I dissent.
The majority invalidates a jury instruction on proximate cause—an essential element of every tort case—that has been used in this state for some 50 years and embodies well-established law. And, by delegating responsibility for defining proximate cause to the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, the majority neglects its duty to provide guidance to trial courts and litigants. This court should give guidance to the committee, not seek guidance from it.
The majority proscribes use of BAJI No. 3.75, a standard jury instruction that defines proximate cause as “a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.” As I shall explain, proximate cause includes two elements: an element of physical or logical causation, known as cause in fact, and a more normative or evaluative element, which the term “proximate” imperfectly conveys. The majority concedes that the concept of proximate cause includes *1057these two distinct elements, yet it limits its discussion of BAJI No. 3.75 to that instruction “as it relates to cause in fact.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1049, fn. 4.) Having found BAJI No. 3.75 fatally deficient, the majority suggests that another instruction, BAJI No. 3.76, provides a satisfactory alternative instruction on cause in fact. Yet the majority does not embrace this other instruction as an adequate expression of the second, more elusive element of proximate cause. Because BAJI No. 3.75 addresses both elements of proximate cause, the majority’s decision leaves a significant unanswered question: Is there now a standard jury instruction that trial courts can use to convey the second element?
Legal scholars have long struggled with the complexities and subtleties of proximate cause. (See e.g., Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25 Harv.L.Rev. 103; Prosser, Proximate Cause in California (1950) 38 Cal.L.Rev. 369.) But the problem of proximate cause—when and how to limit liability when cause and effect relationships logically continue to infinity—has remained intractable and the riddle of proximate cause has remained unsolved. (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 43, p. 300.) Although BAJI No. 3.75 is not a model of clarity, and a better instruction would certainly be most welcome, this court should not proscribe the use of BAJI No. 3.75 unless and until it proposes a better instruction that includes both elements of proximate cause, or at least provides meaningful guidance on the subject. Because the majority has done neither, I would not hold in this case that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with BAJI No. 3.75.
I
To understand the issue presented in this case, it is necessary to examine the concept of proximate cause and the manner in which BAJI No. 3.75 explains it to the jury.
An essential element of any cause of action for negligence is that the defendant’s act or omission was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury. (E.g., Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 41, at p. 263; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 965, p. 354.) To simply say, however, that the defendant’s act or omission must be a necessary antecedent of the plaintiff’s injury does not resolve the question of whether the defendant should be held liable. As Prosser and Keeton observed: “The consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would ‘set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.’ ” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 41, at p. 264, quoting North v. Johnson (1894) 58 Minn. 242 [59 N.W. 1012].)
*1058Accordingly, the law must impose limitations on liability other than simple causality. These additional limitations are related not only to the degree of connection between the act or omission and the injury, but also to “our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 41, at p. 264.) Thus, there are two basic elements of proximate cause: cause in fact and the limitations imposed by “our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands.” For the sake of clarity and convenience, I shall refer to the latter element as the social evaluative process.
BAJI No. 3.75, the instruction invalidated by the majority, addresses both elements of proximate cause. By stating that a proximate cause is one “without which the injury would not have occurred” (or, in other words, that the injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct), the instruction addresses the element of cause in fact. The term “natural and continuous sequence” and the word “proximate,” on the other hand, address the social evaluative process because they require the jury, after determining cause in fact, to reflect further on causation before finally deciding the issue of liability.
II
The majority disapproves BAJI No. 3.75 because it contains the word “proximate,” which connotes proximity in space or time. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1050.) The majority exaggerates the difficulties presented by the use of the word “proximate” and adopts a wholly inadequate solution. Although proximity in time or space is not relevant to cause in fact, it is frequently an appropriate consideration in determining the second element of proximate cause, the social evaluative process. In the absence of an instruction that captures that element at least as well, use of BAJI No. 3.75 should not be forbidden.
The majority relies on a statement from Prosser and Keeton objecting to the term “proximate” as “an unfortunate word, which places an entirely wrong emphasis upon the factor of physical or mechanical closeness.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 42, at p. 273, italics added.) Yet by these words Prosser and Keeton do not assert that proximity in space and time is irrelevant to the ultimate determination of proximate cause, but only that it should not be unduly emphasized. This necessarily implies that temporal and spatial proximity does play some role in the determination of proximate cause.
Other authority supports the conclusion that temporal and spatial proximity is frequently an appropriate consideration in determining the social *1059evaluative process element of proximate cause. As a Court of Appeal recently remarked, “The time span between any alleged misconduct and the harm is among the factors to be considered in determining the existence of proximate cause.” (Weissich v. County of Marin (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1083 [274 Cal.Rptr. 342]; see also Duffy v. City of Oceanside (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 666, 674 [224 Cal.Rptr. 879]; Rest.2d Torts, § 433, com. f.) The same is true of proximity in space. Foreseeability of injury, which is a concept that includes spatial nearness or remoteness, may be relevant to the trier of fact’s decision whether defendant’s act “was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572-573, fn. 6 [224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624].) Indeed, a case the majority cites recognizes the potential relevance of temporal and spatial proximity. In Osborn v. City of Whittier (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 609, 616 [230 P.2d 132], the court said that “[p]roximity in point of time or space . . . is of no importance except as it may afford evidence for or against proximity of causation.” (Italics added.)
The majority directs its remaining criticism of BAJI No. 3.75 to the statement in the instruction that “a proximate cause is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury . . . .” (Italics added.) Quoting from a psycholinguistic study, the majority characterizes the instruction as befuddling because the term “natural and continuous sequence” precedes the verb it modifies, thus creating the impression that the cause itself is in a “natural and continuous sequence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1051.) But this perceived problem with the placement of the language could be readily corrected by simply rearranging the sentence to read: “a proximate cause of the injury is a cause without which the injury would not have occurred and which produces the injury in natural and continuous sequence.”
There is no immediate need to proscribe use of BAJI No. 3.75. Trial courts have been instructing juries in its language since 1969 (BAJI No. 3.75 (6th ed. 1977); BAJI No. 3.75 (5th ed. 1969)), and, as the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1050, fn. 5), it is almost identical to the standard instruction used since 1943. (BAJI No. 104 (4th ed. 1943).) The courts of this state have long considered it a correct statement of the law. (Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 331, 347 [160 Cal.Rptr. 246].) Despite its flaws, BAJI No. 3.75 ought to be retained as an acceptable instruction in the absence of a proposed superior instruction.
The majority asserts that disapproval of BAJI No. 3.75 is justified because “[ijssues that are properly referred to as questions of proximate or legal cause are contained in other instructions. (See e.g., BAJI No. 3.79 [superseding causes].)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1044, fn. 2.) But a review of the *1060relevant instructions (BAJI Nos. 3.77, 3.78, 3.79, and 3.80) shows that each addresses a specialized situation.1 None attempts a general definition of the social evaluative process element of proximate cause, and thus none will fill the void resulting from the proscribing of BAJI No. 3.75.
Ill
The majority favors the “substantial factor” instruction, BAJI No. 3.76, over the “but for” instruction, BAJI No. 3.75, as a definition of cause in fact. But the majority makes no claim that BAJI No. 3.76 adequately addresses the social evaluative process element, the most critical and elusive aspect of proximate cause.
BAJI No. 3.76 states that “[a] legal cause of injury is a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” The word “substantial” refers only to whether the defendant’s act was more than a minimal element in the plaintiff’s injury. (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 41, at p. 267; see also Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, supra, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 369, 378-382.) Thus, BAJI No. 3.76 is essentially a cause-in-fact instruction. Because it requires only a single determination by the jury (whether the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in producing the plaintiff’s injury), BAJI No. 3.76 does not reflect as clearly as does BAJI No. 3.75 the two separate and distinct elements of proximate cause.
When the “substantial factor” test of BAJI No. 3.76 is used as a means of setting limits on liability, it is no better than the “but for” test of BAJI No. 3.75, the instruction invalidated by the majority, and it is just as problematic as the word “proximate” in BAJI No. 3.75. As Prosser and Keeton observed: “A number of courts have [used substantial factor as a test of proximate cause, not just cause in fact], apparently accepting the phrase as the answer to all prayers and some sort of universal solvent. As applied to the fact of causation alone, the test though not ideal, may be thought useful. But when the ‘substantial factor’ is made to include all the ill-defined considerations of policy which go to limit liability once causation in fact is found, it has no more definite meaning than ‘proximate cause,’ and it becomes a hindrance rather than a help.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 42, at p. 278.)
*1061Because its language is neither as clear nor as helpful as it superficially appears, the “substantial factor” (BAJI No. 3.76) instruction is no better than the “but for” instruction (BAJI No. 3.75). As Prosser and Keeton explained: “Even if ‘substantial factor’ seemed sufficiently intelligible as a guide in time past, however, the development of several quite distinct and conflicting meanings for the term ‘substantial factor’ has created risk of confusion and misunderstanding, especially when a court, or an Advocate or scholar, uses the phrase without explicit indication of which of its conflicting meanings is intended.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, (5th ed., 1988 supp.) § 41, p. 43.) For instance, the term “substantial factor” may impose an additional barrier to liability when used to focus on the respective degrees of the contribution of different causes of any injury. It may also be used to focus the inquiry on an actor’s motive or purpose in the sense of attempting to provide a means of distinguishing permissible and impermissible motives. And it may be confused with the separate requirement that the plaintiff prove the elements of the case by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 43-45.)
Thus, the majority fails to recognize that BAJI No. 3.76 is no better than BAJI No. 3.75 as a comprehensive proximate cause instruction.
IV
By delegating to the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions2 the responsibility for defining proximate cause, the court neglects its duty, as the highest court in this state, to provide guidance to the state’s trial courts.
It is easy, as the majority has done, to find fault with existing formulations of proximate cause. It is quite another matter, however, to actually address and resolve the subtle and complex issues presented by the concept of proximate cause. The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions will necessarily be in the same situation as are trial judges: “The trial judge is in the dilemma that a failure to instruct at all on proximate cause is very likely to be error, while any instruction he [or she] gives runs the risk of being so complicated and vulnerable to attack in its ideas or language that it invites *1062appeal.” (Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, supra, 38 Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 423-424.)
Unless and until this court is prepared to offer a better alternative or provide meaningful guidance on both elements of proximate cause, I would not invalidate BAJI No. 3.75. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury in the terms of BAJI No. 3.75.
BAJI No. 3.77 states that there may be concurrent causes. BAJI No. 3.78 says that a defendant is not relieved of liability when there are two independent causes. BAJI No. 3.79 explains that a defendant is not relieved of liability by the negligence of a third party if the defendant should have realized that the third party might act as it did, or a reasonable person would not have regarded the third party’s acts as highly extraordinary, or the conduct of the third party was not extraordinarily negligent and was a normal consequence of the situation created by the defendant. BAJI No. 3.80 addresses the situation when all of the defendants were negligent but the plaintiff cannot prove causation.
The committee’s full name is The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. Formed in 1938, the committee includes among its members attorneys as well as superior court judges. The committee has performed invaluable service by drafting standard or pattern jury instructions, based primarily on published appellate decisions, for use in civil jury trials. Although no statute mandates the use of the instructions, the Judicial Council has recommended their use, when applicable, “unless [the trial judge] finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law.” (Cal. Standards Jud. Admin., § 5.) The Judicial Council has cautioned that trial judges should give jury instructions proposed by the parties’ attorneys “no less consideration” than the committee’s standard instructions. (Ibid.)