Dissenting.—I agree with Justice Mosk that defendant’s trial was fraught with error and is incapable of supporting the judgments on either guilt or penalty. I write separately, however, to emphasize the prejudicial nature of two errors—one at the guilt phase and one at the penalty phase—that prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial.
I.
Defendant’s entire defense rested on the theory that Barrett, not he, had killed the victim. The testimony of Barrett and of her sister Eckstrom that defendant, rather than either of them, had committed the murder was perhaps the most significant testimony that was presented in support of the prosecution’s case. In return for their testimony, the sisters were both offered immunity from prosecution for crimes associated with the victim’s murder. Defendant contends that, in light of the conditions under which the sisters were granted immunity, their testimony should not have been admitted at trial and that the erroneous admission of the testimony was prejudicial.
The governing legal principles are well established by our past cases. As we explained in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 768-769 [254 *238Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]: “A prosecutor may grant immunity to one jointly charged with a crime upon the condition that he or she testify fully and fairly as to the facts involved. (People v. Green (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 831, 838-839 [228 P.2d 867].) When the grant of immunity places the witness under strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion, however, the testimony is tainted by the witness’s self-interest and is inadmissible. (People v. Medina [(1974)] 41 Cal.App.3d [438,] 455 [116 Cal.Rptr. 133].) . . . [fl] . . . ‘What is improper ... is not that what is expected from the informant’s testimony . . . will be favorable to the People’s case, but that the testimony must be confined to a predetermined formulation or rendered acceptable only if it produces a given result, that is to say a conviction.’ [Citation.]”
Defendant’s case relied entirely on his and others’ assertions that Barrett killed the victim. The agreements entered into by Barrett and Eckstrom were expressly conditioned upon the truth of the representation of each of the sisters “that she did not personally inflict any injuries upon [the victim].” The agreements also provided that each of the women would testify “completely and truthfully at all proceedings including preliminary examination and trial concerning all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing [of the victim].” In return for offering this testimony, “the prosecutor [agreed to] move to dismiss all charges pending against Avette Barrett with the exception of [felony auto theft]”; Eckstrom was not even subject to prosecution for auto theft. Under these circumstances, it is beyond question that the initial condition in the immunity agreements was improper.
The agreements were signed the day the preliminary examinations began, January 21, 1986. Though not mentioned in the majority opinion, both Barrett and Eckstrom testified under oath at the preliminary examination. Upon taking the stand both Barrett and Eckstrom were reminded by the court of their obligations under the immunity agreements; at one point after Barrett paused in response to several questions incriminating defendant, the court took a five-minute recess during which time the judge suggested to the prosecutor, “maybe you’ll want to go over the terms of that [immunity] agreement with her.” Thus both Barrett and Eckstrom were well aware of the terms and conditions of their respective immunity agreements. Both sisters testified at the preliminary examination that defendant, and not they, had killed the victim.
On May 26, 1987—the 30th day of trial and shortly before Barrett was called to testify—the prosecutor amended Barrett’s immunity agreement: “Amendment to plea agreement on 5-26-87. I, Gary Rossi, Special Prosecutor for Sierra County, agree to amend the plea agreement dated 1-21-86 to strike condition number one [regarding the representation that *239Barrett did not physically injure victim]. This was done to guarantee [defendant] a fair trial.” The special prosecutor recognized that the immunity agreement of January 1986 was improper and threatened to compromise defendant’s access to a fair trial.
The majority hold that the special prosecutor’s amendment of the immunity agreement was sufficient to cure any potential error in the agreement: “Barrett’s testimony was admissible because the only condition remaining at the time of trial was that she testify completely and truthfully.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 191.) Because “corroborating circumstances” existed, largely in the form of Barrett’s testimony, they further hold that the admission of Eckstrom’s testimony was not prejudicial despite the fact that the original condition of the immunity agreement was never removed. (Id. at pp. 191-192.) The majority are wrong. Neither of the sisters’ testimony should have been admitted.
Barrett testified extensively and articulately during the preliminary examination: she claimed that she and Eckstrom had encouraged defendant to “knock out” the victim so that they could steal his van, testified at length about the circumstances leading up to the victim’s murder, and described in graphic detail the incidents of the murder, e.g., that the sound of defendant hitting the victim was “like him hitting . . . like a watermelon, a cantaloupe.” Eckstrom’s testimony was similar.
The majority assert that because no unacceptable restrictions remained on Barrett when she testified at trial, she was therefore able to testify freely, and that such testimony would not be tainted by the original immunity agreement in place at the time of her preliminary examination testimony. This assertion is insupportable. In purporting to release Barrett from the unacceptable initial condition of her immunity agreement, the special prosecutor did not offer Barrett immunity from prosecution for perjury should her testimony at trial differ materially from that offered at the preliminary examination. Neither did the special prosecutor offer to amend the condition of Barrett’s immunity agreement that required her to testify completely and truthfully at the preliminary examination as well as at trial.
The import of the special prosecutor’s failure to take these corrective actions is obvious. In reality, Barrett was not free to testify truthfully at trial but was only free to testify in a manner consistent with her preliminary examination testimony, which was clearly tainted by the invalid initial condition. If her trial testimony conflicted with her preliminary examination testimony, Barrett would have been liable for prosecution for perjuring herself with respect to at least one of the proceedings. Furthermore, and most significantly, if her trial testimony conflicted with her preliminary *240examination testimony, Barrett would also have been liable for prosecution for the victim’s murder since, even after the midtrial amendment, the immunity agreement continued to be conditioned upon Barrett’s promise to testify completely and truthfully at both the preliminary examination and trial. If she had testified inconsistently at trial, the prosecutor could clearly revoke the immunity agreement on the ground that she had failed to testify truthfully at either the preliminary hearing or the trial.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the prosecutor’s belated amendment of the immunity agreement did not cure the agreement of its impermissibly coercive feature and, despite the revision, Barrett was placed under “such a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion as to deny defendant a fair trial.” (People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1255 [232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].)
Nor can I agree with the majority’s argument that Eckstrom’s testimony was not prejudicial. The immunity agreement entered into by Eckstrom prior to the preliminary examination remained in force throughout the trial. In view of my conclusion that Barrett’s testimony should have been excluded from evidence, I cannot join in the majority’s assertion that the admission of Eckstrom’s testimony did not deny the defendant a fair trial. Indeed, as Eckstrom was the only witness to the murder other than defendant, and as her testimony flatly rejected defendant’s version of the facts, I conclude that there were insufficient “corroborating circumstances” supporting Eckstrom’s testimony to render its admission into evidence harmless.
It is beyond my comprehension that the majority can so blithely conclude that there was no error as to Barrett and no prejudice as to Eckstrom without a full disclosure of these facts and with virtually no analysis of the substantial legal issues presented by the immunity agreements. As the majority opinion demonstrates, the law in this area is reasonably well settled. Yet a summary examination of this record discloses facts that cannot be easily squared with the majority’s discussion of the law. After carefully weighing those facts, I conclude that the immunity agreements entered into by both Barrett and Eckstrom were improper and that the effect of the agreements was prejudicial.
II.
On July 15, 1987, the jury retired to consider the evidence presented during the penalty phase of defendant’s trial. The jury received, in writing, special instruction No. 60, which read in pertinent part: “If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt *241and return a verdict fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of parole.” (Italics added.) As the majority acknowledge, this was error. Life with parole was not available to defendant.
After nearly six hours of deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the court. The first asked: “In the event this jury cannot decide 100 % on the penalty phase of this case what would be the sentance [szc] imposed?” The second asked that the court “[p]lease explain the. noted page of instructions.” The noted page referred to special instruction No. 60, with its erroneous reference to life with parole.
These facts indicate that the jurors in this case foresaw a possible deadlock and were concerned about the consequences of such a deadlock. Indeed, at the time the jury submitted its questions to the jury, the jurors were split, 10 to 2, on the appropriate penalty to impose upon defendant. The jury was evidently unaware that a deadlock would lead to a retrial of the penalty phase before another jury, and may have believed that the law prescribed a specific sentence to be imposed by the court in lieu of a jury determination. Further, the jury was apparently also confused as to the alternative sentences available to it, since it asked for an explanation of special instruction No. 60.
The court’s responses to the jury’s questions did nothing to dispel the jury’s misconceptions. To the first, it properly responded that “[t]he statutes provide for what happens in the event that you folks aren’t able to reach a decision, but I can’t tell you what that is at this point in time.” Yet as to the mistyped instruction informing the jury that under certain conditions it must return a verdict fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of parole, the court did not respond properly; it neither discovered nor corrected the error. Instead, the court told the jury that “the instruction itself is self-explanatory. And we hope with that in mind, that you might be able to reach a decision.”
The majority concede that the instruction was erroneous. The opinion concludes, however, that the mistyped instruction can be dismissed as a harmless typographical error, since the jury must have realized from other instructions and numerous comments during the trial that there were only two possible penalties, death and life without parole, that the jury should consider.
The majority misapply the harmless error test. In reviewing the penalty phase in a death penalty case, the harmless error standard requires that we inquire into “whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ [that the] error affected a verdict.” (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447 [250 *242Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) In determining whether a juror has based his vote on improper considerations, we must inquire in all cases into “whether the instructions tend to impose such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict that we are uncertain of the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated conclusion. This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.” (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 97 A.L.R.3d 73], citation omitted.) I believe that, absent the instructional error, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would not have arrived at a unanimous opinion.
Incredibly, the majority assert that the jury was not confused by special instruction No. 60: “[A]n examination of the entire record reveals that the jury was fully cognizant that there were only two available sentencing options—death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole—and that its solemn responsibility was to choose between them.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 229, italics in original.) But the jury obviously was confused about the special instruction’s reference to life with the possibility of parole since it specifically brought special instruction No. 60 to the court’s attention for further explanation. The jury’s confusion about the special instruction was not dispelled by the court. Instead, by stating that the instruction was “self-explanatory,” the court assured the jury that the special instruction No. 60 was correct.
A fundamental assumption that underlies our entire judicial system is that the jurors follow the court’s instructions. (See Delli Paoli v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 232, 242 [1 L.Ed.2d 278, 285-286, 77 S.Ct. 294], overruled on other grounds in Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 699 [250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) Particularly when the jury has specifically focused upon an erroneous instruction, it is improper simply to assume, as the majority opinion does, that the jury was not affected by the error. Indeed, when the court proceeds to affirm an erroneous instruction, even though the jury brings the instruction to the court’s attention, we must recognize the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—that the jury concluded that it had a duty to accept the instruction as it was written and reject any conflicting views.
In this case, the import of special instruction No. 60, as it was submitted to the jury, was ambiguous. Yet it was prejudicial however the instruction was interpreted. Individual jurors who were in doubt about the penalty to *243impose—death or life without parole—may have been led into voting for death on the belief that if they adhered to their doubt, the law required them to vote for life with the possibility of parole. Alternatively, the instruction could have been interpreted to mean that if “doubt” existed because the jurors could not unanimously agree on a verdict—i.e., if the jury deadlocked—then the jury as a whole was required to return a verdict of life with the possibility of parole. Thus the jury would be effectively coerced into unanimity if the dissenting jurors could not countenance allowing defendant the prospect of parole. However illogical either interpretation may appear to persons who are familiar with the workings of the law, either is a plausible interpretation of the instruction that the court submitted to the jury and, upon the jury’s inquiry, directed that the jury follow.
Furthermore, the majority fail to see the potential connection between the erroneous instruction and the jury’s simultaneous inquiry with regard to the consequences of a jury deadlock. The jury did not need to interpret the special instruction literally in order to prejudice defendant. As noted, the jurors were obviously concerned about the effect of a deadlock on defendant’s future; one or more jurors may have feared, in light of the erroneous instruction, that if the jury was unable to arrive at a unanimous decision the court might be required, by the unspecified statute to which the court referred, to sentence defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In my view, this is a plausible, perhaps even a likely, explanation of why the jury asked what sentence would be imposed in the event of a deadlock and for an explanation of special instruction No. 60.
The test for harmless error at the penalty phase of a death penalty case precludes us from affirming a death penalty whenever there is a reasonable possibility that an error may have affected the jury’s verdict. In light of the literal meaning of special instruction No. 60 and the court’s statement that the instruction was self-explanatory, I conclude that a reasonable possibility exists that the mistyped instruction operated “to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency” (People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817 [69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353]) and improperly led one or more jurors to rule in favor of death as a result of a misunderstanding of the law.
I would reverse the judgment as to penalty.
III.
It is frequently observed that there is no such thing as a trial without error. In this case, however, the errors were egregious and their effect *244prejudicial. I must therefore dissent from the entirety of the majority’s opinion.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 22, 1991. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.