believe that the majority misinterprets ORS 656.273(1) by misapplying PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). According to PGE, before we resort to legislative history to interpret a statute, we are required to conclude that the text of the statute, when examined in context, is ambiguous. PGE, 317 Or at 611. The majority simply announces that ORS 656.273(1) is ambiguous, without identifying two plausible interpretations of the relevant language. Because I believe that an examination of the text of ORS 656.273(1), in context, establishes that there is only one plausible interpretation of it, I dissent.
In order to conclude that the board’s interpretation of ORS 656.273(1) is not correct, I think that the court must explain how the statute could be interpreted to mean something different. We would have to do that in order to conclude that a contract is ambiguous. See, e.g., Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James Co., 313 Or 464, 470, 836 P2d 703 (1992). I see no reason why the same principle does not apply to statutory construction under PGE. I believe that the majority fails to identify two plausible interpretations of the statute because it cannot.
The majority examines ORS 656.273 in context with ORS 656.214(7) and ORS 656.273(8) and concludes that “[i]t is not unreasonable to read those provisions together to mean that an ‘actual worsening does include circumstances where symptoms worsen to a greater extent than the waxing and waning contemplated by the previous award.” 145 Or App at 300. That interpretation is a completely coherent interpretation of the statute, in context.
The 1995 amendment to ORS 656.273(1) added the requirement that there be an “actual worsening” of a condition in order to establish that there has been an aggravation *307of it. That change indicates that a real worsening, as distinguished from an illusory one, is required. As the majority recognizes, the change meshes well with the 1995 amendment to ORS 656.214(7), which states that “[a]ll permanent disability contemplates future waxing and waning of symptoms of the condition,” and with ORS 656.273(8), which provides that an aggravation can be established by showing that “the worsening [of the condition] is more than waxing and waning of symptoms of the condition contemplated by the previous permanent disability award.” Taken together, the provisions establish that, to prevail on an aggravation claim, a claimant must establish that her condition has, in fact, worsened, and that the worsening of it represents more than the contemplated waxing and waning of its symptoms. I do not see how the words of the statute, in context, can be understood to require anything more.
The majority announces, however, that the meaning of the statute is ambiguous because “[a]rguably, the amended language means that the underlying condition must actually worsen in order to prove an aggravation.” 145 Or App at 300. The majority argues that, because the legislature amended the statute to include new language, there is, “at a minimum,” a possibility that the legislature intended to change the standard to prove an aggravation. Id. After examining the legislative history, the majority concludes that the legislature wanted to require claimants to show “proof of a pathological worsening.” 145 Or App at 305. The legislature certainly can change the standard for proving an aggregation. However, when the new language in ORS 656.273(1) is considered in context, the majority’s interpretation of the statute is implausible.1
In fact, the majority’s construction of ORS 656.273(1) essentially renders ORS 656.214 and ORS 656.273(8) superfluous. It concludes that ORS 656.273(1), as amended, establishes that symptomatic worsening is never *308sufficient to establish an aggravation. If that is true, then it is unnecessary to say that waxing and waning of symptoms is an expected feature of every condition (ORS 656.214) and that an aggravation can be established by showing that “the worsening [of the condition] is more than waxing and waning of symptoms of the condition contemplated by the previous permanent disability award” (ORS 656.273(8)). A focus on the waxing and waning of symptoms is irrelevant if increased symptoms are insufficient to establish that a condition has worsened, as the majority’s construction of ORS 656.273(1) posits. The majority fails to explain how its construction of ORS 656.273(1) meshes with ORS 656.214 and ORS 656.273(8).
The source of any ambiguity in the statute can be traced to the statute’s legislative history rather than to the statute itself. It is the statements by some of the proponents of the 1995 workers’ compensation bill that create confusion about the intended meaning of ORS 656.273(1). However, under PGE, we cannot turn to legislative history unless an ambiguity about the legislature’s intent is evident from the text and context of the statute itself. 317 Or at 609. There is no such ambiguity here. The only plausible construction of ORS 656.273(1) is that an actual worsening can be shown through a significant worsening of symptoms, as the Board concluded. Thus, the Board’s interpretation should be affirmed.
Furthermore, much of the legislative history that is quoted by the majority is completely consistent with the interpretation of the statute that I’ve stated above. Representative Mannix, in particular, said in a variety of ways that the changes were intended to reconfirm one of the things that the 1990 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law had sought to establish. That is that the symptoms of a permanent condition are expected to wax and wane, so a com-pensable aggravation of the condition requires a showing that the condition is worse than it was at the last arrangement, taking the expected waxing and waning of symptoms into account. For example, he said:
“Do the physicians say there’s actual worsening of the condition or is this waxing and waning of symptoms? The kind of stuff you would have anticipated.”
*309That discussion makes no sense if the only way to establish a worsening is by showing a pathological worsening of the condition.
Representative Mannix also said that the worsening need not be permanent in order to constitute an aggravation:
“Well to be frank about it, the attending physician will tend to err on the side of caution and say well, looking at this * * * and evaluating this condition, yeah it’s worse. Is it temporarily worse or permanently worse? That doesn’t matter. If it’s a worsened condition you’ll get an aggravation. Then later you can look at whether it’s permanent or temporary and reevaluat[e] it. Oh they got better again, fine. They didn’t get better, then you got some more permanent disability.”
In addition, however, Representative Mannix also said two other, very different things about the 1995 amendments to ORS 656.273 and ORS 656.214. He said that the amendments were intended (1) to require a claimant to submit evidence from a doctor in which the doctor states that the condition has worsened and (2) to require a claimant to show a pathological, as opposed to a symptomatic, worsening of the condition. Those are not the same thing, as Representative Mannix, himself, recognized.
For example, he said that
“[a]t some point somebody’s symptoms will have increased so much that the doctor’s going to come to the conclusion that there is actually a worsening of the condition. Let the doctor say so. But let’s not say that there are any other assumptions that somehow meant [sic] to having just the waxing and waning of symptoms reported that that meant you have an aggravation. Ask the doctor the question about the aggravation.”
That discussion suggests that increased symptoms beyond those contemplated in the normal waxing and waning of a condition can establish an aggravation, but that a doctor must say that the condition is worse. In other words, a doctor must use magic words, to wit, that the claimant’s condition is worse, in order for the Board to conclude that there has been an aggravation. The Board cannot reach that conclusion on *310its own based on the medical evidence. Under that understanding, increased symptoms can establish a worsening, as long as the magnitude of the increase is significant enough to lead a doctor to conclude that there has been a worsening.
Alternatively, Representative Mannix said that “[aggravation ought to be pathological worsening and the doctor can tell you whether or not there’s been a pathological worsening.” For that purpose, I understand the term “pathological” to mean structural or functional. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1655 (1976) (definition of pathology). If that is what the amendment sought to require, I’m not sure how the amendment adds anything to the existing requirement that the aggravation be based on “objective findings.” The necessary objective findings will reflect a structural or functional change in the condition.
In any event, the addition of the words “actual worsening” to ORS 656.273(1) cannot reasonably be interpreted (1) to add a requirement that a doctor testify that there has been an actual worsening in order for the Board to find an aggravation or (2) to mean that the Board cannot find an aggravation on the basis of objective findings of increased symptoms that exceed those expected for the condition in the light of the expected waxing and waning of it. If the legislature intended to accomplish either of those two things, it needed to add different words to the statute than it did. The majority simply settles on a conclusion about the intended goal of the amendments and then announces that the amendments achieved that goal without explaining how the words chosen by the legislature, in fact, did that.
In contrast, the Board’s interpretation of ORS 656.273(1) gives meaningful effect to all of the relevant provisions. The discussion of waxing and waning in ORS 656.214 and ORS 656.273(8) essentially explains what constitutes an actual worsening under ORS 656.273(1). They do that by establishing that increased symptoms are insufficient to establish an aggravation if they fall within those expected as part of the waxing and waning of symptoms that accompanies any permanent disability. The increased symptoms must be greater than those that were contemplated in the prior award for the condition to be considered to have *311worsened. That is the only plausible construction that can be gleaned from the text and context of the statute. Therefore, I believe that the opinion errs in holding that the Board misinterpreted the relevant statutes.
Landau, J., joins in this dissent.The majority correctly states that the text of a statute before it is amended is considered part of the statute’s context. 145 Or App at 300. However, the prior statute cannot be considered in isolation. It must be considered with the other contextual cues. In this case, those include ORS 656.214(7) and ORS 656.273(8). When those statutes are considered, it is not possible to interpret the change in ORS 656.273(1) to do what the majority says it does.