This is an appeal on the judgment roll from a judgment denying petitioner a writ of mandate whereby he sought to compel the Pension Board of the City of Alameda to grant him a pension to which he claimed he was entitled under section 5 of an ordinance of said city (No. 276, N. S.) “providing for a relief, health, life insurance and pension fund for members of the fire and police departments of the city of Alameda.” The cause was tried on the pleadings and stipulations of counsel, and the sole question presented by the appeal is one of statutory construction.
The pension fund created by the ordinance is built up of fines collected, by contributions of certain amounts by the city, and deductions from the monthly salaries of each member of the police and fire departments; and the ordinance provides for the granting of several separate and distinct pensions, three of which are as follows: Section 2 provides that after a person has served a period of 25 years or more, the Pension Board either of its own motion or on application of the employee shall retire the employee from active service on a monthly pension equal to one-half of the salary paid to members of his rank. Section 3 provides for retirement at half salary at any time for disability; and section 5, which is the particular section in question here, reads as follows: “Any person having served ten (10) years or more as a member of the regularly constituted Fire or Police Department shall, if he be removed from said Fire or Police Department for any cause other than conviction of a felony; notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty; or in case of voluntary or involuntary resignation, be entitled to all the provisions of Section 2 of this ordinance, in the proportion that the number of years he has served in either of said departments bears to twenty-five (25) years.”
Appellant entered the employ of the city of Alameda as a fireman on February 1, 1930, and he continued to serve as such up to December 8, 1941, covering a period of 11 years and 10 months. On that date he presented his resignation and it was accepted. But the board refused to allow him the pension provided for by section 5 of the ordinance. It is appellant’s contention that construed by itself and in the light of the other provisions of the ordinance, the clear import and intent of said section 5 is that if after having served 10 years a member of either of the departments mentioned there*519in resigns, voluntarily or involuntarily, and his resignation is accepted, he is entitled as a matter of right to the reduced amount of pension provided for therein. The position taken by the respondents is that the terms '‘ conviction of a felony; notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty; or in case of voluntary or involuntary resignation” must be read together, and are definitive of the instances in which a person who has served 10 years or more will not be entitled to a pension; that therefore, since appellant voluntarily resigned, he forfeited his right to the pension.
The decisions hold uniformly that laws and ordinances providing for the payment of pensions after specified years of service are sustained as valid and constitutional on the ground that they are in the nature of compensation for services rendered (Douglas v. Pension Board, 75 Cal.App. 335 [242 P. 756] ; O’Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659 [169 P. 366]), and that this is especially true where as here monthly deductions are made from the employee’s salary which go into the pension fund. The ordinance here involved was in force at the time appellant became a member of the department; and as said in O’Dea v. Cook, supra, pension provisions become a part of the contemplated compensation for services to be rendered and in a sense form a part of the contract of employment. Mainly for the reasons stated the courts have repeatedly declared that pension laws are to be liberally construed and if any doubt remains in regard to the proper construction of a pension statute, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the person claiming the right to the pension. (O’Dea v. Cook, supra; Aitken v. Roche, 48 Cal.App. 753 [192 P. 464] ; Casserly v. City of Oakland, 215 Cal. 600 [12 P.2d 425] ; Dillard v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 599 [127 P.2d 917].)
Both parties to this proceeding state that said section 5 is awkwardly drawn, and apparently the dispute over its meaning is brought about largely by the punctuation employed in framing the section; that is, by the presence of the semicolons after the words "felony” and "duty.” However, in this connection the courts have held that an awkwardly and loosely drawn statute should be so construed as to remove its inconsistencies and to give to it the most reasonable solution permissible, even though such construction is not entirely satisfactory; and that in arriving at a solution, punctuation is never a controlling factor; that it may be entirely dis*520regarded when necessary to ascertain the true intent and meaning. (23 Cal.Jur. pp. 734, 735.) Moreover, it is held that in construing statutes courts are not always bound by the grammar, and that grammatical construction may be disregarded if necessary to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning. (23 Cal.Jur. 734.)
Considered in the light of the foregoing legal doctrines and the other provisions of the ordinance, it is our opinion that the construction of said section 5 contended for by appellant must be sustained. As will be noted, the section deals with two distinct methods of termination of employment after service of ten years; the first is by removal, which of course means the discharge of the employee for cause, and this is accomplished by the act of the employer; the second is by way of resignation, voluntary or involuntary, which is brought about by the act of the employee. It will be seen, therefore, that the words “removed” and “resignation” as there used convey opposite meanings; and that the two methods of termination of employment therein set forth are not only separated by a semicolon after the word duty, but the resignation clause is preceded by the words “or in case of,” thus emphasizing the two separate and distinct thoughts. Then again it is significant that the portion of the section dealing with removal starts out with the words “if he be removed”, whereas that portion relating to resignation starts with different words, to wit, “or in case of,” indicating an intention to separate the two ideas.
Moreover it is a well established, rule of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which in its application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted. (23 Cal.Jur. p. 766; Spier v. Peck, 36 Cal.App. 4 [171 P. 115]; Goldsmith v. Board of Education, 66 Cal.App. 157 [225 P. 783]; Aggeler v. Dominguez, 217 Cal. 429 [19 P.2d 241]; Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314 [30 P.2d 417].)
Assuming, therefore, that by reason of the incorrect punctuation or erroneous grammatical construction, the provisions of said section 5 are open to two constructions, it is manifest that if respondents’ construction be adopted and the resignation clause be read into and made part of the exclusionary removal clauses which operate to deprive an employee of his *521right to any pension, it would result in bringing about not only an unfair and unreasonable result, but an apparently ridiculous situation. For example, it will be noted, under the provisions of said section 5 it is not in all cases of removal that an employee is deprived of the pensions provided for therein. It is only in eases where the removal is for conviction of a felony, notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty. In all other cases of removal, regardless of the cause, he is entitled as a matter of right to receive the pension. Those causes may be drunkenness, the commission of any sort of a misdemeanor, offenses involving moral turpitude (if they do not amount to a felony), or as held in Daly v. Otis, 92 Cal.App. 242 [267 P. 921], wherein this same section of the. ordinance was under review, ‘ ‘ absence without leave. ’ ’ But, adopting respondents’ construction, if an employee with ten years of clean record and honest and faithful service chose to resign, he would not be allowed to stand on an equal footing with those who are removed for drunkenness, commission of misdemeanors, etc., and as in those cases, be allowed a pension, but would be placed in the classification of those removed for felony, notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty, and thus deprived not only of the right to a pension, but to a return of any part of the money deducted from his monthly salary for the pension fund during the preceding ten years. Such construction, in our opinion, would not only be illogical, unreasonable and unfair, but would be contrary to the intention of the voters by whom the ordinance was adopted.
Respondents do not contend that the provisions of said section 5 will not support the construction contended for by appellant; but they urge that such construction would be unreasonable. In this regard they argue that thereunder an employee facing charges of conviction of a felony, notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty, could circumvent the ordinance by resigning before the charges were heard and determined. But that is not true, for as held in the case of Curtin v. Board of Police Commissioners, 74 Cal.App. 77 [239 P. 355], the board is not bound to accept the resignation of the employee. It may refuse to do so prior to the filing of the charges or thereafter, and if those charges are afterwards filed it may dismiss him notwithstanding he has attempted to resign.
*522In the present ease it appears that at the hearing before the pension board on January 7, 1942, the city introduced in evidence a document addressed to the city manager by the chief of the fire department from which document it appears that on Saturday, December 6, 1941, appellant had been suspended from duty for intoxication, and he was therein charged with a violation of certain departmental rules and his dismissal from the department was requested. The following Monday appellant resigned. It is apparent that when this document was filed with the city manager two courses were open to the city. It could have charged appellant before the proper board with drunkenness', and had him removed on that ground, in which event he would have received the pension; or it could have charged him with notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty, and if removed on that ground he would have been deprived of the pension. But neither of those courses was followed. His resignation was accepted; consequently, under section 5 of the ordinance, if it has been here correctly construed, he was entitled to the pension.
Respondents further contend that the obvious intent of the ordinance, when read as a whole, is that an employee “should serve the city for at least 25 years before he has the option, on his own initiative, to demand a pension as a matter of right.” But under the construction here given section 5 he would not be entitled to a pension as a matter of right prior to 25 years service, for, as already pointed out, it is within the power of the board at all times to refuse to accept his resignation; and if after it has declined to do so, the employee nevertheless refuses to perform his duties, he may be charged, under the rule of the Curtin ease, with notorious or consecutive insubordination or neglect of duty, and, if removed, thus deprived of any pension rights. Here, however, appellant’s resignation was accepted.
Another argument advanced by respondents is that the actuarial set-up of the pension system in the ordinance indicates that there was no intention to provide a pension for an employee whose resignation is accepted after only ten years of service. However, no evidence whatever was introduced on that subject, and in the absence of any facts, it is not a matter that can be intelligently considered.
Nor was any pleading filed or evidence offered raising the question of contemporaneous administrative construction, so *523that such issue is not here involved. Whatever remaining points are urged by respondents in support of their position are, in our opinion, without merit.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, P. J., concurred.